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the	 theory	 of	 “duration.”	 We	 call	 this	 Bergson’s	 Transcendental	 Dualism	 and	
present	a	study	of	the	materialist-phenomenological	interrelation	between	time	
and	 duration	 as	 the	 key	 towards	 reconstructing	 a	 unique	materialist	dialectic	
that	 is	neither	naïvely	positivistic	nor	nihilistic	 in	nature.	Our	argument	 is	 that	
this	 dualism	 of	 intuition	 sits	 at	 the	 core	 of	 Bergson’s	 philosophy	 and	 it	
accomplishes	 a	 reversal	 of	 idealism	 that	 makes	 possible	 both	 the	
critique/negation	 of	 the	 historical	 constitution	 of	 finite	 human	 subjectivity	 as	





contradistinction	 to	 that	 of	 time,	 it	 is	 our	 view	 that	 the	 theory	 of	 duration	
corresponds	 to	Bergson’s	non-metaphysical	way	of	apprehending	 the	Absolute	
Self,	 not	 in	 terms	 of	 a	 belief	 in	 the	 supra-sensible	 Idea	 but	 as	 the	 pure,	















30/120)	 refers	 to	page	30	of	Time	and	Free	Will	 in	 the	English	 edition	 and	page	
120	of	the	Œuvres.		
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We	will	 be	 following	 the	 traditional	 way	 of	 referencing	 individual	 dialogues	 by	






























This	 thesis	 proposes	 to	 extract	 a	 unique	materialist	 dialectical	 logic	 from	 Henri	
Bergson’s	 method	 of	 philosophy,	 known	 as	 the	 method	 of	 intuition.	 In	 lieu	 of	
introduction,	 let	 us	 begin	 with	 the	 general	 question	 as	 to	 why	 Bergson’s	
philosophy	 still	 matters	 for	 us	 today	 and	 what	 benefit	 we	 can	 expect	 from	
examining	his	thought	in	terms	of	the	problem	of	dialectical	logic.	After	all,	 is	not	
Bergson’s	philosophy	a	thing	of	the	past	due	to	its	generally	recognised	“apolitical”	
nature?	 Even	 if	 one	 admits	 that	 his	 thought	 has	 an	 important	 place	 within	 the	
general	 history	 of	 Western	 philosophy,	 has	 it	 not	 received	 this	 honorary	 place	
precisely	 because	 it	 is	 recognized	 as	 an	 anti-dialectical	 philosophy	 and	 is	 it	 not	
precisely	because	of	such	a	characteristic	that	his	philosophy	has	become	a	passé?	
Henri	 Bergson	 was	 undoubtedly	 one	 of	 the	 most	 visible	 figures	 in	
philosophy	not	only	in	France	but	also	worldwide	at	the	beginning	of	the	twentieth	
century.	 Besides	 the	 fact	 that	 he	 was	 one	 of	 the	 very	 few	 philosophers	 that	
received	 the	 Nobel	 Prize,	 his	 public	 lectures	 at	 the	 Collège	 de	 France	 attracted	
tremendous	 interest	 from	 the	 audience	 and	 his	 success	 at	 some	 point	 is	 said	 to	
have	 reached	 a	 height	 of	 “cult-like”	 zeal.2	However,	 he	 quickly	 fell	 from	 public	
prominence	 after	 the	 First	 World	War	 and	 was	 largely	 replaced	 by	 a	 strand	 of	
thought	influenced	by	Alexandre	Kojève’s	reintroduction	of	Hegel	to	France	in	the	





2	Lawlor,	 L.	 &	 Moulard,	 V.,	 ([2004]	 2016).	 “Henri	 Bergson.”	 Stanford	 Encyclopedia	 of	





synonymous	 with	 the	 burden	 of	 “vitalist	 idealism”	 and	 “spiritualism”	 that	
relegated	him	on	the	bad	side	of	historiography	within	the	context	of	leftist	politics.	
After	the	end	of	the	Second	World	War,	for	such	figures	as	Maurice	Merleau-Ponty,	
Jean-Paul	 Sartre,	 Max	 Horkheimer,	 and	 Walter	 Benjamin,	 the	 denouncing	 of	
Bergsonism	became	a	gesture	equivalent	to	showing	an	allegiance	to	Marxism.4			
What	benefit,	 then,	 can	we	expect	 from	delving	 into	Bergson’s	philosophy	
today?	Why	examine	this	figure	that	seemingly	has	no	use	for	us	anymore?	Let	us	
turn	 to	 the	 subject	matter	 of	 dialectical	 logic,	 since	 it	 is	 through	 examining	 this	
problematic	 that	our	rationale	 for	delving	 into	Bergson	first	comes	to	 light.	Alain	
Badiou,	who	is	one	of	the	longstanding	critics	of	Bergson’s	philosophy,	states:		
		





Dialectical	 logic,	 according	 to	Badiou,	 is	 that	which	 comes	before	 politics	 and	 its	
import	for	politics	lies	in	this	characteristic	of	being	its	prior	condition.	That	is,	as	
Hegel	states	in	the	Science	of	Logic,	what	an	examination	of	dialectical	logic	has	as	
its	 subject	matter	 is	 the	 question	 of	 the	 “beginning	 of	 everything”	 [Anfang	 aller	
Dinge]. 6 	The	 word	 “beginning”,	 which	 appears	 alongside	 the	 concept	 of	
Logic/Logos,	is	here	to	be	understood	as	the	origin,	or	the	Greek	arche,	as	it	is	used	
in	 the	 first	sentence	of	 the	Gospel	of	John:	 “[In]	 the	beginning	was	 the	Word”	 [Ἐν		




particular	 practical	 actions	 we	 can	 undertake,	 a	 philosophical	 examination	 of	
																																																								
4	See	 John	 Heckman’s	 introduction	 to	 Jean	 Hyppolite’s	 Genesis	 and	 Structure	 of	 Hegel’s	
Phenomenology	of	Spirit.	Heckman,	J.,	(1974).	Introduction.	In	Hyppolite,	J.,	([1946]	1974).	
Genesis	and	Structure	of	Hegel’s	Phenomenology	of	 Spirit.	Trans,	 S.	 Cherniak,	 J.	 Heckman.	
Evanston:	Northwestern	Univ.	Press.	p.xix.	 “For	most	of	 those	who	became	 interested	 in	
phenomenology	(with	the	notable	exception	of	Hyppolite),	the	question	of	breaking	from	
Bergson	was	important,	since	it	represented	a	break	from	idealism.”	
5	Badiou,	 A.,	 (2013).	 “Affirmative	 Dialectics:	 from	 Logic	 to	 Anthropology.”	 International	
Journal	of	Badiou	Studies.	Vol.2,	No	1.	p.1.	




dialectical	 logic	 addresses	 upon	what	 presupposition,	 or	 upon	what	 foundation,	
our	politics	can	be	based	in	the	first	place.			
	 Of	course,	just	as	the	realm	of	politics	is	a	continuous	striving	towards	novel	
developments,	 philosophy’s	 effort	 to	 grasp	 the	 beginning	 as	 such	 itself	 also	




can	 be	 better	 articulated	 or	 even	 be	 improved	 for	 the	 benefit	 of	 our	 future	






My	 dialectical	 method	 is,	 in	 its	 foundation,	 not	 only	 different	 from	 the	
Hegelian,	 but	 exactly	 opposite	 to	 it.	 For	 Hegel,	 the	 process	 of	 thinking,	
which	he	even	transforms	into	an	independent	subject,	under	the	name	of	
the	 ‘Idea’,	 is	 the	 creator	 of	 the	 real	world,	 and	 the	 real	world	 is	 only	 the	
external	appearance	[Erscheinung]	of	the	idea.	With	me,	reverse	is	true:	the	
ideal	 is	 nothing	but	 the	material	world	 reflected	 in	 the	mind	of	man,	 and	
translated	into	forms	of	thought.9		
	
As	 “opposed”	 to	 the	 Hegelian	 dialectic,	 Marx	 famously	 states	 that	 his	 dialectical	
logic	regards	“the	Material”	rather	than	“the	Ideal”	 to	be	the	Demiurge/creator	of	
the	 Real	 [Demiurg	 des	 Wirklichen].	 But	 what	 have	 we	 gained	 from	 such	 a	
materialist	reversal	and	what	exactly	does	it	mean	to	have	this	materialist	dialectic	
as	the	foundation	of	politics?		
To	 be	 sure,	 Marx’s	 materialist	 reversal	 of	 dialectic	 has	 left	 us	 with	 a	
profound	paradox	 internal	 to	philosophy.	 In	putting	 itself	 forth	as	 a	new	kind	of	
dialectical	 logic,	 and	 hence	 constituting	 itself	 as	 a	 philosophical	 theory	 of	 the	
beginning	 in	 its	 own	 right,	 materialist	 dialectic	 nonetheless	 seems	 to	 deny	




9	Marx,	 K.,	 ([1976]	 1990).	 “Postface	 to	 the	 Second	 Edition.”	 In	 Capital.	 Vol.	 1.	Trans.	 B.	
Fowkes.	London:	Penguin	Books.	p.102.		
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retain	 the	 semblance	 of	 independence.	 They	 have	 no	 history,	 no	
development;	 but	 men,	 developing	 their	 material	 production	 and	 their	
material	 intercourse,	 alter,	 along	 with	 this	 their	 real	 existence,	 their	
thinking	 and	 the	 products	 of	 their	 thinking.	 Life	 is	 not	 determined	 by	
consciousness,	but	consciousness	by	life.10		
	
Life	 is	not	determined	by	consciousness,	but	consciousness	by	Life:	 this	means	 that	
what	philosophy	once	strived	to	lay	claim	upon	–	that	is,	Logic	as	the	foundation	of	
everything	 –	 is	 now	 seen	 as	 a	mere	 secondary	 result	 of	 Life	 –	 a	 Life	 that	which	
exists	outside	philosophy.	The	 real	 foundation	 is	now	designated	 in	 terms	of	 the	
material	 Life-process;	 what	 the	 logic	 now	 designates	 as	 the	 foundation	 is	
something	that	exists	outside	of	philosophy.		
	 Let	us	ask	again:	what	have	we	gained	from	this	reversal?	We	know	that	the	
materialist	 dialectic	 has	 been	 widely	 accepted	 within	 the	 disciplines	 of	 political	
economy,	 history,	 sociology,	 anthropology,	 geography,	 literary	 criticism,	 cultural	
studies,	media	studies,	art	and	art	criticism,	largely	through	providing	the	former	
fields	with	the	general	framework	of	criticizing	various	forms	of	knowledge	as	the	
product	 of	 ideological	 consciousness.11	Accordingly,	 the	 implication	 is	 that	 since	






theorists’	 takes	 (such	 as	 Derrida’s	 “deconstruction”,	 Foucault’s	 “genealogy”,	 etc.)	 and	 it	
does	 not	 mean	 exactly	 the	 same	 thing	 since	 each	 philosopher	 constructs	 his	 own	






expressed	 as	 the	 capacity	 to	 observe	 ourselves	and	 to	 be	 aware	 of	 the	 real	 and	
irreducible	existence	of	ideologies	within	our	consciousness	so	that	we	can	protect	
ourselves	 from	 being	 deceived	 into	 believing	 in	 the	 independence	 of	 our	
consciousness.	Philosophy’s	 function	 is	 thus	 circumscribed	 to	protecting	us	 from	
being	passive	contributors	to	the	reproduction	of	ideologies.	
	 However,	if	Life	is	to	be	seen	as	the	true	foundation	and	if	we	are	to	regard	
it	 as	 that	 which	 exists	 outside	 of	 philosophy,	 what	 does	 this	 mean	 for	 our	
consciousness?	The	consequence	of	accepting	the	materialist	dialectic	would	seem	




thus	 necessarily	 becomes	 an	 activity	 of	 thought	 that	 summons	 the	 “phantoms	
formed	 in	 the	 human	 brain”	 and,	 as	 such,	 even	 when	 it	 strives	 to	 grasp	 the	
foundation	of	 everything,	 it	 can	only	do	 so	 through	 thinking	 as	 a	means.	Yet	 the	
new	materialist	logic	has	already	established	for	us	that	thinking	is	alienated	from	
Life	and	that	our	thought	does	not	have	the	capacity	to	stand	on	its	own	and	get	in	













time,	 the	 only	 truth	 of	 History	 and	 a	 total	 indetermination	 of	 the	 Truth.	 The	
totalising	thought	of	historical	materialism	has	established	everything	except	for	
its	own	existence	 […]	we	do	not	know	what	 it	means	 for	a	Marxist	historian	 to	
speak	the	truth.	Not	 that	 his	 statements	 are	 false	 –	 far	 from	 it;	 but	 he	 does	 not	
have	the	concept	of	Truth	at	his	disposal.	In	this	way,	Marxism	presents	itself	to	
us,	 as	 ideologists,	 as	 an	 unveiling	 of	 being,	 and	 at	 the	 same	 time	 as	 an	
unanswered	question	as	to	the	validity	of	this	unveiling.	
Sartre,	 J.-P.,	 ([1960]	 	2004).	Critique	of	Dialectical	Reason.	Trans.	A.	Sheridan-Smith.	New	
York:	Verso.	p.19.	
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the	clouds	of	 ideological	consciousness	and	obtain	 the	knowledge	of	 the	Real	via	
thinking?	 Indeed,	 Marx	 was	 the	 thinker	 that	 based	 his	 own	 philosophy	 upon	 a	
criticism	of	 the	Hegelian	 “pantheistic	mysticism.”13	Yet,	 if	Marxism	professes	 that	
Life	 is	something	 that	 is	 located	outside	of	philosophical	consciousness,	does	not	
Marxism	rather	come	to	be	a	repetition	of	what	it	criticised	in	the	first	place?			
This	 is	 an	 urgent	 question	 that	 concerns	 the	 condition	 of	 possibility	 for	
human	 freedom.	 If	 we	 fail	 to	 provide	 a	 sufficient	 answer	 to	 the	 above	 question	
internal	 to	 philosophy,	 it	 is	 our	 politics	 or	 the	 sphere	 of	 all	 practical	 action	 that	
must	necessarily	suffer	in	consequence.	The	paradox	of	materialist	dialectic	is	that,	
in	 destroying	 the	 possibility	 of	 thought	 to	 grasp	 within	 itself	 the	 beginning	 of	
everything,	it	nonetheless	constitutes	itself	as	a	new	philosophical	doctrine	of	the	
beginning.	This	means	that	the	materialist	reversal	of	dialectic	does	not	necessarily	
allow	 us	 to	 flee	 from	 ideological	 philosophy	 once	 and	 for	 all	 and	 to	 engage	 in	 a	









do	 is	 to	 ask	 in	 turn:	 on	what	 ground?	On	 what	 ground	 has	 philosophy	 become	
nothing?	 It	 can	 only	 be	 that	 it	 is	 upon	 another	 philosophical	 ground	 that	
philosophy	is	proclaimed	as	nothing.	 It	 is	not,	 therefore,	anti-philosophy	that	has	
killed	philosophy.	Rather,	philosophy	has	killed	 itself	 –	 it	has	made	 the	choice	 to	
see	 itself	 as	 powerless	 in	 front	 of	 Life.	 Put	 simply,	 our	 problem	 today	 is	 the	
groundlessness	as	the	ground,	or	the	lack	of	foundation	serving	as	the	foundation	
beneath	 our	 feet.	 According	 to	 the	 materialist	 dialectic,	 we	 stand	 upon	 the	









the	 supra-sensuous	 unknowable	 Idea.	 Marx	 states	 that	 “[in]	 direct	 contrast	 to	





itself,	 cannot	 protect	 itself	 from	 degenerating	 into	 relativism	 or	 nihilism.	 Either	
way,	our	politics	is	destined	to	be	a	mere	farce.		In	other	words,	we	could	say,	with	
Heidegger,	 that	 what	 the	 materialist	 reversal	 produces	 is	 a	 “fulfilment”	
[Vollendung]	 of	metaphysics,	 or	 that	 the	 reversal	 of	 Idealism	 ends	 up	 producing	
another	 kind	 of	 Idealist	 Metaphysics	 despite	 of	 its	 promise	 to	 do	 the	 very	
opposite.15		The	absence	of	true	Life	or	the	unavailability	of	the	Absolute	Truth	to	
philosophy	is	thus	not	the	novelty	of	the	materialist	reversal	but	a	mere	repetition	
of	 the	 history	 of	 Western	 Metaphysics.	 And	 if	 materialism	 does	 not	 succeed	 in	
going	 beyond	 Idealist	 Metaphysics,	 Life	 becomes	 a	 mere	 object	 of	 belief	 and	
materialism	another	form	of	Theology,	which	is	just	another	name	of	nihilism.16		
What	 happens	 to	 our	 Life?	 What	 happens	 to	 us	 as	 Life?	 Does	 not	
philosophy’s	powerlessness	in	front	of	Life	mean	that	we	are	powerless	in	front	of	
ourselves	as	Life?	If	this	is	the	case,	our	labour	in	life	is	fruitless	labour.	What	can	
save	 us	 from	 this	 state	 of	 hopelessness	 except	 for	 abandoning	 the	 fundamental	
care	for	Life?	We	criticize	philosophy	for	being	derivative	and	blind,	but	we	cannot	
find	 the	way	 to	 rid	 ourselves	 from	 this	 perilous	 situation	 since	 this	 is	what	 our	
philosophy	in	fact	tells	us:	lifelessness	is	our	life.	We	do	not	live	but	we	are	made	to	
live	 by	 Life.	 The	 real	 question	 thus	 becomes:	 within	 such	 a	 situation	 how	 can	
politics	derive	its	strength	and	a	genuine	sense	of	purpose?	How	can	we	live	life	if	
we	 are	 convinced,	 before	 we	 even	 begin,	 that	 we	 are	 mere	 products	 of	 the	







16	Heidegger,	M.,	 ([1961]	 1987,	 1982).	Nietzsche	Vol.	 3	&	4.	Trans.	 D.F.	 Krell.	 New	 York:	
HarperCollins.	pp.205-210.			
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Overall,	 the	 fact	 that	 the	problem	of	 the	 absence	of	 true	beginning	besets	
philosophy	 ever	 since	Marx’s	materialist	 reversal	 indicates	 that	 our	 era	 has	 not	
overcome	the	most	fundamental	stumbling	block	pointed	out	by	the	initiator	of	the	




by	 questions	 that	 it	 cannot	 dismiss,	 because	 they	 are	 posed	 to	 it	 by	 the	
nature	 of	 reason	 itself,	 but	 it	 also	 cannot	 answer,	 because	 they	 surpass	
human	reason’s	every	ability.	Our	reason	falls	 into	this	perplexity	through	
no	 fault	 of	 its	 own	 […]	 for	 the	 principles	 that	 it	 employs	 go	 beyond	 the	
boundary	 of	 all	 experience	 and	 hence	 no	 longer	 acknowledge	 any	





[Grundsätze]	 that	 it	 employs	 goes	 beyond	 the	 boundary	 of	 all	 experience.	 Kant’s	
Copernican	 Revolution	 of	 modern	 philosophy	 is	 thus	 postulated	 upon	 an	
acknowledgement	 that	metaphysics	 as	 such	 is	 alienated	 from	 the	 true	 principle	
and	 is	 thus	destined	 to	 repeat	 the	war	between	despotic	dogmatism	and	 skeptic	
anarchy,	both	of	which	are	the	products	of	the	common	failure	of	finding	the	true	
beginning	 within	 itself.	 As	 long	 as	 material	 Life	 or	 the	 Demiurge	 of	 the	 real	 is	
considered	 to	 be	 withdrawn	 from	 philosophical	 consciousness,	 we	 remain	
confronted	 with	 the	 infinite	 opposition,	 or	 the	 endless	 conflicts,	 between	
metaphysics	 as	 either	 dogmatism	 or	 scepticism	 as	 Kant	 states.	 Within	 this	
configuration,	neither	of	them	possesses	the	capacity	to	establish	our	life	upon	the	
actual	knowledge	of	the	Good	and	there	can	be	no	objective	difference	between	the	










Levinas,	 E.,	 ([1961]	 1969).	 Totality	 and	 Infinity.	Trans.	 A.	 Lingus.	 Pittsburgh:	 Duquesne	
Univ.	Press.	p.21.		
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the	 above-mentioned	 problem	 of	 nihilism	 within	 philosophy.	 The	 fundamental	
question	that	motivates	our	project	is:	how	can	Bergson’s	philosophy	prepare	the	
ground	 for	 a	 genuine	 form	 of	 politics,	 or	 a	 genuine	 form	 of	 living	 after	 the	
materialist	 reversal	of	dialectic?	How	can	our	collective	existence	be	based	upon	
the	 genuine	 Good	and	 not	 merely	 upon	 the	 self-consciousness	 of	 our	 alienation	
from	 this	 very	 raison	d’être	of	 politics	 as	 such?	 If,	 as	Marx	 declared,	 “Life	 is	 not	
determined	by	consciousness,	but	consciousness	by	Life”,	how	can	we	live	our	life	
through	philosophy?	Our	inability	to	find	the	true	beginning	after	Marx’s	reversal	
of	 dialectic	 is	 equivalent	 to	 our	 inability	 to	make	 our	 own	 history	or	 to	 become	
active	subjects	able	to	exercise	their	power	to	determine	their	own	destiny	out	of	




Now,	 this	 lack	 of	 beginning	 in	 philosophy	 after	 the	materialist	 reversal	 is	
coupled	with	a	 complementary	 symptom	with	 regard	 to	 the	problem	of	 the	end.	
Since	philosophy	lacks	the	power	of	finding	the	beginning	within	itself,	it	also	lacks	






is	 not	 ‘true,’	 is	 false.”20	Nihilism	 thus	 refers	 to	 both	 the	 fundamental	 lack	 of	 the	
beginning	as	well	as	of	the	end	as	its	two	complementary	symptoms.	If	Marx	was	
the	 philosopher	 who	 pointed	 out	 the	 lack	 of	 the	 true	 beginning	 in	 philosophy	
through	the	reversal	of	the	material	and	the	ideal	via	the	self-proclaimed	reversal	
of	Platonism	and	the	abolishment	of	the	“true	world”,	Nietzsche	was	the	one	who	
stressed	 the	 lack	 of	 the	 true	 end	 and	 uncovered	 the	 fictitiousness	 of	 the	








convincing	 to	 us.	 As	 Arendt	 notes,	 Nietzsche’s	 famous	 statement	 “God	 is	 dead”	
refers	 to	 the	 death	 of	 “the	 traditional	 thought	 of	 God”	 that	 thinks	 of	 it	 as	 the	
bestower	 of	 world’s	 order	 residing	 in	 the	 supra-sensuous	 world.21	The	 death	 of	
God	thus	refers	to	the	death	of	the	belief	in	the	existence	of	the	end	of	the	world	in	
the	supra-sensuous	realm.		
Like	 Marx,	 Nietzsche	 presents	 us	 with	 the	 fundamental	 criticism	 of	 the	
Western	 metaphysical	 tradition	 that	 seeks	 the	 end	 of	 the	 world	 within	 the	
suprasensible	 realm	 of	 the	 Idea	 and	 instead	 interprets	 such	 ends	 as	 the	 by-
products	of	material	Life.	However,	having	 said	 this,	we	 cannot	be	 satisfied	with	
this	 criticism	 of	 the	 suprasensible	 end	 alone	 since	 an	 overcoming	 of	 nihilism	
requires	us	 to	 take	one	 step	 further.	That	 is,	nihilism	cannot	be	overcome	solely	
through	 pointing	 out	 that	 the	 traditionally	 conceived	 end	 is	 a	 false	 projection	
stemming	 from	 our	 illusory	 belief	 in	 the	 world	 beyond	 or	 behind	 the	 sensuous	
realm.	Although	it	 is	necessary,	 if	the	critique	of	the	nihility	of	the	supra-sensible	
end	 is	 left	by	 itself	and	seen	as	the	only	thing	that	philosophy	can	do	against	 the	
onslaught	of	 illusion,	 this	does	not	 liberate	us	 from	the	nihility	of	ends	 itself	and	
secretly	 results	 in	 reinforcing	 nihilism.	 Unless	 the	 criticism	 is	 coupled	 with	 an	
affirmation	of	the	true	end,	the	consciousness	of	the	falsity	of	the	end	turns	against	
itself	 and	 ends	 up	 idealizing	 the	 abstract	 lack	 of	 the	 end	 as	 the	 new	 end	 in	 the	
manner	 of	 the	 idealist	 teleology.	 Ironically,	 the	 critical	 reversal	 of	 Platonism	
accidentally	 results	 in	 constituting	 itself	 into	 a	 belief	 in	 Chaos/Non-Being	 as	 the	
hidden	concept	of	God.	As	Nietzsche	famously	says:	“The	true	world	is	gone:	which	
world	 is	 left?	The	 illusory	one	perhaps?	…	But	no!	we	got	rid	of	the	illusory	world	






















the	 greatest	 freedom!”24	Here,	 along	 with	 the	 critique	 of	 supra-sensuous	 ends,	
Nietzsche	posits	a	recovery	of	the	“innocence	of	becoming”	as	the	supreme	end	of	
the	critique.	In	other	words,	the	liberation	from	ends	is	the	means	towards	the	real	




That	 is,	 the	 very	meaning	 of	 speaking	 of	 and	 critiquing	 nihilism	 resides	 in	 one’s	
overcoming	 of	 it.	 Far	 from	 being	 satisfied	 with	 merely	 pointing	 out	 the	
fictitiousness	of	 all	 ends,	Nietzsche	also	 speaks	of	 the	difference	between	 “active	
nihilism”	 and	 “passive	nihilism.”25	The	 latter	 is	 the	 “decline	 and	 recession	 of	 the	
power	of	the	spirit”	and	the	former	is	said	to	be	“a	sign	of	increased	power	of	the	
spirit”.	The	criticism	of	nihilism	is	therefore	not	meant	to	be	a	mere	confirmation	
of	 the	 powerlessness	 of	 philosophy	 vis-à-vis	 externally	 given	 ends	 (passive	
nihilism).	 Rather,	 it	 is	 expected	 to	 function	 as	 the	 springboard	 towards	 the	 true	
end.	The	question	therefore	becomes:	what	persuades	us	to	turn	towards	the	true	
end?	With	what	procedure	 can	we	 shake	off	 the	nihilistic	 skepticism	 towards	all	
ends	of	becoming	and	regain	a	hope	 in	our	own	becomings?	The	problem	 for	us	
today	is	no	longer	that	false	ends	are	masquerading	as	true.	This	belief	no	longer	
exists	 and	 its	 criticism	 is	 merely	 a	 confirmation	 of	 the	 new	 belief	 in	 the	
meaninglessness	of	existence	and	in	philosophy’s	powerlessness	when	confronted	

















after	 the	 materialist	 reversal	 stems	 from	 the	 difficulty	 of	 completing	 this	 very	
reversal	 at	 the	 level	 of	 the	 experience	 of	 consciousness.	 Indeed,	 Marx	 and	
Nietzsche	brought	 about	 the	 reversal	 of	 the	 relationship	 of	 priority	 between	 the	
Ideal	 and	 the	 Material	 and	 hence	 established	 a	 theory	 of	 material-historical	
determination	 of	 philosophical	 consciousness.	 However,	 due	 to	 the	 difficulty	 of	
affirming	 Absolute	 Knowledge	 within	 this	 new	 philosophical	 perspective,	 the	
material	 life-process	now	accidentally	takes	up	the	role	of	the	divine	mediator	of	
history	 and	 philosophical	 consciousness	 has	 no	 choice	 but	 to	 see	 itself	 as	 a	
derivative	 product.	 Our	 self-consciousness	 has	 thus	 been	 suffering	 from	 its	 own	
sense	 of	 powerlessness	 to	 establish	 itself	 upon	 a	 new	 theory	 of	 the	 Absolute	
Knowledge	 and	 this	 effectively	 returns	 materialism	 back	 to	 the	 problem	 of	 the	
Idealist	 Metaphysics.26	The	 alienation	 of	 consciousness	 from	 the	 Absolute	 then	
confronts	us	with	renewed	strength	and	we	once	again	 find	ourselves	within	the	
antithetical	 opposition	 between	 philosophy	 as	 ideological	 consciousness	 and	
material	life	process	as	the	pure	Beyond.	In	short,	unless	we	confront	the	problem	
of	 the	 unavailability	 of	 Life,	 the	materialist	 reversal’s	 promise	 of	 liberation	 from	
																																																								
26 	Within	 a	 certain	 strand	 of	 Marxism,	 the	 congruence	 between	 materialism	 and	
metaphysics	has	long	been	acknowledged.	Jean-Paul	Sartre,	for	instance,	states:		
I	conclude	in	all	good	faith	that	it	is	a	metaphysical	doctrine	and	that	materialists	
are	metaphysicians.	 But	 they	 immediately	 stop	me.	 […]	 It	 is	 a	 clear	 and	a	priori	
stand	 on	 a	 problem	which	 infinitely	 transcends	 our	 experience.	 This	 is	 also	my	





ideological	 illusion	 ends	 up	 being	 a	 false	 promise	 that	 repeats	 the	 same	 old	
mistake.		
We	propose	 to	revisit	Bergson’s	philosophy	vis-à-vis	 the	problem	that	 the	
materialist	reversal	of	dialectic	has	brought	forth.	Today,	if	we	are	to	go	back	to	a	
philosopher	whose	time	has	seemingly	passed	and	if	this	going	back	is	to	be	of	any	
political	 value,	 this	must	 be	 done	with	 the	 intent	 of	 overcoming	 the	 problem	 of	
nihilism	within	 the	context	of	 the	materialist	dialectic.	Our	 intention,	however,	 is	
not	 at	 all	 to	undo	materialism	by	 returning	 to	Bergsonian	 “idealism”.	Our	 aim	 is	
exactly	 the	 opposite:	 Bergson	 will	 be	 read	 and	 defended	 as	 a	 materialist	
dialectician	 that	 solves	 the	 problem	 of	 nihilism.	 In	 direct	 opposition	 to	 the	
traditional	reading	that	treats	Bergsonism	as	a	type	of	Idealism,	we	will	argue	that	
Bergson	 rather	 performs	 the	 reversal	 of	 the	 Material	 and	 the	 Ideal	 without	
alienating	philosophical	consciousness	from	material-life	and	relapsing	to	nihilism.		
As	we	intend	to	show,	the	crux	of	 the	matter	 is	how	to	overcome	nihilism	
and	 gain	 access	 to	 human	 freedom	 through	 a	 new	 form	 of	 materialist	 dialectic.	
Throughout	 his	 career,	 Bergson	 tirelessly	 expounds	 upon	 the	 unique	























In	 the	 above	 quotation,	 Bergson	 states	 that	 this	 telos/end	 of	 reasonable	














relative	 attachment	 to	 an	 external	 creator	 and	 the	 “reasonable”	 would,	 at	 best,	
denote	 the	 self-consciousness	 of	 its	 ultimate	 unfreedom	 in	 front	 of	 the	 Absolute	
Being.	 In	 this	 way,	 overcoming	 nihilism	 would	 be	 impossible	 since	 freedom	
belongs	 to	what	 is	 external	 to	 human	 being	 and	 since	 the	 beginning	 and	 end	 of	
everything	 can	 only	 be	 a	 mere	 projection	 stemming	 from	 the	 side	 of	 the	 finite	
creature.	However,	this	is	not	at	all	what	Bergson	means	by	the	“human”	nor	by	the	
“reasonable”.	 On	 the	 contrary,	 what	 is	 human	 for	 Bergson	 is	 above	 [au-dessus]	






to	 find	 out	 what	 is	 meant	 by	 “reasonable	 evolution”	 as	 the	 ultimate	 end	 of	
philosophy.	In	short,	we	aim	to	reconstitute	a	materialist	dialectic	that	is	capable	of	
providing	 us	 with	 both	 the	 condition	 for	 critique/negation	 of	 ideological	
																																																								
30	MM	184/321.	Bergson	uses	 the	word	man	[l’homme]	 rather	 than	human,	which	 is	 the	
term	we	have	preferred	to	use	in	this	thesis.	
31	MM	184/321.	





Bergson’s	 philosophy	 is	 capable	 of	 performing	 what	 has	 been	 commonly	
understood	as	 the	materialist	 function	of	philosophy	–	 that	 is,	Critique	–	and	 the	
second	 part	 aims	 to	 resolve	 the	 existing	 impasse	 within	 materialism	 –	 that	 is,	
nihilism	–	without	violating	the	basic	constitution	of	the	materialist	reversal.	
What,	 however,	 qualifies	 Bergson’s	 philosophy	 as	 a	materialism	 and	 how	
can	 we	 derive	 a	 dialectical	 logic	 from	 his	 thought?	 Many	might	 object	 that	 this	
project	 is	 untenable	 since	 Bergson	 has	 been	 known	 as	 the	 anti-dialectical	
philosopher	par	excellence,	which	has	resulted	 in	him	being	treated	as	one	of	 the	
most	unlikely	candidates	that	can	deliver	a	materialist	dialectic.	After	all,	Bergson	
clearly	 bids	 “farewell	 to	 the	 dialectical	 artifice	which	 lulls	 the	 attention	 to	 sleep	
and	which,	in	dreams,	gives	the	illusion	of	advancement”.33	Much	textual	evidence	
from	his	works	would	indeed	explicitly	suggest	that	Bergson	often	speaks	against	





method,	 is	 also	manifest	 […]	Bergson	 reproaches	 the	 dialectic	 for	 being	 a	
false	movement,	 that	 is,	 a	 movement	 of	 the	 abstract	 concept,	 which	 goes	








Zone	 Books.	 p.44.	 In	 his	 early	 essay	 on	 Bergson	 titled,	 “Bergson’s	 Conception	 of	
Difference”,	Deleuze	derives	the	key	concept	of	difference	which	 is	 later	developed	 in	his	
doctoral	 dissertation,	Difference	 and	 Repetition.	 However,	 he	 introduces	 this	 concept	 in	




to	 argue	 that	 Bergson	 does	 not	 ignore	 the	 problem	 of	 contradiction.	 For	 us,	 the	 chief	
import	 of	 Bergson’s	 philosophy	 is	 to	 establish	 within	 dialectic	 both	 the	 logic	 of	




dialectical	 aspect	 does	 exist	 within	 his	 philosophy	 is,	 of	 course,	 not	 fully	
mistaken.35		The	original	French	title	of	his	doctoral	dissertation	 is	 “Essay	on	the	
Immediate	Data	 of	 Consciousness”	 and	 it	 is	 certainly	 upon	 “the	 immediate”	 that	
Bergson	places	emphasis	 in	a	way	that	connotes	his	 intention	of	emphasizing	his	
opposition	 to	dialectical	 mediation.	 However,	 the	 mere	 recognition	 of	 Bergson’s	
insistence	upon	the	immediate	or	anti-dialectical	aspect	does	not	necessary	lead	to	
a	 conclusion	 that	 there	 is	 therefore	 no	 dialectic	 in	 his	 philosophy,	 or	 that	 his	
philosophy	 as	 a	 whole	 can	 be	 adequately	 understood	 in	 terms	 of	 its	 one-sided	
opposition	against	dialectic.	On	the	contrary,	we	will	propose	that	the	philosophy	
of	 Bergson	 as	 a	 whole	 contains	 this	 opposition	 within	 it	 but	 it	 is	 by	 no	 means	
exhausted	by	 it.	That	 is,	 the	 immediate	and	the	mediated	–	or	 the	anti-dialectical	
and	 the	dialectical	 aspects,	 so	 to	 speak	–	 are	both	 irreducibly	present	within	his	
philosophy.	 In	 fact,	 Bergson	 conceives	 not	 only	 their	 distinctness	with	 regard	 to	
one	another	but	also	their	unity	in	their	inter-relation	so	as	to	ground	both	aspects	
within	 a	 higher	 Logic.	 In	 our	 view,	what	 Bergson	 calls	 the	method	of	 intuition	 is	
none	other	than	this	Logic	itself.	A	re-thinking	of	his	philosophy	with	regard	to	this	




35	Between	 the	 early	 and	 the	mid-20th	 century,	 Bergson’s	 philosophy	 became	 one	 of	 the	
favourite	 targets	of	 criticism	by	numerous	well-known	Marxist	writers	 in	both	Germany	
and	 France	 such	 as	 Max	 Horkheimer,	 Walter	 Benjamin,	 Georges	 Politzer,	 and	 Louis	
Althusser,	 just	 to	 name	 a	 few.	 Since	 the	 latter	 half	 of	 the	 19th	 century,	 due	 to	 Gilles	
Deleuze’s	 explicit	 engagement	 with	 Bergson’s	 thought	 in	 virtually	 all	 of	 his	 texts,	 there	
have	been	numerous	debates	concerning	 the	status	of	Deleuze’s	philosophy	vis-à-vis	his	
Bergsonism	 through	 provocative	 commentaries	 by	 Alain	 Badiou	 and	 other	 affiliated	
commentators.	 In	 these	 recent	 developments,	 Bergsonism	 (in	 Deleuze	 as	 well	 as	
Bergsonism	as	such)	is	often	treated	as	the	mark	that	qualifies	Deleuze’s	thought	as	anti-
Marxist,	or	more	simply,	as	capitalist	bourgeois	ideology.	On	the	one	hand,	by	conceding	to	
such	 a	 view,	 it	 has	 become	 a	 commonplace	 for	 many	 contemporary	 commentators	
sympathetic	 to	 Deleuze	 to	 treat	 Deleuze’s	 Bergsonism	 as	 a	 problem	 that	 needs	 to	 be	
overcome.	 As	 such,	 they	 often	 explicitly	 differentiate	 Deleuze’s	 Bergsonism	 and	
Bergsonism	as	such.	On	the	other	hand,	many	Deleuzian	writers	situate	themselves	within	
this	Marx/Bergson	dichotomy	and	endorse	what	has	come	to	be	known	as	“affect	theory”,	
“anti-representational	 theory”,	 etc.,	and	 are	 explicitly	 against	Marxist	 criticism.	 In	 either	
case,	 the	more	 important	question	 regarding	 the	 status	of	 the	opposition	between	Marx	
and	 Bergson	 (which	 is	 the	 very	 premise	 of	 the	 discussion)	 has	 not	 been	 adequately	
addressed.	For	a	thorough	review	of	the	reception	of	Bergson’s	philosophy	within	Marxist	






In	 the	 second	 introduction	 to	 Creative	 Mind,	 Bergson	 states:	 “these	
considerations	on	duration	were,	as	it	seemed	to	be,	decisive.	Step	by	step	they	led	
me	to	raise	intuition	to	the	level	of	a	philosophical	method.”37	Intuition,	according	
to	 Bergson,	 is	 established	 as	 a	 “philosophical	 method”	 as	 a	 result	 of	 his	
consideration	 on	 the	 problem	 of	 duration.	 In	 its	 ordinary	 usage,	 the	 word	
“intuition”	 refers	 to	 an	 irrational	 way	 of	 knowing	 things.	 When	 one	 intuitively	
knows	something,	this	usually	means	that	one	knows	something	without	knowing	
why	or	how	one	knows.	This,	 however,	 is	 not	 at	 all	what	Bergson	means	by	 the	
term.	Bergson	states	 that	 it	 is	 a	 “method”	and,	hence,	 that	 it	differs	 in	kind	 from	
how	 it	 is	 usually	 perceived	 in	 terms	 of	 a	 generalized	 anti-intellectualism.38	By	
intuition,	 then,	we	shall	understand	 it	as	a	unique	principle	of	philosophy	 that	 is	
precisely	formulated	in	accordance	with	Bergson’s	original	reading	of	the	legacies	
of	 Kant	 and	 the	 post-Kantian	 conceptions	 of	 intuition	 [Anschauung]	 as	 the	
transcendental	 condition	 of	 experience.	 Also,	 insofar	 as	 it	 is	 said	 to	 be	 the	
“method”,	we	 cannot	 understand	 it	 in	 terms	of	 a	 philosophical	 investigation	 “of”	
intuition	in	the	sense	that	there	is	philosophy	first	which	afterwards	thinks	about	
intuition	 as	 a	 particular	 empirical	 phenomenon	 that	 is	 examined	 by	 it	 in	 the	
manner	of	psychology.	If	intuition	is	the	method	of	philosophy,	this	can	only	mean	
that	 intuition	 is	 first	 erected	 [ériger]	 as	 that	which	 is	prior	 to	 any	 philosophical	
investigation	 “of”	 any	 empirical	 phenomenon	 whatsoever.	 The	 very	 fact	 that	
Bergson	states	that	intuition	is	a	method	means	that	we	must	approach	it	as	that	
which	 makes	 any	 philosophical	 investigation	 itself	 possible	 in	 the	 first	 place;	
indeed,	 it	 is	 the	 latter	 that	springs	forth	as	a	result	of	establishing	 intuition	as	 its	
foundation.	 Intuition	 is	 therefore	 the	 irreducible	 presupposition	 that	 precedes	




about	 the	materialist	 dialectic?	 Is	 not	 a	 study	of	Marx’s	 philosophy	 sufficient	 for	
this	 task?	What	 can	 Bergson’s	 philosophy	 give	 us	 that	 is	 lacking	 in	 Marx’s	 own	
																																																																																																																																																																		
in	 philosophy.	 It	 has	 its	 strict	 rules,	 constituting	 that	which	Bergson	 calls	 “precision”	 in	
philosophy.”	See	Deleuze,	Bergsonism,	p.13.		
37	CM	30/1271.	Translation	modified.		




writings?	 It	 is	 our	 argument	 that	 the	 problem	 we	 encounter	 vis-à-vis	 the	
materialist	dialectic	cannot	be	fully	resolved	via	a	study	of	Marx’s	work	per	se	since	
Marx	does	not	show	us	precisely	how	the	materialist	dialectic	is	itself	established	
prior	 to	 its	 demonstration;	 by	 extension,	 the	 investigation	 of	 the	 materialist	
dialectic	cannot	be	confined	within	the	pre-established	realm	of	Marxism.	What	we	





towards	 the	 end	 of	 Economic	 and	 Philosophical	 Manuscripts	 of	 1844),	 his	
discussions	are	 largely	 restricted	 in	providing	a	criticism	of	Hegel’s	 idealism	à	la	
Feuerbach	and	they	do	not	explicitly	present	his	own	dialectic	in	a	positive	manner.	
Of	 course,	 Marx’s	 criticism	 of	 Hegelianism	 is	 an	 indispensable	 source	 for	 an	
investigation	into	the	construction	of	materialist	dialectic.	Yet,	in	order	to	inquire	
into	the	very	essence	and	the	inner	structure	of	the	materialist	dialectic,	we	must	
venture	 out	 of	 Marx’s	 own	 writings	 and	 construct	 a	 new	 materialist	
phenomenology,	or	a	materialist	science	of	the	experience	of	consciousness,	which	is	




In	 the	 Phenomenology	 of	 Spirit	 I	 have	 exhibited	 consciousness	 in	 its	
movement	 onwards	 from	 the	 first	 immediate	 opposition	 of	 itself	 and	 the	
object	to	absolute	knowing.	The	path	of	this	movement	goes	through	every	
form	 of	 the	 relation	 of	 consciousness	 to	 the	 object	 and	 has	 the	 Notion	 of	
science	[Begriff	der	Wissenschaft]	for	its	result.39		
																																																								
39	Hegel,	Science	of	Logic,	p.48.	One	might	well	 argue	 that	 the	question	pertaining	 to	 the	
relationship	 between	 phenomenology	 and	 logic	 in	 Hegel’s	 overall	 system	 is	 much	 less	
straightforward	than	can	be	detected	in	this	passage	from	Science	of	Logic.	For	instance,	in	
the	Encyclopedia,	phenomenology	 is	 not	what	 comes	 before	 logic	 but	 after	 it	 under	 the	
rubric	 the	 Philosophy	 of	 Mind	 between	 Anthropology	 and	 Psychology.	 Phenomenology	
therefore	 seems	 to	 assume	 two	 distinct	 places	 within	 the	 overall	 shape	 of	 the	 system.	
However,	we	 agree	with	Heidegger	when	he	 says:	 “the	Phenomenology	of	Spirit	remains	
the	work	and	the	way	that	not	only	once	but	always,	and	in	a	definite	and	indispensable	
manner,	 prepares	 the	 ground	 –	 better:	 the	 space,	 the	 dimensionality,	 the	 realm	 of	
expansion	–	for	the	encyclopedia-system.”	That	is,	although	phenomenology	also	occupies	
the	 inner	 position	 within	 the	 system,	 this	 grounding	 of	 phenomenology	 as	 the	 inner	
element	 of	 the	 later	 system	 is	 nonetheless	 prepared	 by	 the	 preliminary	 exercise	 in	
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manifestations.	 Marx	 rather	 accepts	 this	 point	 and	 states	 in	 the	 Manuscripts	 of	
1844	that	“[w]e	must	begin	with	his	Phenomenology,	which	is	the	true	birthplace	
and	secret	of	the	Hegelian	philosophy.”40		Leading	on	from	the	above,	if	Marx	puts	
forth	 a	 new	 logic	 that	 differs	 from	 the	 Hegelian	 version,	 we	 can	 say	 that	 the	





a	 result;	 this	 can	 be	 done	 independently	 from	 the	 strict	 confines	 of	Marx’s	 own	
writings.	 One	 might	 be	 inclined	 to	 think	 that	 materialism	 does	 not	 require	
phenomenology	or	even	to	presuppose	that	materialism	is	 to	be	understood	as	a	
destruction	of	the	very	possibility	of	phenomenology	since	the	latter	is	the	project	
that	 seeks	 to	 obtain	 absolute	 knowledge	 exclusively	 through	 cognizing	 the	
experience	 of	 consciousness.	 After	 all,	 as	 we	 have	 explained	 above,	 Marx	 states	
that	philosophy	“has	no	history”	and	hence	he	treats	it	as	the	secondary	product	of	
the	 material	 process	 that	 lies	 outside	 it.	 Why,	 then,	 should	 we	 engage	 in	
phenomenology	when	we	already	concede	that	it	is	the	secondary	product	of	Life?	
Do	 we	 not	 know	 that	 any	 attempts	 to	 obtain	 absolute	 knowledge	 through	
consciousness	 necessarily	 ends	 up	 being	 a	 failure	 since	 consciousness	 is	
constructed	 and	 the	 real	 constructing	 force	 of	 Life	 rather	 lies	 outside	
consciousness?		
To	 be	 sure,	 there	 is	 a	 great	 temptation	 to	 assume	 that	 the	 materialist	
negation	 of	 philosophical	 consciousness	 is	 a	 destruction	 of	 the	 possibility	 of	
obtaining	 absolute	 knowledge	 through	 the	 science	 of	 the	 experience	 of	
consciousness;	 in	 other	 words,	 it	 is	 easy	 to	 regard	 materialism	 as	 anti-
phenomenology.	However,	in	order	to	protect	ourselves	from	the	jaws	of	nihilism,	
																																																																																																																																																																		




it	 is	 necessary	 to	 regard	 the	 materialist	 reversal	 as	 a	 call	 to	 envisage	 a	 new	
phenomenology	 that	 establishes	 not	 the	 Ideal	 but	 the	 Material	 Life	 as	 the	
“Demiurge	of	the	Real”	within	the	experience	of	consciousness.	After	the	reversal,	
Material	Life,	or	the	Other	of	philosophical	consciousness,	is	granted	the	position	of	
the	 Absolute	 Self.	 The	 new	 phenomenology	 must	 then	 accept	 that	 the	 Other	 of	
philosophical	 consciousness	 is	 obtained	 through	 a	 new	 philosophical	
consciousness.	The	 establishment	of	 the	Other/Material	 Life	 as	 the	Absolute	 Self	
must	be	seen	as	phenomenology’s	positive	achievement	rather	than	its	destruction.	
After	 all,	 even	 if	 one	 accepts	 that	 the	 absolute	 knowledge	 produced	 by	 the	
philosophical	 consciousness	 is	 not	 an	 absolute	 but	 rather	 a	 contingent	 product,	
there	 is	no	point	 in	denying	 that	 this	negation	of	 the	absolute	knowledge	occurs	
within	 consciousness	 and	 that	 it	 is	 simultaneously	 a	 realization	 of	 the	 Other	 of	
philosophical	 consciousness	 as	 the	 new	 absolute	 by	 the	 new	 philosophical	
consciousness.		
After	 the	materialist	 reversal,	philosophy	 is	 thus	confronted	with	a	choice	
between	 two	 possible	 routes:	 one	 is	 to	 admit	 that	 we	 are	 unable	 to	 know	 the	
Absolute	and	establish	this	unavailability	or	absence	of	truth	as	the	ultimate	truth;	
the	 other	 is	 to	 point	 out	 the	 being-there	 of	 the	 new	 truth	 not	 in	 terms	 of	 the	
hitherto	 understood	 shape	 of	 philosophy	 but	 through	 a	 new	 philosophy	 that	
surpasses	the	limitation	of	old	philosophical	consciousness.	We	are	convinced	that	
it	is	towards	the	second	route	that	we	need	to	follow.	Rather	than	establishing	the	
unavailability	 of	 the	 Other/Life	 as	 the	 Absolute	 –	 namely,	 the	 Otherness	 of	 the	
Other	with	 respect	 to	 knowledge	 as	 the	 Absolute	 Truth	 –	we	 shall	 envisage	 the	
Other	 of	 philosophical	 knowledge	 as	what	 is	 given	 within	 a	 new	 experience	 of	
consciousness.		
After	all,	the	mere	acceptance	of	the	falsity	of	one’s	self-consciousness	alone	
does	 not	 produce	 a	 new	 concept	 of	 logic	 and	 the	 latter,	 if	 it	 deserves	 the	 name,	
must	 be	 established	 upon	 the	 absolute	 knowledge	 and	 not	 upon	 the	 mere	
consciousness	 of	 its	 impossibility.	 The	materialist	 dialectic,	 which	 is	 established	
upon	 the	 negation	 of	 the	 Hegelian	 theory	 of	 absolute	 knowledge,	 must	 itself	
contain	a	new	materialist	theory	of	absolute	knowledge.	The	challenge,	of	course,	
is	 to	 envisage	 the	 new	 philosophical	 consciousness	 of	 the	 Absolute	 Self	 without	
accidentally	 turning	 it	 into	 an	 ideological	 form	 of	 consciousness.	 There	 is,	
therefore,	a	great	risk	in	taking	up	such	a	project.	Yet	if	we	continue	to	evade	the	
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possibility	 of	 obtaining	 absolute	 knowledge	 within	 the	 science	 of	 experience	
altogether,	 the	 result	 of	 the	 materialist	 reversal	 would	 merely	 be	 a	 one-
sided/alienated	consciousness	 that	 is	 turned	against	 itself	 and	 left	with	no	other	
choice	 but	 to	mortgage	 its	 ultimate	 fulfilment	 onto	 a	 pure	 speculation/Idea	 that	
lies	 outside	 itself.	 Without	 the	 acquisition	 of	 the	 new	 kind	 of	 the	 absolute	
knowledge,	 although	 the	 materialist	 reversal	 seems	 to	 have	 promised	 the	
liberation	of	the	body	from	the	“phantom”	of	the	head,	it	is	the	head	that	ends	up	
losing	the	Body	and	become	convinced	that	 it	 is	 itself	 incapable	of	 finding	 it.	The	
task	for	us	is	to	find	the	body	without	confusing	it	with	the	phantom	of	the	head.	
The	point	is	to	know	clearly	the	difference	between	the	Ideal	and	the	Material	with	







intuition	 so	 as	 to	 understand	 how	 it	 can	 be	 established	 as	 the	 foundation	 of	 a	
materialist	 dialectic.	 Our	 central	 argument	 is	 that	 while	 Bergson’s	 theory	 of	
intuition	 is	 constructed	 alongside	 the	 legacies	 of	 Kant	 and	 post-Kantianism,	 it	
nonetheless	differs	 from	the	 former	 through	a	materialist	reversal	akin	 to	 that	of	
Marx.	That	is,	in	a	manner	analogous	to	Marx’s	materialist	dialectic	as	the	reversal	
of	 the	 Idealist	 dialectic,	 we	 argue	 that	 Bergson	 reverses	 the	 Kantian	 and	 post-
Kantian	 idealism	 of	 intuition	 and	 produces	 a	 distinctly	 materialist	 theory	 of	
intuition.	Furthermore,	we	will	argue	that	Bergson’s	materialist	reversal	does	not	
signify	a	“fulfilment”	of	 idealist	metaphysics.	Although	 it	prepares	 the	ground	for	
the	 materialist	 criticism	 of	 metaphysics,	 it	 nonetheless	 establishes	 a	 manner	 of	
apprehending	the	Absolute	through	a	distinctly	non-metaphysical	means.	In	short,	
when	understood	in	terms	of	a	materialist	reversal,	Bergson’s	method	of	intuition	
can	 help	 us	 clarify	 the	 definite	 phenomenological	 procedures	 the	 materialist	
operations	of	Negation	as	well	as	Affirmation	ultimately	consist	of.		
Our	 aim	 in	 delving	 into	 Bergson’s	 method	 of	 intuition	 is	 therefore	 to	









Life	 –	 or	 the	 so-called	 “real”,	 “sensuous”,	 “human”,	 etc.	 –	 as	 that	 which	 is	 truly	
affirmative	in	contradistinction	to	the	Hegelian	affirmativeness	of	the	Idea.	As	we	
have	 said	 earlier,	 however,	 Marx	 does	 not	 fully	 explicate	 what	 the	 “real”	 or	
“sensuous”	 is	 in	 terms	of	a	new	theory	of	 the	experience	of	consciousness.	Given	
that	 lack,	 what	 we	 set	 out	 to	 demonstrate	 in	 this	 thesis	 is	 the	 following:	 while	
providing	 the	 framework	 for	 critiquing	 the	 coming	 into	 being	 of	 the	 Idea	 out	 of	
material	 Life-process,	 Bergson’s	 method	 of	 intuition	 can	 also	 provide	 this	 very	
framework	 for	affirming	the	Truth	of	Life	without	 turning	 it	 into	a	mere	 idea,	an	
object	of	critique	within	experience.	
That	being	said,	 the	traditional	criticism	against	Bergson	from	the	Marxist	
perspective	 has	 been	 focused	 upon	 its	 alleged	 anti-dialecticism,	 or	 its	 supposed	
incapacity	 to	 negate	 ideological	 consciousness	 due	 to	 its	 perceived	 naïveté	
towards	the	historical	mediation	of	 the	 latter.	This	 is	 largely	due	to	the	mistaken	
view	of	Bergsonism	as	simple	anti-Kantianism	that	is	unable	to	consider	seriously	
the	element	of	negativity	within	the	Hegelian	dialectic	that	ultimately	stems	from	
the	 former’s	 post-Kantianism.	 Indeed,	 the	 most	 well	 known	 philosophical	
invention	of	Bergson	is	the	concept	of	duration	[la	durée],	which	is	first	put	forth	in	







time	 and	 dialectic	 (both	 in	 its	 Hegelian	 as	 well	 as	 the	 Marxist	 versions)	 as	 the	




prompted	 by	 time. 42 	That	 is,	 Bergson’s	 philosophy	 appears	 as	 simple	 anti-
dialecticism	 since,	 although	 dialectic	 requires	 the	 negative	 force	 of	 time	 as	 the	
central	 motor	 of	 history	 (as	 what	 it	 thinks	 and	 acquires	 as	 the	 object	 is	 the	
knowledge	 of	 the	 movement	 of	 time),	 Bergson’s	 concept	 of	 duration	 seems	 to	
exorcise	 this	 force	 of	 negativity	 and	 destroy	 the	 possibility	 of	 cognising	 the	
movement	 of	 negativity.	 While	 Marx	 puts	 forth	 his	 dialectic	 as	 the	 opposite	 of	
Hegel’s,	in	his	case	doing	away	with	the	negativity	of	time	is	not	at	all	the	intention	
of	 the	materialist	 reversal.	 Materialist	 dialectic	 rather	 retains,	 as	Marx	 says,	 the	
“rational	kernel”	of	the	Hegelian	dialectic,	which	is	the	aspect	of	the	negativity	that	
constitutes	 its	 “critical	 and	 revolutionary”	 aspect	 rather	 than	 its	 “mystical”	 and	
conservative	 elements.43	For	Marxists,	 then,	 Bergson’s	 supposed	 anti-Kantianism	
seems	to	be	a	move	that	simply	ignores	and	goes	against	revolutionary	negativity.	
The	theory	of	duration	is	thus	seen	as	ushering	Bergsonism	towards	the	one-sided	




relationship	 between	Bergson’s	 philosophy	 to	 that	 of	 Kant’s.	 To	merely	 suppose	




does	 not	 exist.	 We	 may	 summon	 Hegel	 to	 our	 aid,	 who,	 in	 the	 preface	 to	
Phenomenology	of	Spirit,	states:		
	
The	more	conventional	opinion	gets	 fixated	on	 the	antithesis	of	 truth	and	
falsity,	the	more	it	tends	to	expect	a	given	philosophical	system	to	be	either	
accepted	or	contradicted;	and	hence	it	finds	only	acceptance	or	rejection.	It	
does	 not	 comprehend	 the	 diversity	 of	 the	 philosophical	 system	 as	 the	
progressive	unfolding	of	 truth,	but	rather	sees	 in	 it	 simple	disagreements.	
																																																								
42	To	speak	of	phenomenology	in	relation	to	Kant	(rather	than	purely	in	relation	to	Hegel)	
is	 not	 an	 anachronism.	 As	 Kant	 states	 in	 private	 letters	 to	 Lambert	 and	 Hertz	 in	
1770/1772,	Kant’s	Critique	of	Pure	Reason	is	 intended	 to	be	a	 “general	phenomenology”,	
which	 is,	 in	 his	 own	 words,	 “presupposed	 by	 metaphysics”.	 See	 Kant,	 I.,	 (1999).	
Correspondences.	Trans.	A.	 Zweig.	 Cambridge:	 Cambridge	Univ.	 Press.	 p.108.,	 p.132.	Also	







In	 a	 Hegelian	 vein,	 then,	 to	 see	 only	 an	 abstract	 opposition	 against	 Kant	 in	
Bergson’s	anti-Kantianism	does	not	explain	the	real	nature	of	their	relation.	Rather,	
this	 would	 assume	 the	 disappearance	 of	 Kantianism	 from	 Bergson’s	 work	
altogether	 despite	 the	 fact	 that	 “anti-Kantianism”	 already	 presupposes	 a	
consideration	of	Kant	to	be	against	it	in	the	first	place.	In	other	words,	a	negation	
of	 the	 old,	 if	 it	 is	 at	 all	 successful,	 must	 be	 seen	 as	 a	 constructive	 addition	 or	
extension	of	 the	original	project	 so	as	 to	contain	and	affirm	 the	original	and	add	
something	new.				
In	 tandem	with	 the	 argument	 that	 materialism	 is	 not	 a	 simple	 refusal	 of	
idealism	 but	 retains	 the	 “rational	 kernel”,	 we	 propose	 to	 see	 Bergson’s	 anti-




the	 realisation	of	 the	Hegelian	philosophy	or,	 generally,	 of	 the	philosophy	
that	prevailed	until	now,	a	realisation,	however,	which	is	at	the	same	time	
the	 negation,	 and	 indeed	 the	 negation	 without	 contradiction,	 of	 this	
philosophy.45	
	
Similarly,	 a	 negation	 of	 idealism	 by	 materialism	 cannot	 be	 reduced	 to	 a	 mere	
disagreement.	 Instead,	 it	 needs	 to	 be	 seen	 as	 the	 creation	 of	 novelty	 that	 builds	
itself	 through	 a	 non-contradictory	 relation	 to	 what	 is	 negated.	 In	 an	 analogous	
manner,	and	as	opposed	to	the	popular	image	of	Bergson	as	a	simple	anti-Kantian,	
we	will	argue	that	his	anti-Kantianism	is	a	materialist	reversal	of	Kantianism	–	or	a	















does	 it	 mean	 for	 us	 to	 understand	 Bergson’s	 concept	 of	 intuition	 in	 terms	 of	 a	
materialist	reversal?	How	is	a	materialist	reversal	possible	with	an	inversion	that	
takes	place	at	the	level	of	intuition	and	how	does	it	help	us	to	surpass	the	problem	
of	 the	 unavailability	 of	 the	 true	 Logos	 after	 the	materialist	 reversal?	 To	 answer	
these	 questions,	 we	 must	 understand	 Bergson’s	 theory	 of	 time	 in	 its	 broadest	
sense.	 It	 is	 our	 contention	 that	 Bergson’s	 theory	 of	 time	 can	 reveal	 to	 us	 the	
distinctly	materialistic	conception	of	the	experience	of	consciousness,	which,	in	its	
completion,	gives	rise	to	the	materialist	dialectic	as	a	result.	Time,	in	the	sense	that	
Kant	 conceives	 of	 it,	 is	 the	 a	priori	 form	 of	 intuition.	 Insofar	 as	 phenomenology	
aims	 for	 the	 acquisition	 of	 the	 absolute	 knowledge	 of	 the	 Self	 through	 the	
experience	of	consciousness,	it	also	aims	for	the	concrete	knowledge	of	time	as	the	






of	 time.	 In	essence,	 in	putting	 forth	 the	concept	of	duration,	Bergson	argues	 that	
Kantian	 time	 is	nothing	other	 than	space,	or	 the	 fourth	dimension	of	 space	–	 the	
form	of	exteriority	rather	than	that	of	 interiority.	 In	a	nutshell,	Bergson	criticises	
Kantian	 conception	 of	 time	 for	 being	 an	 “illegitimate	 translation”	 of	 the	 Self	 in	
terms	 of	 its	 external	 appearance	 and	 hence	 alienated	 from	 the	 content/truth	 of	




judgment	that	Bergson’s	 theory	of	 time	as	a	whole	 is	 thus	opposed	to	Kant’s	and	
that	 its	 essence	 can	 be	 understood	 in	 terms	 of	 this	 one-sided	 opposition.	 It	 is	
presumed	 that	 there	 is	 a	 perfectly	 symmetrical	 configuration	 between	 Kantian	
time	as	the	mediation/negation	of	the	Self	on	the	one	hand	and	Bergsonian	time	as	
the	 immediate/affirmativeness	 of	 the	 Self	 on	 the	 other.	 From	 that	 standpoint,	 it	
	 36	
would	thus	seem	obvious	that	Bergson	is	an	anti-dialectical	philosopher	and	that	
his	 philosophy	 is	 utterly	 unable	 to	 provide	 any	 criticism	 of	 ideological	
consciousness	since	 there	 is	no	 theory	 to	explain	how	the	appearance	of	 the	Self	
comes	into	existence	out	of	the	functioning	of	time.			
Everything	 changes,	 however,	 if	 Bergson’s	 anti-Kantianism	 is	 seen	 not	 a	
simple	 disagreement	 against	 Kant	 and	 if	 his	 theory	 of	 duration	 is	 seen	 not	 as	
something	that	annuls	the	negativity	of	Kantian	time.	In	this	thesis,	we	will	argue	
that	 Bergson’s	 philosophy	 rather	 apprehends	 both	 time	and	duration	as	 the	 two	
transcendental	 conditions	 of	 intuition	 and	 that	 these	 two	 elements,	 though	 they	
differ	 from	one	another,	 cannot	be	reduced	 in	 terms	of	one	or	 the	other.	We	call	
this	irreducibility	Transcendental	Dualism.	This	means	that	the	dualism	of	time	and	
duration	 within	 intuition	 is	 to	 be	 seen	 as	 transcendental,	 or	 that	 the	 duality	 of	
intuition	 itself	 is	 the	 a	 priori	 condition	 of	 subjectivity,	 in	 the	 manner	 that	 Kant	












the	 immediate,	 both	 time	 and	 duration	 co-exist	 as	 the	 transcendentally	 dual	
condition	 of	 intuition.	 Our	 argument	 therefore	 is	 that	 it	 is	 this	 duality	 of	 the	
transcendental	 condition	 that	 qualifies	 Bergson’s	 method	 of	 intuition	 as	 a	
materialist	reversal	of	idealist	phenomenology.		
“Dualism”,	 in	 the	 ordinary	 sense	 of	 the	 term,	 is	 often	 treated	 as	 being	
problematic	 in	 itself.	 This	 kind	 of	 ordinary	 duality	 assumes	 that	 two	 opposites	






this	 dualism	 is	 not	 complete	 in	 Kant;	 as	 such,	 post-Kantian	 philosophy	 and	 the	
consciousness	 of	 the	 Self	 attained	 through	 phenomenology	 after	 Kant	 is	 not	 a	
dualism	 that	 is	 conscious	 and	 certain	 of	 itself	 but	 a	 one-sided	 dualism	 that	 is	 in	
need	of	its	Other.	The	thing-in-itself,	or	that	which	lies	outside	time	is	not	given	but	
is	merely	 an	object	 of	belief	and	 is	 only	 affirmed	 in	 terms	of	 the	 Idea	of	Reason,	
which	 is	 a	 one-sided	 self-projection	made	by	 the	 spontaneity	 of	Reason.	 That	 is,	
after	positing	the	concept	of	time	and	dividing	the	world	into	appearance	and	the	
things-in-themselves,	 the	experience	of	 consciousness	 is	one-sidedly	 confined	on	
the	side	of	appearance.	With	regard	to	the	thing-in-itself,	it	is	merely	treated	as	the	




in-itself. 46 	However,	 materialism	 is	 the	 doctrine	 that	 ultimately	 negates	 this	









with	 the	 critical	 consciousness	 of	 the	 idea	 as	 the	 illusion	 of	 Life.	 The	 task	 for	






reality	 of	 materiality	 that	 differs	 from	 the	 former	 within	 consciousness	 without	
confusing	the	two.	What	we	put	forth	as	Transcendental	Dualism	is	the	duality	of	
the	 field	 of	 intuition	 itself,	which	 differs	 in	 kind	 from	 the	 ordinary	 dualism	 that	
envisages	 duality	 from	 the	 side	 of	 time	 alone.	 What	 we	 propose	 is	 a	 higher	
synthesis,	 as	 it	 were,	 of	 duality	 and	 singularity	 –	 a	 higher,	 superior	 dualism	 of	
duality	and	singularity	within	the	experience	of	consciousness.	If	ordinary	dualism	
is	 solely	 conditioned	 by	 time,	 superior	 dualism	 includes	 the	 condition	 of	 time	
within	 it	 but	 also	 apprehends	 the	 other	 condition	 that	 gives	 the	Other	of	 time	or	
duration	within	experience	along	with	time.		
The	ultimate	aim	of	establishing	a	transcendental	dualism	of	intuition	is	to	
prepare	the	 foundation	 for	“the	true	work	of	 integration”,	 in	Bergson’s	words,	or	
what	amounts	 to	 the	same	thing,	a	 “reasonable	evolution”.47	What	matters	 in	 the	
end	 is	 to	 apprehend	 the	 two	 transcendental	 conditions	 together	 so	 that	 this	
knowledge	of	the	beginning	endow	us	with	the	capacity	to	synthesize	the	powers	of	
negation	and	affirmation	so	as	to	bring	about	a	free,	self-conscious	development	of	
Life	 as	 the	 end	 of	 materialist	 philosophy.	 Thus,	 what	 matters	 at	 the	 end	 is	 to	





and	 the	 synthesis	 does	 not	 resolve	 the	 difference	 between	 them.	 Although	 the	
demonstration	of	our	argument	must	be	reserved	for	the	body	of	this	thesis,	 it	 is	






call	 the	 fourth	 position	 between	 two	 kinds	 of	 thirdness	 since,	 as	 we	 will	
demonstrate	below,	time	and	duration	are	both	particular	types	of	thirdness	that	
are	obtained	through	two	distinct	kinds	of	sublation	of	ontological	contradiction.		






to	 be	 seen	 as	 double	 and	 insofar	 as	 the	 method	 of	 intuition	 grasps	 the	
transcendental	 in	 its	 irreducible	 duality,	 time	 and	 duration	 refer	 to	 two	 distinct	
kinds	 of	 thirdness	 obtained	 through	 different	 procedures	 of	 mediation;	
concomitantly,	 the	 subject	 of	 synthesis,	 who	 is	 capable	 of	 seeing	 both	 time	 and	
duration	simultaneously	occupies	the	position	of	the	fourth.		That	is,	“Affirmation”	
and	 “Negation”,	 which	 in	 turn	 correspond	 to	 distinct	 manners	 of	 apprehending	
duration	and	time	within	 intuition,	refer	to	those	two	distinct	kinds	of	mediation	
and	 the	 synthesis	 of	 the	 two	 is	 neither	 one	 or	 the	 other	 but	 distinctly	both	and	
neither.	Indeed,	as	we	will	see,	“reasonable	evolution”,	cannot	take	place	if	we	see	
it	 in	 terms	of	either	 affirmation	or	 negation.	As	we	will	 argue,	with	Bergson,	 the	






Having	said	 the	above,	what	 is	 the	meaning	of	 reasonable	evolution	and	 through	
what	 method	 can	 this	 notion	 be	 interpreted?	 In	 other	 words,	 what	 is	 the	
appropriate	 method	 of	 interpreting	 the	 meaning	 of	 reasonable	 evolution?	 This	
thesis	 is	 an	 investigation	 into	 Bergson’s	 theory	 of	 intuition	 as	 a	 philosophical	
method,	 and	 we	 aim	 to	 derive	 the	 meaning	 of	 reasonable	 evolution	 through	 a	
particular	method	 of	 interpreting	 this	method	 as	 the	 condition	 of	 possibility	 for	
reasonable	 evolution.	 It	 is	 therefore	 an	 investigation	 into	 the	 transcendental	









Since	 the	 subject-matter	 of	 the	 thesis	 is	 Bergson’s	 theory	 of	 intuition	
understood	as	a	philosophical	method,	the	methodological	question	regarding	the	
appropriateness	of	the	method	of	interpretation	overlaps	with	the	actual	work	of	










to	 find	 something	 hidden	 and	 to	 illuminate	 this	 hitherto	 hidden	 thing	 from	
something	 else.	 In	 a	 nutshell,	 what	 the	 method	 of	 extraction	 does	 is	 to	 first	
encounter	and	receive	a	thing	itself	that	is	to	be	interpreted,	and	then	to	derive	a	
concept	for	the	thing	encountered.	This	endeavor	therefore	ends	with	a	production	
of	a	concept,	or	a	knowledge	of	 the	 thing,	but	 the	concept	 to	be	produced	within	
this	 process	 is	 modeled	 after	 the	 thing	 that	 is	 received	 beforehand.	 Hence	 the	
method	involves	two	separate	steps	and	it	has	a	dual	function.		
Extraction	distinctly	understood	within	 the	present	 thesis	 is	an	extraction	
of	philosophical	meaning	from	texts.	Since	what	we	are	inquiring	into	specifically	
here	is	the	question	whether	the	tool	to	get	a	hold	of	the	thing	is	appropriate	for	















in	 man,	 the	 thinking	 being,	 the	 free	 act	 may	 be	 termed	 a	 synthesis	 of	
feelings	and	ideas	and	the	evolution	which	leads	to	it	a	reasonable	evolution.	
The	 artifice	 of	 this	method	 simply	 consists,	 in	 short,	 in	 distinguishing	 the	
point	 of	 view	 of	 customary	 or	 useful	 knowledge	 from	 that	 of	 true	
knowledge.49	
	
Bergson	 is	 here	 not	 saying	 that	 the	 “free	 act”	 is	 composed	 of	 choosing	 the	 true	
knowledge	over	the	customary	or	useful	knowledge.	The	freedom	that	a	thinking	
human	exercises,	for	Bergson,	does	not	have	to	do	with	choosing	the	real	over	the	
usual	 as	 in	 a	 true	 or	 false	 question.	 Rather,	 Bergson	 speaks	 of	 “the	 artifice”	
[l’artifice]	that	makes	a	distinction	between	the	real	and	the	usual,	and	the	“free	act”	
of	human	being	and	“reasonable	evolution”	lies	in	having	this	artifice.	We	can	also	
gather	 from	 the	 above	passage	 that	 this	 artifice	 is	 seen	as	 that	which	makes	 the	






	 Since	 the	 methodological	 questioning	 must	 address	 whether	 the	 chosen	
method	 is	 appropriate	 for	 interpreting	 the	 thing	 to	 be	 interpreted,	 let	 us	
investigate	whether	this	so-called	“artifice”	can	resonate	with	what	we	propose	as	
the	 method	 of	 extraction.	 What	 is	 an	 “artifice”?	 It	 refers	 to	 a	 trick,	 skill,	 or	 a	
craftsmanship,	 etc.	 It	 is	 a	 capacity	 or	 a	 power,	which	 can	 be	 either	 corporeal	 or	





is	 the	 skill	 to	 make	 the	 pots	 and	 the	 knowhow	 to	 coordinate	 the	 production	
process,	 and	 the	 artifice	 for	 cooking	 is	 the	 ability	 to	 cook	 or	 prepare	 food	 in	 a	
certain	way.	In	both	cases,	an	artifice	is	directed	towards	accomplishing	a	certain	
goal,	and	it	is	therefore	directed	towards	something	outside	itself.		Thus,	by	asking	
whether	 the	 method	 of	 extraction	 is	 an	 appropriate	 method,	 we	 are	 asking	
whether	this	method	resonates	with	the	qualities	of	the	so-called	artifice,	which	is	
a	skill	or	a	kind	of	craftsmanship	that	is	directed	towards	a	making	of	something.			
The	methodological	question	that	we	must	raise	here	 is	 this:	 if	an	artifice,	
which	is	a	skill	that	enables	a	making	of	something,	is	the	object	of	interpretation,	
why	 is	 the	 method	 of	 extraction	 appropriate	 for	 this	 task?	 How	 can	 we	





we	 must	 know	 a	 little	 more	 about	 the	 artifice	 itself.	 The	 appropriateness	 of	 a	
method	 for	 the	 thing	 in	question	must	be	determined	by	 the	quality	of	 the	 thing	
that	is	being	approached.	In	other	words,	we	must	let	the	quality	of	the	thing	to	be	





about	 the	 salad	 or	 it	 would	 take	 a	 look	 at	 the	 salad	 and	 try	 to	 turn	 itself	 into	
something	 that	 looks	 like	 a	 fork.	 For	 this	 reason,	 in	 order	 to	 know	whether	 the	
chosen	method	is	appropriate,	we	must	first	take	a	look	at	the	quality	of	the	thing	
itself	 and	 let	 this	 quality	 be	 the	 guide	 for	 judging	 if	 the	 chosen	method	 contains	
matching	qualities.		
We	 have	 already	 stated	 that	 the	 object	 of	 inquiry	 for	 this	 thesis	 is	 the	
method	of	intuition,	and	this	method	is	said	to	be	an	“artifice”.	The	question	for	us	
here	 is	 concerning	 how	 to	 determine	 what	 sort	 of	 method	 does	 the	 so-called	













this	 must	 then	 be	 the	 guide	 for	 us	 to	 judge	 the	 appropriateness	 of	 the	 chosen	
method.	 The	 method	 of	 extraction,	 on	 its	 part,	 must	 therefore	 contain	 the	
capacities	to	derive,	that	is	to	say	to	encounter	and	to	get	in	touch	with	its	object	of	
interpretation	as	well	to	attain	the	artifice	itself	within	itself.		
Another	 important	 quality	 of	 an	 artifice	 is	 that	 it	 is	 the	 transcendental	
condition	of	possibility	for	both	its	products	as	well	as	the	individual	who	possesses	
the	 artifice.	 First,	 let	 us	 consider	 the	 situation	 regarding	 the	 “product”	 of	 the	
artifice.	 Let	 us	 think	 of	 an	 example	 of	 cooking.	 The	 artifice	 of	 cooking	 is	 what	
makes	 the	 production	 of	 food	 possible.	 The	 artifice	 of	 cooking	 serves	 as	 the	
transcendental	condition	for	the	production	of	the	food	made	by	an	individual	who	
posses	 the	 artifice	 of	 cooking	 (a	 cook).	 The	 transcendental	 here	means	 that	 the	
very	being	of	any	 products	 that	 the	artifice	 creates	 is	necessarily	 conditioned	by	
the	 artifice,	 or	 that	 the	 products	 necessarily	 exist	 through	 the	 existence	 of	 the	
artifice.	 Since	 an	 artifice	 is	 what	 makes	 its	 product	 possible,	 the	 product	 is	
necessarily	conditioned	and	brought	to	bear	the	particular	form	of	existence	due	to	
the	 artifice.	 We	 can	 therefore	 call	 the	 relationship	 between	 an	 artifice	 and	 its	
creation,	 a	 transcendental	 synergy	 between	 the	 two.	 The	 thing	 created	 and	 the	
artifice	 for	 it	 is	 transcendentally	 bound	 together,	 and	 the	 very	 existence	 of	 the	




the	 artifice	 of	 cooking	 is	 what	 makes	 any	 production	 of	 food	 possible,	 but	 the	
existence	of	the	artifice	within	the	cook	is	the	transcendental	condition	for	the	very	
being	 of	 the	 cook.	 If	 this	 individual	 was	 not	 a	 cook	 before,	 the	 individual	 has	
become	a	cook	through	an	actual	acquisition	of	the	artifice,	and	without	the	artifice	
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of	 cooking,	 the	 individual	 would	 not	 be	 a	 cook.	 Thus,	 the	 derivation	 and	 the	
acquisition	 of	 the	 artifice	 is	 what	 conditions	 the	 very	 being	 of	 the	 individual	
transcendentally.		
Now,	 let	us	scrutinize	 further	about	 the	appropriateness	of	 the	method	of	
extraction	 for	 the	particular	 type	of	artifice	 that	 is	 in	question.	Bergson	makes	 it	
clear	within	 the	above	passage	 from	Matter	and	Memory	that	 the	artifice	 that	he	
speaks	 of	 vis-a-vis	 the	 end	 of	 reasonable	 evolution	 is	 that	 of	 “distinguishing”	
[distinguer]	two	points	of	view.	What	exactly	is	this	“distinguishing”?		
The	artifice	of	“distinguishing”	can	be	described	in	terms	of	a	skill	to	tell	the	
difference,	 to	 see	 an	 inner	 division	 within	 a	 thing,	 or	 clearly	 demarcating	 two	
separate	 regions,	 qualities,	 etc	 of	 a	 thing.	 Then,	 what	 are	 those	 things	 that	 are	
distinguished	from	each	other	within	the	thing?	If,	as	we	just	remarked,	an	artifice	
is	the	transcendental	condition	of	the	thing	it	creates,	with	what	does	the	specific	
artifice	 in	 question	 have	 its	 transcendental	 synergy?	 What	 does	 this	 specific	
artifice	create	and	to	what	does	it	serve	as	its	transcendental	condition?	They	are	
said	 to	 be	 two	points	of	view	 [le	point	de	vue]	of	 cognition	 [la	connaissance],	 and	
those	two	points	of	view	are	of	“ideas”	[idées]	on	the	one	hand	and	the	“feeling”	or	
“sentiments”	[sentiments]	on	the	other.	What	do	those	attributes	tell	us	about	the	
specific	 quality	 of	 the	 artifice?	 What	 kind	 of	 things	 does	 this	 artifice	 of	
distinguishing	create	or	what	sort	of	creativity	does	it	condition	transcendentally?	









between	 the	 “usual”	 and	 the	 “real”,	 or	 between	 “ideas”	 and	 “feelings”,	 and	 this	
capacity	itself	is	what	makes	“reasonable	evolution”	possible.		
Furthermore,	we	 have	 stated	 that	 an	 artifice	 is	 itself	 something,	 and	 it	 is	






condition	 for	 the	 thinking	 human	 being	 to	 be	what	 it	 is	 and	 the	 artifice	 is	what	
brings	about	 the	 transformation	of	 the	 individual	 in	becoming	a	 thinking	human	
being.		
We	are	now	in	a	better	position	to	see	if	the	proposed	method	of	extraction	
is	 appropriate	 for	 the	 task.	 Overall,	we	must	 not	 forget	 that	 this	methodological	
consideration	 is	 directed	 towards	 the	 method	 of	 interpreting	 the	 method	 of	
intuition.	That	is,	the	methodological	problem	that	we	are	dealing	with	is:		through	
what	 appropriate	method	 of	 interpretation	 can	 the	 artifice	 be	 approached	 if	 the	
object	in	question	is	a	method	of	philosophy	that	transcendentally	conditions	the	
free	 act	 of	 thinking	 human	 being	 as	 well	 as	 the	 very	 being	 of	 the	 human	 being	
itself?	What	qualities	 are	must	 the	method	of	 extraction	 contain	within	 it?	 If	 the	
artifice	 in	 question	 is	 the	 transcendental	 condition	 that	 produces	 the	 thinking	
being	with	a	capacity	 for	 free	act	and	reasonable	evolution,	an	acquisition	of	 this	
artifice	 by	 an	 individual	 brings	 about	 a	 transformation	 of	 the	 individual	 into	 an	
individual	who	is	actually	able	to	think	(being	a	thinking	being)	and	is	able	to	have	
a	concept	for	this	capacity	of	thinking.		
As	 we	 stated,	 in	 order	 for	 a	 method	 to	 be	 appropriate	 for	 the	 thing	 in	
question,	 the	method	must	deserve	 its	place	 in	 front	of	 the	 thing	or	 that	 it	must	
already	 contain	 the	 quality	 that	 it	 sees	 in	 the	 thing.	 Thus,	 since	 the	 artifice	 is	
something	 that	 brings	 about	 a	 transformation	 to	 the	 individual	 that	 comes	 to	
acquire	it,	the	method	that	is	required	to	get	a	hold	of	this	must	itself	be	capable	of	




Then,	 since	 the	 artifice	 is	 the	 transcendental	 condition	 for	 the	 creation	of	




a	 bearer	 of	 the	 artifice	 or	 a	 being	 a	 thinking	 human	 being.	 The	 method	 of	
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extraction	 must	 therefore	 be	 able	 to	 bring	 about	 a	 self-transformation	 of	 the	
individual.			
Granted	the	artifice	is	what	makes	the	human	possible	transcendentally,	this	
transcendental	 condition	 of	 the	 human	 is	 itself	 an	 object	 of	 attainment	 and	
creation.	 The	 method	 in	 question	 therefore	 must	 be	 able	 to	 derive	 itself	 first	
through	 first	 encountering	 itself,	 and	 then	 conceiving	 of	 itself	 through	 this	 self-





What,	 then,	does	 it	mean	 to	attain	 the	skill	 that	makes	 the	creation	of	 the	
human	being	possible	and	how	is	it	that	the	method	of	extraction	can	be	judged	as	




the	 concept	 for	 the	 artifice,	 and	 this	 is	 the	 same	 as	 to	 actually	 attaining	 the	
transcendental	 condition	 through	 the	hermeneutic	method	of	extraction.	Overall,	
the	method	 of	 extracting	 a	meaning	 of	 philosophical	 texts	 then	 is	 to	 acquire	 an	




Where,	 however,	 can	 we	 get	 in	 touch	 with	 and	 derive	 the	 artifice	 in	 question?	
Which	texts	shall	we	focus	specifically	in	order	to	derive	the	artifice?	Of	course,	if	it	
is	indeed	Bergson’s	philosophical	method,	the	artifice	of	making	the	distinction	is	
present	 within	 everything	 he	 wrote.	 However,	 depending	 upon	 the	 particular	
subject-matters	 that	 are	 looked	 at	 through	 the	 artifice,	 our	 chance	 of	 directly	
encountering	the	artifice	itself	varies	significantly.	The	artifice	of	distinguishing	the	
usual	and	the	real	–	where	can	we	look	in	order	to	see	from	where	it	springs	forth?	
The	answer	to	this	question	 is	prefigured	 in	the	choice	of	 the	main	philosophical	
subject-matter,	which	is	Bergson’s	theory	of	intuition	as	his	philosophical	method.	
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In	 order	 to	 receive	 and	 conceive	 of	 the	 artifice	 in	 question,	 we	 must	 examine	
Bergson’s	theory	of	intuition	before	everything-else.		
It	 is	 for	 this	 reason	 that	 the	 present	 thesis	 will	 focus	 primarily	 upon	
Bergson’s	 first	 two	 major	 works	 –	 Time	 and	 Free	Will	 and	Matter	 and	Memory.	
Within	 these	 first	 two	works,	 Bergson	 establishes	 his	 theory	 of	 intuition	 as	 the	
transcendental	 condition	 of	 human	 experience	 through	 taking	 up	 a	 particular	
philosophical	 position	 vis-a-vis	Kant’s	 theory	 of	 time.	 It	 is	within	 those	 first	 two	
works	that	we	can	see	his	theoretical	justification	for	the	acquired	artifice.	In	order	
to	extract	the	artifice,	we	will	not	so	much	focus	upon	Creative	Evolution,	which	is	
perhaps	 his	most	 famous	 work	 and	 one	 that	 seems	 to	 be	 the	most	 appropriate	
work	for	this	thesis.		
Creative	Evolution	is	a	work	that	Bergson	deals	with	the	theory	of	evolution	
through	 investigating	 into	 the	 natural	 history	 of	 human	 faculties	 (intellect	 and	
instinct).	Due	to	this	characteristic,	it	seems	like	a	work	that	requires	our	primary	








the	 intellect	 and	 of	 the	 instinct.	 But	 the	 question	 for	 us	 is	 regarding	 the	
philosophical	method	 that	 allows	Bergson	 to	 speculate	 upon	 this	 division	 in	 the	
first	 place.	 If	 the	 artifice	 of	 distinguishing,	 or	 the	 method	 of	 intuition	 is	 really	
Bergson’s	 philosophical	 method,	 the	 whole	 discourse	 within	 Creative	 Evolution	








Of	 course,	 all	 of	 Bergson’s	 writings	 are	 taken	 into	 consideration	 in	 this	
thesis	and	our	choice	of	treating	Time	and	Free	Will	and	Matter	and	Memory	as	our	
primary	 texts	 does	 not	mean	 that	we	 condemn	 other	works	 or	 that	we	will	 not	
make	any	references	to	it.	Rather,	it	just	means	that	the	artifice	is	already	at	work	
within	 the	 writing	 of	 other	 works,	 and	 the	 derivation	 and	 the	 conceptual	
justification	for	the	artifice	must	be	treated	as	our	main	texts	for	the	thesis.		
	 We	 just	 mentioned	 that	 it	 is	 within	 the	 first	 two	 works	 that	 Bergson	
engages	 with	 Kant’s	 theory	 of	 time.	 Kant’s	 theory	 of	 time,	 in	 its	 marvelous	
complexity,	 is	 at	 the	 end	 a	 theory	 of	 the	 transcendental	 condition	 of	 human	
experience	or	 intuition.	 If	Bergson	derives	a	new	theory	of	 time	 through	reading	
and	 arguing	 against	 Kant,	 and	 through	 this	 he	 acquires	 a	 new	 method	 of	
philosophy,	 this	 means	 that	 Bergson	 has	 an	 alternative	 theory	 of	 the	
transcendental	 condition	 of	 human	 experience	 or	 that	 he	 had	 acquired	 and	
conceived	of	the	new	transcendental	artifice	for	the	human	experience	in	general.	
This	 thesis	 is	 an	 attempt	 to	 extract	 this	 alternative	 theory	 of	 the	 transcendental	
condition	 that	Bergson	had	acquired.	The	artifice	 that	we	aim	to	extract	must	be	
situated	 where	 Bergson	 theorizes	 what	 the	 transcendental	 condition	 of	 human	








cleared	 away	 beforehand.	 One	 thing	 that	 was	 not	 sufficiently	 explained	 in	 the	
above	description	of	the	method	of	extraction	is	its	adherence	to	materialism.	That	
is,	 the	method	of	 extraction	 is	proposed	 in	a	way	 that	adheres	 to	 the	materialist	
reversal	of	dialectic,	and	it	must	therefore	be	seen	within	this	particular	scenery.			
Marx	 says	 in	 the	 1873	 Postface	 to	 Capital	 that	 the	 dialectical	 method	 he	
employs	 is	 a	 reversal	 of	 Hegel’s	 and	 this	 amounts	 to	 designating	 the	 Material	




the	 case.	 That	 is,	 the	 method	 of	 extraction	 must	 be	 able	 to	 defend	 itself	 as	 a	
materialist	theory	of	interpretation	that	adheres	to	the	reversal	of	dialectic.		
Furthermore,	 if	 this	 adherence	 to	 materialism	 is	 actually	 successful,	 the	
method	 of	 extraction	must	 be	 able	 to	 prevent	 itself	 from	 falling	 into	 the	 trap	 of	
nihilism,	 and	 it	 can	 successfully	 overcome	 materialism’s	 shortcomings	 to	 fully	
realizing	itself	as	something	that	differs	from	idealism.	In	other	words,	nihilism	is	
the	product	of	idealism	wearing	the	mask	of	materialism,	and	we	shall	ask	whether	




First	 of	 all,	 to	 point	 out	 an	 obvious	 concern,	 it	 is	 not	 so	 difficult	 to	 turn	 the	
proposed	method	 of	 interpretation	 itself	 into	 an	 object	 of	 a	materialist	 critique.	
The	 method	 of	 extraction	 is,	 after	 all,	 a	 method	 of	 interpreting	 the	 meaning	 of	
philosophical	texts.	If	this	is	the	case,	from	a	materialist	perspective,	one	can	easily	
claim	 that	an	 interpreted	meaning	of	 texts	 is	necessarily	derived	 from	the	actual	
material-historical	forces	that	surrounds	the	activity	of	interpretation	that	a	priori	
determines	 the	meaning.	Then,	 the	proposed	method	of	actually	getting	 in	 touch	
with	the	quality	of	the	artifice	itself	seem	like	a	naive	idealist	belief.	After	all	that	
was	said	so	far	about	the	materialism	of	the	method	of	intuition,	isn’t	the	method	
of	 extraction	 that	 interprets	 the	 method	 still	 based	 upon	 a	 naive	 faith	 in	 the	
autonomy	 of	 a	 philosophical	 Idea?	 After	 all	 that	 was	 said	 and	 proposed	 about	
Bergson’s	materialism	 and	 his	 supposed	 overcoming	 of	 nihilism,	 isn’t	 this	 thesis	




here	without	overtaking	what	 is	 to	be	done	within	 the	actual	body	of	 the	 thesis.	
However,	without	 going	outside	of	 the	 confines	of	 the	general	description	of	 the	







and	 Bergsonism	 have	 been	 one	 of	 the	 favorite	 targets	 for	 Marxist	 ideology	
criticism.	 For	 instance,	 many	 well-known	 ideology	 criticisms	 that	 target	 Gilles	
Deleuze’s	philosophy	have	been	based	upon	the	well-known	materialist	criticism	
of	Bergson	due	to	Deleuze’s	supposed	Bergsonism.	The	name	of	Bergson	has	long	
denoted	 the	 supposed	 vitalism,	 spiritualism,	 or	 the	 inability	 to	 critique	 its	 own	
historicity,	etc.52		
The	question	is:	how	is	 it	possible	that	what	we	propose	as	the	method	of	
extracting	 the	 transcendental	 artifice	 protects	 itself	 from	 such	 a	 simple	 ideology	
critique?	And,	by	extension,	how	is	 it	possible	that	the	method	of	extraction	does	






Life	 through	 a	 genuine	 materialism.	 If,	 as	 we	 propose,	 that	 materialism	 can	 be	
described	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 reversal	 of	 dialectic	 that	 Marx	 brought	 about,	 the	
Material	Life-Process	or	Life	is	the	so-called	Demiurge	of	the	real.	Let	us	remember	
that	 Marx	 said	 “Life	 is	 not	 determined	 by	 consciousness,	 but	 consciousness	 by	
Life.”53	If	this	is	the	case,	what	exactly	is	Life	and	what	does	it	mean	to	say	that	Life	
is	the	Demiurge	of	the	real?	Furthermore,	what	 is	the	status	of	this	so-called	Life	
within	 the	 proposed	method	 of	 interpreting	 a	meaning	 of	 philosophical	 texts?	 If	
Life	is	different	from	an	Idea	and	if	Life	is	indeed	what	creates	the	“real”,	how	can	a	
method	of	interpretation	protect	itself	from	being	entirely	determined	by	Life	and	
hence	merely	being	an	externally	determined	 ideology?	Where	 is	Life	within	 the	
method	of	extraction	and	how	is	it	different	from	an	Idea	of	Life?		








53	Marx, K & Engels, F., ([1964] 1976). The German Ideology. Moscow: Progress Publishers. 
p.42.	
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unaware	of	 itself	does	not	know	what	Life	 itself	 is	 independent	of	the	ideological	
conception	 that	 it	 has	 about	 it.	 That	 is,	 an	 ideological	 philosophy	 confuses	 Life	
itself	 with	 the	 ideological	 construction/mediation	 of	 Life	 itself.	 If	 the	 proposed	








Within	materialism,	 this	 seemingly	 innocent	 phenomenon	 of	 Life	 itself	 is	
the	 keystone	 that	 supports	 everything-else	 that	 exists.	 If	 a	 concept	 of	 Life	 is	 not	
Life,	and	 if	our	task	 is	 to	know	Life	 itself,	 through	what	means	can	one	approach	
Life	 itself?	 First	 of	 all,	 if	 Life	 is	 the	 object	 of	 knowledge,	 what	 is	 the	 tool	 that	
deserves	its	place	for	it?	In	order	to	take	up	and	defend	the	philosophical	position	
of	materialism,	Life	is	something	that	must	be	known	in-itself	and	one	must	know	
its	 difference	 from	 the	 concept	 of	 Life.	 That	 is,	 a	 concept	 or	 a	 philosophical	
consciousness	of	Life	 is	not	Life,	and	all	conceptual	means	 to	know	Life	does	not	
count	 as	 a	 proper	 knowledge	 of	 Life.	 This	 obviously	 does	 not	 mean	 that	
philosophical	concepts	are	evil	and	we	must	get	rid	of	 it	 in	order	to	reach	Life.	 If	
one	engages	in	such	a	one-sided	dualism,	Life	cannot	be	reached.		




lacking	 from	anything	within	 the	 real	with	no	exceptions.	To	place	oneself	within	
the	 real	 for	 materialism	 is	 to	 see	 everything	 that	 exists	 in	 the	 world	 as	 being	
necessarily	conditioned	by	Life.	If	Life	is	what	conditions	absolutely	everything,	it	
can	 be	 said	 that	 an	 act	 of	 interpreting	 a	 meaning	 of	 philosophical	 texts	 must	





The	 present	 thesis	 aims	 at	 interpreting	 a	 philosophical	 artifice.	 The	
question	 is,	 in	 order	 to	 preliminarily	 defend	 the	 materialism	 of	 the	 method	 of	
extraction,	 how	 is	 it	 that	 a	mere	 interpretation	 of	 texts	 can	 claim	 to	 go	 beyond	
merely	 recognizing	 its	 external	 derivation?	 The	 only	way	 forward	 is	 to	 say	 that	







something-else.	 It	 is	 a	 symbol	 that	 points	 towards	 an	 other	 region	 of	 reality	
outside	of	 itself.	Here,	we	are	 simply	 saying	 that	 a	 concept	of	 a	 spoon	 is	not	 the	
spoon.		





concept	 and	 the	 inside	 of	 concept	 must	 be	 identical	 to	 each	 other	 in	 order	 to	
properly	describe	the	realm	of	Life	vis-a-vis	the	concept.	To	acquire	the	artifice	of	
distinguishing	 the	points	of	view	of	 ideas	and	 feelings	 is	 to	 take	up	two	separate	
points	of	views	within	the	same	human	being.	From	the	side	of	Life	within	a	human	
being,	 the	 concept	 is	 what	 gets	 produced	 through	 its	 effort	 –	 the	 concept	 is	 its	
product.	 From	 the	 side	 of	 the	 concept,	 however,	 this	 does	 not	mean	 that	 Life	 is	
lacking	from	it.	Life	is	the	transcendental	condition	of	the	concept,	and	this	means	
that	 Life	 resides	within	 the	 concept.	 Life	 is	 the	 energy	of	 the	 concept,	 or	 its	 very	









The	 more	 appropriate	 question	 for	 the	 proposed	 method	 regarding	 its	
materialism	 is	 how	 to	 deal	 with	 the	 consequence	 of	 accepting	 the	 possibility	 of	
knowing	 Life	 itself.	 If	 Life	 can	 be	 known,	 a	 thinking	 person	 is	 not	 merely	 the	
conception	 one	 has	 of	 oneself.	 The	 concept	 one	 has	 of	 oneself	 is	 itself	 made	
possible	 by	 Life,	 and	 this	 Life	 that	makes	 one’s	 self-conception	 possible	 is	 itself	
known	and	located	within	oneself.	Once	the	knowledge	of	Life	is	actually	acquired	
by	 an	 individual,	 the	 individual	 comes	 to	 possess	 the	 condition	 that	 makes	 the	
individual	within	 oneself.	 A	 philosophical	 thinking	within	 this	 scenery,	 that	 is	 to	
say		a	conceptual	articulation	of	itself	and	the	production	of	a	concept	for	itself	gets	




Let	 us	 discuss	 the	 last	 point	 a	 bit	 more	 and	 let	 it	 be	 the	 last	 aspect	 of	 this	





of	 being	 one-sidedly	 constituted	 as	 merely	 “affective”	 existence.	 The	 method	 of	
extraction	 is	 an	 acquisition	 of	 the	 artifice	 and	 a	 creation	 of	 the	 concept	 for	 the	
artifice.	This	method	of	interpretation	is	suggested	to	be	an	appropriate	one	for	the	
artifice	also	because	the	meaning	of	reasonable	evolution	as	well	as	what	is	meant	
by	 the	 “free	 act”	 of	 the	 thinking	 being	 is	 expected	 to	 show	 itself	 through	 the	
interpretive	exercise.		
	 However,	 against	 the	 supposed	 materialism	 of	 the	 proposed	 endeavour,	
how	is	 it	possible	 that	such	a	capacity	 for	“the	 free	act”	 is	seen	as	belonging	to	a	
mere	 human	 being?	Why	 is	 it	 that	 such	 a	 freedom,	which	 denotes	 the	 power	 of	
being	 the	causa	sui	as	well	 as	having	 the	capacity	 for	auto-determination,	 can	be	
seen	 as	 granted	 to	 an	 individual	 human	 being	 who	 employs	 the	 method	 of	
interpretation?	 If	 what	 we	 have	 argued	 so	 far	 can	 be	 granted	 its	 validity,	 the	
proposed	method	of	 extraction	has	 the	quality	 of	 being	 able	 to	 actually	bringing	
about	 a	 transformation	 to	 an	 individual	 who	 practices	 it,	 and	 the	 result	 of	 this	
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trap	 of	 nihilism	 and	 really	 say	 that	 an	 individual	 can	 in	 fact	 come	 to	 possess	 a	
capacity	 for	self-determination?	The	materialist	reversal	of	dialectic	 introduced	a	
transformation	 to	 the	 concept	 of	 the	 Absolute,	 and	 the	 new	 concept	 now	points	
towards	 the	 so-called	 Material	 Life-Process.	 We	 have	 already	 stressed	 that	 the	
dialectic	clearly	defines	this	Life	to	be	different	from	the	concept	of	Life	and	further	
that	Life	 itself	must	be	something	 in	 its	own	right.	 If	one	was	 to	pose	a	question	










	 In	 order	 to	 demarcate	 our	 own	 position,	 let	 us	 point	 out	 Gilles	 Deleuze’s	
reading	of	Bergson	and	explain	how	our	 reading	differs	 from	 it.	Even	 though	we	
admire	Deleuze’s	 own	 philosophy	 as	well	 as	 his	 reading	 of	 Bergson	 greatly,	 our	




duration	refers	 first	and	foremost	to	an	experience	of	Life	 itself	and	it	 is	 through	





talking	about	 is	not	granted	 to	an	empirical	 individual	but	 to	an	 “immemorial	or	
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ontological	 Memory”.55	Deleuze	 says	 that	 within	 Bergson’s	 philosophy,	 a	 certain	
“leap”	is	made	and	this	leap	introduces	us	into	“the	element	of	sense.”56	The	word,	
“ontological”	here	means	that	the	so-called	immemorial	memory	is	in	fact	a	supra-
sensible	 Idea	 that	has	no	basis	 in	sensuous	reality.	What	 is	accessed	 through	the	




Being	 is	 an	 actual	 object	 of	 encounter	 and	 it	 is	 a	 question	 of	 knowing	 the	 true	
nature	of	duration.	It	is	not	a	question	of	Memory	since,	for	us,	duration	does	not	
appear	as	such	 if	 the	region	one	seeks	 it	 is	 the	realm	of	memory.	Memory,	as	we	
will	 explain	 in	 the	 second	chapter,	 is	 already	a	 representation	of	duration	and	 it	
differs	 in	 kind	 from	 duration	 itself.	 Deleuze	 made	 a	 mistake	 to	 assume	 that	
duration	itself	can	only	be	attained	through	“leaping”	into	the	Ontological,	and	this	
move	 effectively	 turns	 Bergson’s	 philosophy	 into	 an	 idealism.	 For	 us,	 Being	 can	
only	 be	 accessed	 if	 one	 seizes	 to	 think	 in	 terms	 of	 leaping	 into	 it	 and	 actually	
coming	 to	posses	 the	means	 through	which	 it	 is	accessed	here	and	now,	which	 is	
the	 realm	 of	 perception	 and	 not	memory.	That	 is,	 the	 so-called	Deleuzian	 “leap”	
into	 the	 ontological	 is	 precisely	 that	 which	 prevents	 the	 actual	 encounter	 and	
taking	 possession	 of	 Life	 within	 perception	 and	 this	 is	 the	 major	 obstacle	 that	
materialist	philosophy	must	overcome	in	order	to	prevent	nihilism.	What	is	said	to	
be	the	“Ontological”	by	Deleuze	is	not,	 for	our	method	of	extraction	that	is,	really	
Being.	 The	 “Ontological”	 must	 rather	 be	 put	 into	 quotation	 marks	 because	 the	
actuality	of	the	ontological	resides	outside	the	region	of	the	concept	in	general.	The	
“Ontological”,	 that	 is	 to	 say	 Being	 itself,	 cannot	 be	 truly	 accessed	 in	 itself	 if	 it	 is	
regarded	as	a	region	one	gets	to	through	“leaping”	and	escaping	into	it	from	here.	A	
leap	into	something	is	to	depart	from	the	here	and	now.	If	the	“Ontological”	is	what	
is	 accessed	 through	 departing	 from	 the	 here	 and	 now,	 one	 is	 not	 in	 fact	 in	 the	
actual	presence	of	the	ontological	in	its	material	reality.	Life,	if	it	is	in	fact	different	
from	the	concept	of	Life,	cannot	be	an	object	of	attainment	through	departing	from	

















time,	which	differs	 in	kind	 from	duration.	As	 it	 is	well	known,	Bergson	 famously	
argues	 against	 the	 Kantian	 conception	 of	 time	 by	 putting	 forth	 the	 thesis	 of	
duration,	 which	 is	 said	 to	 be	 what	 constitutes	 “real”	 time.	 From	 this	 latter	
perspective,	 Kantian	 time	 is	 a	 transcendental	 form	 of	 mediation	 (intuition	 as	 a	
priori	mediated	by	time	as	the	form	of	 intuition)	but	for	Bergson,	 it	 is	that	which	
distorts	 genuine	duration	 and	 turns	 it	 into	 an	 illegitimate	 translation	of	 the	 Self.	
However,	as	we	have	briefly	explained	above,	Bergson’s	criticism	of	time	is	not	a	
simple	 opposition.	 Rather,	 a	 close	 reading	 reveals	 that	 Bergson	 in	 fact	 retrieves	
Kantian	time	as	a	real	existence,	which	comes	into	being	out	of	social	relations	as	
the	 condition	of	 the	 “surface	ego”	 [le	moi	superficiel].	That	 is,	 after	 criticising	 the	






“suffering”	 within	 material	 reality.	 Time	 is	 therefore	 a	 social	 construction	 and	
hence	the	transcendental	condition	of	experience	in	the	Kantian	sense	of	the	term	
is	seen	as	a	product	of	material	historical	formation.	Reconfigured	in	this	way,	the	








contradistinction	to	“space”	or	Kantian/spatialized	time.	 If,	as	we	argue	 in	Part	 I,	
Kantian	 time	 indeed	does	exist	 for	Bergson,	 the	 simple	opposition	between	 time	
and	duration	fails	to	characterise	the	nature	of	 intuition.	That	 is,	duration	or	real	
time	is	not	what	replaces	false	time	when	it	enters	into	the	scene.	On	the	contrary,	
neither	 time	 nor	 duration	 vanishes	 and	 duration	 is	 what	 must	 be	 held	 in	 sight	
along	with	time	and	side	by	side	within	intuition.	That	is,	although	it	is	outside	of	
the	 milieu	 of	 what	 we	 will	 call	 ordinary	 within-time-ness	 (the	 world	 of	
appearance/mundus	sensibilis),	the	realism	of	time	does	not	abolish	the	particular	
presence	of	 duration	within	 intuition.	 Duration	 is	 a	 kind	 of	without-time-ness,	or	
what	Kant	 conceives	 as	Freedom	 	“within”	 intuition	presented	 alongside	 time.	 In	
short,	duration	will	be	explored	in	terms	of	a	transcendental	condition	that	lets	the	
Other	of	Time	appear	within	intuition.		
	 Due	 to	 its	 immediacy,	many	 commentators	 have	 mistaken	 duration	 as	 a	
correlate	 of	 idealism.	 In	 comparison	 to	 Kantian	 idealism	 of	 without-time-ness	
(rightly	argued	by	Fichte	and	others),	we	will	demonstrate	that	the	without-time-
ness	of	duration	is	that	which	is	given	within	sensuous	experience.	The	“immediate”	




of	 access	 employed	 for	 duration	 thus	 belongs	 to	 a	 qualitatively	 different	 order.	
Such	 a	 view	 of	 duration	 refers	 to	 an	 immediate	 sensuousness	 outside	 of	 the	
temporal	 reflection	 and	 it	 is	 therefore	 a	 non-Ideal,	 non-abstract,	 and	 hence	
materialist	mediation	of	the	absolute	through	a	superior	form	of	sense	awareness.				
	 In	plain	terms,	what	we	argue	is	achieved	through	this	theory	of	duration	is	
a	 foundation	 for	 what	 Heidegger	 calls	 “the	 reversal	 of	 metaphysics”,	 or,	 what	
amounts	to	the	same	thing,	the	overcoming	of	the	Western	“Ontotheology”.57	As	we	
will	 see,	 duration	 grasps	 the	 Absolute	 Self	 in	 a	 way	 that	 differs	 from	 temporal	





socio-political	 critique	 of	 ideology,	 on	 the	 other	 apprehending	 duration	 within	
intuition	protects	our	own	critical	capacity	from	falling	into	relativist	perspectivism,	
or	into	the	trap	of	the	self-denial	that	is	nihilism.	Historical	criticism,	which	places	
any	 pronouncement	 of	 truths	 in	 quotation	marks,	 lacks	 the	 ability	 to	 affirm	 the	
Absolute	 Self	 in-itself.	What	we	 need,	 however,	 is	 a	method	 that	 articulates	 our	
true	 foundation,	 which	 does	 not	 turn	 into	 a	 mere	 imaginary	 fabrication.	 In	 the	
following	 chapters,	 we	 will	 argue	 that	 this	 foundation	 gives	 us	 not	 only	 the	




























































magic	 effect	 called	 into	 being,	 an	 unstable	 and	 inconstant	 illusion	 without	
substance,	comparable	to	optical	illusion	and	the	dream,	a	veil	enveloping	human	
consciousness	[…]	Such	clear	knowledge	and	calm,	deliberate	presentation	of	this	





























Due	 to	 this	 opposition,	 commentators	 across	 the	 spectrum	 base	 their	 readings	
upon	an	assumption	that	time	in	fact	does	not	exist	for	Bergson.	Accordingly,	the	
attribute	 “Bergsonism”	has	 come	 to	 represent	one	who	accepts	 the	annulment	of	
time	through	the	concept	of	duration.	For	those	who	are	fundamentally	opposed	to	
Bergson,	 this	 supposed	 denial	 of	 time	 simultaneously	 proves	 his	 inexcusable	
naiveté	towards	 the	historical	mediation	of	consciousness;	consequently,	 the	 lack	
of	 time	 is	 the	 testimony	 to	 his	 inability	 to	 put	 forth	 a	 revolutionary	 negation	 of	
ideological	 illusion.	A	notable	 illustration	of	 this	 anti-Bergsonian	position	 can	be	
seen	in	Horkheimer’s	remark	in	On	Bergson’s	Metaphysics	of	Time:			
	
Instead	 of	 placing	 his	 psychological	 analyses	 in	 the	 service	 of	 a	 more	
differentiated	knowledge	of	the	historical	context,	always	more	conscious	of	
its	 own	preconditions,	 for	 Bergson	 himself	 they	 are	 directed	 to	 the	 goal	 of	
establishing	 and	 of	 guaranteeing	 his	myth	 of	 ‘creative	 evolution’.	 However,	
the	 contradiction	which	disrupts	 this	 philosophy	 in	 its	 totality	 […]	 consists	
between	 the,	 in	 principle,	 unhistorical	 thought	 of	 the	 entire	 tradition	 upon	
which	Bergson	is	dependent,	and	his	undertaking	to	comprehend	the	role	of	
time.	Since	every	metaphysics	necessarily	includes	the	idea	that	its	form	and	





“a	metaphysical	principle”.	That	 is,	 rather	 than	subordinating	metaphysics	under	
the	 time	 of	 history	 and	 understanding	 the	 latter	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 historical	
determination	 of	 human	 subjectivity,	 Bergson	 naively	 assumes	 that	 real	 time	 is	
																																																								









Since	 the	 end	 of	 the	 nineteenth	 century,	 philosophy	 has	 made	 a	 series	 of	
attempts	 to	 grasp	 “true”	 experience,	 as	 opposed	 to	 the	 kind	 that	manifests	
itself	 in	 the	 standardised,	 denatured	 life	 of	 the	 civilized	 masses.	 It	 is	
customary	to	classify	these	efforts	under	the	heading	of	a	philosophy	of	life.	
Their	 point	 of	 departure,	 understandably	 enough,	 was	 not	 man’s	 life	 in	
society.	What	they	invoked	was	poetry,	preferably	nature,	and,	most	recently,	
the	age	of	myths.	Dilthey’s	book	Das	Erlebnis	und	die	Dichtung	represents	one	
of	 the	 earliest	 of	 these	 efforts	which	 end	with	Klages	 and	 Jung;	 both	made	
common	 cause	 with	 Fascism.	 Towering	 above	 this	 literature	 is	 Bergson’s	
early	 monumental	 work,	 Matière	 et	 Mémoire.	 […]	 Experience	 is	 indeed	 a	
matter	of	tradition,	in	collective	existence	as	well	as	private	life.	It	is	less	the	
product	of	facts	firmly	anchored	in	memory	than	of	a	convergence	in	memory	





dimension	 of	 the	 historical	 determination	 of	 subjectivity.	 Moreover,	 by	 pointing	
out	 that	Bergson	 is	 the	 quintessential	 philosopher	 that	 attempted	 to	 grasp	 “true	
experience”	beyond	the	standpoint	of	“man’s	life	in	society”,	Bergson’s	philosophy	
is	counted	amongst	those	who	“made	common	case	to	Fascism”.			
	 If	we	are	 to	defend	 the	use	of	Bergson’s	dialectical	method	 for	politics,	 the	











61	Benjamin,	 W.,	 ([1972	 –	 1989]	 2003).	 “On	 Some	 Motifs	 in	 Baudelaire”.	 In	 Selected	
Writings	Vol.4	1938-1940.		Trans.	E.	Jephcott.	Massachusetts:	Harvard	Univ.	Press.	p.314.		
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an	 image	 of	 a	 naïve	 metaphysician	 that	 one	 must	 oppose	 if	 one	 endorses	
materialism.		
	 In	 a	 word,	 what	 Horkheimer	 and	 Benjamin	 insist	 upon	 is	 the	 political	
necessity	of	putting	forth	a	revolutionary	“no”.	In	other	words,	they	insist	upon	the	
operation	of	dialectical	negation	 that	 issues	a	 self-critique	so	as	 to	overcome	 the	
bourgeois	 ideology	 inherent	 within	 any	 uncritical,	 positivist	 ideology	
masquerading	as	the	true	experience	of	the	world.	In	Marx’s	words,	this	“no”	is	a	
“negative	revelation”	and	a	feeling	of	shame,	which	is	like	“a	lion	recoiling	in	order	
to	 spring.”62	This	 is	 the	 moment	 when	 the	 “most	 repulsive	 despotism	 stands	
revealed	for	all	the	world	to	see”	and	functions	as	the	springboard	towards	the	real	
“reform	of	 consciousness”.63	It	 is	 out	 of	 an	 allegiance	 to	 this	Marxist	 project	 that	
much	 of	 political	 criticism	 strives	 to	 define	 itself	 and	 oppose	 to	 the	 alleged	
positivist	tendency	in	Bergson’s	philosophy.		
	 In	order	to	defend	the	political	efficacy	of	Bergson’s	method	of	intuition,	we	
will	 challenge	 the	 traditional	 reading	 of	 Bergson	 that	 treats	 him	 as	 a	 naïve	
metaphysician	 and	 will	 instead	 locate	 a	 distinct	 theoretical	 framework	 that	 is	
capable	 of	 putting	 forth	 negation	 in	 his	 concept	 of	 time.	 For	 us,	 to	 ask	whether	
Bergson’s	philosophy	is	capable	of	putting	forth	negation	is	equivalent	to	asking	if	
Bergson	 has	 thought	 of	 time	 as	 a	 real	 existence.	 “Time”	 here	 refers	 to	 the	
equivalent	 of	 the	 concept	 of	 history	 deployed	within	 the	materialist	 criticism	 of	
subjectivity	and	not	to	the	concept	of	duration.	As	opposed	to	the	latter,	which	is	
said	to	be	the	real	time	or	the	immediate	datum	of	consciousness,	time	of	historical	
critique	 refers	 to	 the	 Kantian	 derivation	 of	 the	 concept,	 which	 is	 the	 form	 of	
mediation	that	 conditions	 and	 colours	 individual	 experiences	 in	 a	particular	way	
depending	 upon	 the	 historicity	 of	 the	 social/material	 milieu	 that	 surrounds	 the	
individual.	To	affirm	the	reality	of	time	is	therefore	to	affirm	the	real	existence	of	














method	 with	 the	 distinct	 capacity	 to	 criticise	 the	 historical	 determination	 of	
subjectivity.		
	 Of	course,	duration	is	the	real	time	for	Bergson	and	he	presents	this	concept	




us”.64	In	 turn,	 this	 absolutism	 of	 duration	 seems	 to	 be	 a	 blatant	 violation	 of	 the	
Marxist	 theory	 of	 historical	 determination	 of	 consciousness.	 Many	 would	 thus	
conclude	that	the	concept	of	duration	seems	to	be	a	product	of	Bergson’s	inability	




for	 the	 existence	 of	 the	 unhistorical	 element	 within	 experience	 is	 one	 thing.	 To	






contains	within	 it	 a	 realism,	 or	 a	 socio-historical	 constructivism	of	Kantian	 time,	















As	 its	 English	 title	 suggests,	 Time	 and	 Free	Will	 principally	 expounds	 upon	 the	
relationship	 between	 the	 concept	 of	 time	 and	 the	 problem	 of	 free	 will.	 More	
specifically,	 Bergson	 focuses	 upon	 Kant’s	 conception	 of	 time	 and	 criticizes	 it	 for	
reinstating	 the	 Eleatic	 paradox	 (the	 race	 between	 Achilles	 and	 the	 tortoise)	 in	
terms	of	the	problem	of	free	will.65	Overall,	Bergson’s	argument	is	that	the	Kantian	
conception	 of	 time	 only	 permits	 the	 “symbolical	 representation”	 of	 the	 free	
movement	of	 the	Spirit	 in	 “space”	or	 in	 “a	 fourth	dimension	of	 space”	and	hence	
inadvertently	 makes	 freedom	 impossible. 66 	For	 Bergson,	 Kantian	 time	 is	 the	
“illegitimate	 translation”	 of	 the	 real	 time	 that	 confuses	 the	 qualitative	 and	
indivisible	 movement	 with	 its	 representation	 in	 terms	 of	 a	 quantitative,	
measurable	 sequence	 of	 positions	 that	 abides	 by	 the	 mechanical	 laws	 of	
causality.67		This	confusion	results	in	the	view	of	the	mind	to	be	only	possible	from	
a	 standpoint	 of	 the	 necessary	 laws	 of	 nature.	 As	 long	 as	 the	 mind	 is	 envisaged	
within	this	framework,	any	conception	of	free	will	is	a	priori	rendered	impossible	
unless,	 as	Kant	does	 in	 the	Critique	of	Pure	Reason,	 the	 latter	be	 relegated	 to	 the	
purely	 intelligible	 realm	and	 thus	 regarded	as	a	 supra-sensuous	noumenon	or	an	
object	of	belief.68		
It	 is	with	 respect	 to	 this	problem	of	 the	paradox	of	 free	will	 that	Bergson	
criticizes	Kant’s	conception	of	time	and	instead	devises	the	concept	of	duration	as	
real	 time.	As	opposed	 to	Kantian	 time,	which	 is	 said	 to	be	a	 fourth	dimension	of	
space	or	a	symbolical	representation	of	the	mind,	duration	corresponds	to	the	real	
																																																								














of	belief.	 Instead,	 the	freedom	of	the	will	 is	rendered	as	what	 is	 immediately	and	
sensuously	 given	 to	 consciousness	 in	 a	 way	 distinct	 from	 what	 the	 spatial,	
symbolical	representation	would	make	of	it.		
The	subject	matter	that	we	will	focus	on	in	this	chapter,	however,	is	not	the	
concept	of	duration.	Rather,	we	will	 concentrate	upon	the	concept	of	 time	or	 the	
very	mechanism	that	brings	about	the	“symbolical	representation”	of	duration.	As	
we	 stated	 above,	 the	 traditional	 reading	 of	 Bergson’s	 argument	 against	 Kantian	
conception	 of	 time	 has	 played	 an	 important	 role	 in	 determining	 the	 image	 of	
Bergson	 as	 a	 naïve	metaphysician.	 By	 looking	 at	 the	 overall	 status	 of	 Bergson’s	
argument,	 it	becomes	quite	apparent	 that	 the	concept	of	duration	 fundamentally	
stems	from	his	motive	of	transcending	the	philosophical	position	that	only	admits	
the	view	of	the	mind	in	its	symbolic	representation	in	time.	In	contradistinction	to	
the	mediated	 representation	 of	 the	mind,	 duration	 is	what	 is	 immediately	 given	
and	Bergson’s	point	is	to	stress	that	the	immediate	givenness	of	duration	differs	in	
kind	 from	 the	 givenness	 of	 its	 representation	 in	 time.	 However,	 it	 would	 be	 a	
mistake	 to	 infer	 from	 this	 that	 Bergson	 then	 goes	 against	 the	 theory	 of	
representation	altogether	and	falls	victim	to	the	trap	of	ideology.	It	is	one	thing	to	
say	that	Achilles	and	the	tortoise	differ	 in	kind,	and	quite	another	to	say	that	the	
tortoise	 alone	 is	 and	 the	 Achilles	 is	 not.	 By	 distinguishing	 the	 movement	 of	
duration	 and	 its	 representation,	 Bergson	 is	 essentially	 saying	 that	 time	 and	
duration	 differ	 in	 kind.	 But	 it	 is	 mistaken	 to	 infer	 from	 this	 that	 Bergson	 then	
conceives	of	 time	or	 the	symbolical	representation	of	duration	as	non-being.	It	 is	
indeed	against	the	symbolical	representation	of	 the	movement	that	Bergson	puts	
forth	the	concept	of	duration	but	the	givenness	of	duration	does	not	cancel	out	the	
givenness	 of	 time.	 Instead,	 Bergson	 notes	 that	 they	 are	 the	 “two	 aspects	 of	
conscious	 life”.70	This	 indicates	 that	 the	opposition	between	 time	and	duration	 is	








in	his	dialectic	and	 that	 this	 two-sidedness	of	 the	movement	does	not	cancel	out	
the	particular	movement	that	belongs	to	the	side	of	time.		
We	will	overall	argue	that	Bergson	does	not	only	put	forth	a	polemic	against	









must	 first	 exist.	 Even	 if	 it	 is	 the	 apparent	 or	 illusory	 appearance	 of	 reality,	 this	
illusion	must	itself	be	regarded	as	real	in	its	own	right.	Seen	in	relation	to	the	real	
time	 of	 duration,	 time	 or	 the	 fourth	 dimension	 of	 space	 is	 a	 kind	 of	 false	 time.	
However,	if	time	and	duration	are	the	“two	aspects	of	conscious	life”,	this	indicates	
that	 the	 false	 time	has	a	distinct	 reality	alongside	 that	of	duration	and	Bergson’s	







of	consciousness,	 the	theory	of	 time	will	 instead	supply	the	distinctly	Bergsonian	
framework	 of	 critiquing	 how	 the	 historically	 mediated	 view	 of	 the	 Self	 or	 its	
apparent	reality	is	itself	constituted	out	of	the	alienation	of	consciousness.		
However,	 to	 conceive	of	Bergson’s	 thought	 in	 terms	of	 the	materialism	of	
time	would	 be	 to	 go	 against	 the	 traditional	 reading	 of	Bergson	 altogether	 and	 it	
requires	 us	 to	 explicitly	 reformulate	 aspects	 that	 have	 been	 hitherto	 hidden.	 In	
order	to	illuminate	the	latter,	we	must	engage	in	a	reconstructive	reading	that	pays	
special	 attention	 to	 what	 Bergson	 has	 in	 mind	 when	 he	 criticizes	 Kantian	




specific	 field	 of	 questioning	 his	 conception	 of	 time	 can	 be	 seen	 as	 located.	 To	
inquire	 into	 Bergson’s	 positive	 conception	 of	 time	 is	 to	 examine	 the	 particular	
conception	 from	which	 duration	 is	 differentiated.	 If	 Bergson	 argues	 that	 Kantian	
time	 is	 the	 result	 of	 the	 “illegitimate	 translation”	 of	 duration,	 the	 very	 subject	
matter	 that	 we	 must	 examine	 thus	 resides	 within	 the	 very	 procedure	 of	
“illegitimate	translation”	itself	with	respect	to	the	context	of	Kant’s	philosophy	in	












notice	 that	 real	 duration	 is	made	 up	 of	moments	 inside	 one	 another,	 and	
that	 when	 it	 seems	 to	 assume	 the	 form	 of	 a	 homogeneous	 whole,	 it	 is	
because	 it	 gets	 expressed	 in	 space.	 Thus	 the	 very	 distinction	 which	 he	
makes	between	space	and	time	amounts	at	bottom	to	confusing	time	with	
space	 […]	 He	 thought	 that	 consciousness	 was	 incapable	 of	 perceiving	
psychic	 states	 otherwise	 than	 by	 juxtaposition,	 forgetting	 that	 a	milieu	 in	
which	these	states	are	set	side	by	side	and	distinguished	from	one	another	
is	of	course	space,	and	not	duration.	He	was	thereby	led	to	believe	that	the	




to	 an	 incomprehensible	 fact.	 […]	 He	 therefore	 raised	 it	 to	 the	 sphere	 of	
noumena;	 and	 as	 he	 had	 confused	 duration	 with	 space,	 he	 made	 this	




71	TFW	 232/151.	 Translation	 modified.	 In	 the	 original	 translation,	 the	 term	 “milieu”	 is	
translated	into	“medium”.	The	latter	carries	a	connotation	of	“mediation”	and	hence	also	of	
“form”	as	that	which	mediates	and	orders	matter.	Yet	 it	seems	that	the	fact	that	Bergson	




Bergson’s	 argument	 can	 be	 summarized	 as	 follows:	 Kant	 made	 a	 mistake	 to	
assume	 that	 time	 is	 “homogeneous”,	 while	 such	 a	 characterization	 can	 only	 be	
applied	to	space.	For	Bergson,	time	is	in	fact	“heterogeneous”	and	if	 it	appears	to	
be	 homogeneous,	 it	 is	 because	 it	 gets	 expressed	 in	 space.	 The	 word	 “express”	
[exprimer]	here	can	be	interpreted	as	referring	to	what	Bergson	points	out	by	the	
operation	 of	 “illegitimate	 translation”.	 For	 the	 time	 being,	 we	 can	 suppose	 that	
Bergson’s	 criticism	 of	 Kantian	 conception	 of	 time	 as	 “homogeneous”	 is	 directed	
towards	this	operation	of	“expression”	 that	 turns	time	 into	space	and	 investigate	
how	such	an	operation	poses	a	problem	for	Bergson	in	his	reading	of	Kant.			
The	 question	 is:	 where	 can	 we	 find	 the	 rationale	 behind	 this	 claim	 that	
Kantian	 time	 is	 expressed	 in	 space	 within	 Kant’s	 own	writings?	 By	 “space”	 and	
“time”,	Bergson	is	seemingly	referring	to	the	concepts	derived	from	Kant’s	doctrine	
of	the	Transcendental	Aesthetic	that	we	find	in	the	beginning	of	the	Critique	of	Pure	










object	 of	 intuition	 (i.e.	 “soul”).	 His	 intention	 behind	 these	 conceptions	 (and	 to	
derive	space	and	time	as	the	two	forms)	is	to	determine	in	what	ways	“matter”	or	
the	“manifold	of	appearance”	is	“ordered”	a	priori	via	those	forms	and	to	argue	that	
such	 ordering	 is	 itself	 transcendental;	 it	 thus	pertains	 to	 the	 very	 “principles	 of	








Having	 said	 that,	 Bergson’s	 argument	 vis-à-vis	 Kant’s	 conception	 of	 time	
consists	 in	 saying	 that	Kantian	 time	 is	 “homogeneous”	because	 it	 falls	 under	 the	
category	of	 space	rather	 than	 time	and	 time	 for	Bergson	 is	 “heterogeneous”.	The	
insight	required	from	us	in	order	to	understand	the	particular	nature	of	Bergson’s	
argument	 is	 concealed	 in	 this	 deceptively	 simple	 claim:	Kantian	 time	 is	 space.	 In	
the	following	section,	we	will	first	quickly	survey	Bergson’s	explanations	regarding	
the	 “homogeneity”	 of	 Kantian	 space	 and	 time	 so	 that	we	 can	 later	 return	 to	 the	










space	 is	that	outer	experience	possible	 in	the	first	place.”75		That	 is,	regardless	of	
any	empirical	specificity	of	the	object	in	question,	Kant	establishes	that	the	mind’s	




objects	 appear	 to	 the	mind	 as	 “outside	 and	 alongside	 one	 another”	 in	 “different	
locations”.76	In	essence,	Bergson	describes	these	characteristics	as	the	“multiplicity	
of	 juxtaposition”	and	argues	that	 this	 implies	space’s	homogeneity	since,	 for	him,	
the	 idea	of	number	is	 in	 turn	 implied	 in	 this	 form	of	 juxtaposition.77	According	 to	







milieu	 in	 which	 the	 mind	 places	 it.”78	When	 the	 mind	 intuits	 objects	 outside	 of	
itself,	they	appear	to	the	mind	as	“the	synthesis	of	the	one	and	the	multiple”.79	That	
is,	 within	 space,	 each	 external	 object	 is	 viewed	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 a	 discrete,	
discontinuous	self-same	unit	that	makes	up	a	whole	by	itself.	In	turn,	the	collection	
of	 units	 can	 also	 be	 considered	 as	 a	 self-identical	 unit	 in	 itself	without	 bringing	
about	a	heterogeneity	to	the	form	of	unity	(e.g.	number	1	is	a	unit,	and	number	2,	
which	is	a	collection	of	two	units/1s,	is	itself	a	unit	since	it	is	a	number).	Hence,	in	
the	 case	 of	 mind	 intuiting	 objects	 in	 space,	 there	 is	 a	 constantly	 assumed	
homogeneity	 of	 quality	 regardless	 of	 whether	 one	 focuses	 upon	 a	 unit	 or	 a	
collection	 of	 units	 as	a	unit.	 This	 implies,	 as	Bergson	 states,	 that	 the	 intuition	 of	











In	 reality,	 it	 is	not	a	physical	but	a	 logical	necessity	which	attaches	 to	 the	
proposition:	 ‘Two	bodies	cannot	occupy	 the	same	place	at	 the	same	time.’	
The	 contrary	 assertion	 involves	 an	 absurdity	 which	 no	 conceivable	
experience	 could	 succeed	 in	 dispelling.	 In	 a	 word,	 it	 implies	 a	
contradiction.80		
	
What	 we	 can	 infer	 from	 this	 statement	 is	 that	 spatial	 intuition	 and	 the	 idea	 of	
number	 fundamentally	 imply	 their	 subordination	 under	 the	 logical	 principle	 of	
non-contradiction.	 What	 Bergson	 means	 by	 “homogeneity”	 can	 therefore	 be	
understood	as	homogeneity	of	the	form	of	the	object	that	imposes	itself	as	the	law	
of	 thought.81	Via	 the	 form	 of	 space,	 an	 object	 is	 seen	 in	 terms	 of	 a	 self	 non-









space,	 two	 bodies	 must	 be	 counted	 in	 accordance	 with	 their	 occupations	 of	
separate	locations	and	a	body	is	identical	only	to	itself.	
	 Let	us	now	move	on	to	the	concept	of	time.	The	second	aspect	of	Bergson’s	
argument	 is	 that	Kantian	 time,	 like	space,	 is	also	homogeneous.	 Just	 like	 it	 is	 the	
case	for	the	form	of	space,	Kant	supposes	that	time	is	the	transcendental	 form	of	
inner	sense	and	this	means	that	the	mind	can	only	intuit	itself	through	the	form	of	





only	 occurs	 in	 the	 form	 of	 a	 progressive,	 sequential	 line	 that	 “has	 only	 one	
dimension”.83	Here,	it	is	apparent	that	the	descriptions	of	time	and	space	are	set	up	














space	 and	 time	 and	 says:	 “[s]elf-externality	 splits	 at	 once	 into	 two	 forms,	 positively	 as	
Space,	 and	negatively	 as	Time.”	When	Heidegger	puts	 forth	his	 interpretation	of	Hegel’s	
“ordinary	 conception	 of	 time”	 and	 argues	 that	 Bergson’s	 conception	 of	 time	 is	merely	 a	
correlate	of	Hegel’s	conception,	he	interprets	Bergson’s	“time	is	space”	in	terms	of	a	simple	
reversal	 of	Hegel’s	 “space	 is	 time”.	 For	 us,	 this	 reading	does	not	 penetrate	 into	 the	 true	
meaning	 of	Bergson’s	 polemic	 against	Kant	 since	by	 arguing	 that	 time	 is	 expressed	 into	
space	in	Kant’s	philosophy,	Bergson	is	not	saying	that	duration	becomes	space	in	the	sense	
that	relates	to	what	happens	within	the	doctrine	of	Transcendental	Aesthetic.	Kant	indeed	
argues	 within	 transcendental	 aesthetic	 that	 time	 is	 the	 “formal	 a	priori	 condition	 of	 all	
appearance	generally”	and	Hegel	 is	right	to	re-iterate	this	as	“the	truth	of	space	 is	time”.	
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is	what	 brings	 together	 “in	 one	 and	 the	 same	 object,	 of	 contradictorily	 opposed	
predicates”.85		
	 Why	 does	 Bergson	 argue	 that	 time	 is	 expressed	 in	 space?	 In	 a	 nutshell,	
Bergson’s	contestation	consists	of	pointing	out	that	Kant	did	not	successfully	grasp	





[If]	 time,	as	the	reflective	consciousness	represents	 it,	 is	a	milieu	 in	which	
our	conscious	states	form	a	discrete	series	so	as	to	admit	of	being	counted,	
and	 if	 on	 the	 other	 hand	 conception	 of	 number	 ends	 in	 spreading	 out	 in	








that	 presents	 its	members	 (i.e.	moments)	 in	 terms	of	 self-identical	 and	mutually	
non-contradictory	moments	 (e.g.	…“I”,	…“I”,	…“I”,).	His	argument	 is	 that	 if	 time	 is	
understood	 as	 the	 form	 through	 which	 our	 mind	 appears	 to	 itself	 in	 terms	 of	
discretely	 successive	 units,	 this	 implies	 that	 time	 too	 is	 a	 multiplicity	 of	
juxtaposition	and	it	is	rather	a	“fourth	dimension	of	space.”87			
	 It	 is	 with	 respect	 to	 this	 fundamental	 disagreement	 regarding	 the	













no	 “affiliation	with	number”.89	As	 the	 famous	Eleatic	paradox	of	Achilles	 and	 the	
tortoise	shows,	“we	cannot	make	movement	out	of	immobilities”	and	this	indicates	
that	 Kant	 does	 not	 grasp	 the	 nature	 of	 real	 succession/time	 and	 rather	
“unwittingly	 falling	 back	 upon	 space,	 and	 really	 giving	 up	 time”.90	Bergson’s	
polemic	 is	 concentrated	upon	showing	 that	 the	contradiction	between	space	and	
time	 or	 between	 simultaneity	 and	 succession	 are	 much	 more	 radical	 than	 how	
Kant	 conceives	of	 it.	 Although	 space	 and	 time	are	 set	up	 to	be	distinct	 from	one	
another,	Kant	nonetheless	 conceives	 of	 their	 difference	 through	working	out	 the	
order	 of	 primacy	 between	 the	 two	within	 the	 same	 genus.	 Bergson	 presses	 this	





external	 things	 are	 known	 to	 us	 by	 becoming	 internal	 states,	 time	 is	 the	
condition	of	all	our	representations	be	 it	either	mediately	or	 immediately.	













souls),	 and	 precisely	 thereby	 also,	 indirectly,	 a	 condition	 of	 outer	
appearances.92	
	
Despite	 of	 the	 difference	 between	 the	 two	 forms,	 Kant	 argues	 that	 time	 is	 the	
“condition	of	all	appearance	generally”	and	the	spatial	intuition	is	rather	indirectly	















Let	 us	 pause	 here	 for	 a	moment	 to	 clarify	 the	 status	 of	 Bergson’s	 argument	we	
have	covered	up	to	this	point	vis-à-vis	a	traditional	reading	of	Bergson.	So	far,	we	
have	 surveyed	 Bergson’s	 description	 regarding	 the	 “homogeneity”	 of	 Kantian	
space	 and	 time,	 which	 is	 that	 Kantian	 time	 really	 amounts	 to	 being	 the	 fourth	
dimension	of	space	rather	than	time.	As	we	pointed	out	previously,	what	Bergson	
ultimately	 argues	 here	 is	 that	 Kantian	 time	 is	space.	 The	 important	 question	we	
must	 ask	 is	 therefore	 the	 following:	 by	 saying	 that	 “time	 is	 space”,	 is	 Bergson	
simply	putting	forth	the	reverse	of	Kant’s	original	argument	concerning	space	and	
time?		
By	 claiming	 that	 time	 is	 the	 primary	 form	 of	 intuition	 generally,	 Kant	 is	
essentially	 saying	 that	 “space	 is	 time”,	or,	 to	borrow	Hegel’s	words,	 “the	 truth	of	
space	 is	 time”.93	So	 if	 Bergson	 says	 that	 “time	 is	 space”	 in	 contradistinction	 to	
Kantian	position,	would	it	be	appropriate	for	us	to	interpret	the	latter	claim	as	the	
mere	opposite	 of	 the	Kantian	position	 that	 “the	 truth	of	 time	 is	 space”?	 In	other	
words,	 by	 reproaching	 the	 Kantian	 conception	 of	 time,	 is	 Bergson	 putting	 forth	
space	as	the	primary	form	of	intuition	that	seeps	inward,	so	to	speak,	and	becomes	
the	 form	 of	 time?	 In	 a	 nutshell,	 this	 is	 how	Heidegger	 interprets	 the	 essence	 of	




Hegel's	 thesis	 that	 space	 "is"	 time.	 Bergson	 just	 turns	 it	 around:	 Time	
(temps)	is	space.94	
																																																								









mere	 opposite	 of	 “space	 is	 time”.	 Although	 the	main	 philosopher	 that	Heidegger	
focuses	 in	 comparison	 to	 Bergson	 is	 Hegel	 and	 it	 is	 the	 latter’s	 supposedly	








not	 be	 an	 overstatement	 if	 we	 said	 that	 this	 interpretation	 is	 responsible	 for	
producing	 a	 devastating	 image	 of	 Bergson’s	 overall	 philosophy.	 Indeed,	 even	
though	Bergson’s	name	appears	several	times	in	Being	and	Time,	his	philosophy	is	
only	treated	as	one	of	the	most	prominent	examples	of	how	time	is	understood	in	
its	 “common	 understanding”	 [vulgäre	 Zeitverständnis].	 That	 is,	 based	 upon	 his	
interpretation	 of	 Bergson’s	 argument	 against	 the	 Kantian	 conception	 of	 time,	
Heidegger	argues	that	Bergson	fails	to	grasp	time	in	terms	of	the	“horizon	of	every	
understanding	 and	 interpretation	 of	 being”	 and	 does	 not	 have	what	 he	 calls	 the	
“original	explication	of	time”	[ursprünglichen	Explikation	der	Zeit].95		
	 However,	 having	 surveyed	 Bergson’s	 descriptions	 of	 Kantian	 space	 and	
time,	would	it	be	appropriate	to	interpret	Bergson’s	criticism	in	such	a	way?	This	is	
an	 important	 question	 that	 we	must	 clear	 it	 out	 before	 we	 proceed	 further;	 an	
interpretation	 of	 Bergson’s	 claim	 that	 “time	 is	 space”	 will	 determine	 towards	
which	 Kantian	 doctrine	 Bergson	 is	 directing	 his	 criticism	 and	 this	 will	 in	 turn	
eventually	 specify	 the	 profile	 of	what	 Bergson	 retrieves	 and	 incorporates	 as	 his	
positive	conception	of	time.	In	other	words,	depending	upon	how	we	understand	
the	 specific	 claim	he	makes	 upon	Kantian	 time,	we	will	 have	 a	 different	 outlook	
regarding	 exactly	 in	 what	 realm	 of	 questioning	 Bergsonian	 conception	 of	 time	
belongs.		
If	Heidegger’s	 interpretation	is	right,	what	Bergson	problematizes	through	





kept	 intact.	 In	 this	 way,	 one	 can	 hardly	 say	 that	 Bergson	 offers	 an	 alternative	
conception	 of	 time	 to	 that	 of	 Kant’s	 or	 that	 his	 philosophy	 deepens	 the	
fundamental	understanding	of	time	beyond	what	he	criticizes.	More	specifically,	if	
we	 were	 to	 concede	 that	 Bergson	 in	 fact	 does	 not	 go	 beyond	 the	 “common	
understanding”	 of	 time	 that	 persists	 since	 the	 time	 of	 Aristotle,	 as	 Heidegger	
argues,	 this	 would	 be	 to	 accept	 the	 view	 that	 Bergson	 is,	 after	 all,	 a	 naïve	
metaphysician	 in	 the	 sense	 that	Marxists	 traditionally	 describe.	 	What	Heidegger	
seeks	 through	 problematizing	 time	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 “horizon	 of	 every	
understanding	and	interpretation	of	being”	is	to	disclose	and	to	think	the	problem	
of	 time	 as	 the	 “originality	 of	 the	 origin	 of	 metaphysics.”96	That	 is,	 by	 moving	
beyond	the	ordinary	conception	of	time	as	the	succession	of	the	“now”	and	instead	
putting	 forth	 the	 “original	 explication”	 of	 time,	Heidegger	 seeks	 to	 think	 time	 as	
that	 which	 determines	 the	 inner	 possibility	 of	 metaphysics	 as	 such.97	Then,	 a	
failure	 to	 grasp	 time	 in	 this	 “original”	 way,	 which	 is	 precisely	 what	 Heidegger	
accuses	Bergson	of,	is	to	be	“alienated”	from	the	very	origin	of	metaphysics	as	such	
and,	 hence,	 to	 be	 unwittingly	 entangled	 within	 the	 world	 that	 is	 already	
conditioned	 by	 time.98	Just	 like	 an	 “ideological	 philosophy”	 that	 is	 unable	 to	
critique	its	own	origin	in	material	history,	the	failure	to	grasp	time	as	the	origin	of	
metaphysics	leads	to	the	utter	inability	to	put	forth	a	self-critique.		
Contrary	 to	 Heidegger’s	 argument	 however,	 the	 above	 survey	 clearly	
suggests	 that	 what	 is	 meant	 by	 Bergson’s	 claim	 of	 “time	 is	 space”	 cannot	 be	
understood	in	terms	of	a	mere	“opposition”	to	the	Kantian	“space	is	time”.	The	core	
part	 of	 what	 Bergson	means	 by	 “time	 is	 space”	 is	 that	 both	 time	 and	 space	 fall	
under	the	category	of	space	or	under	the	genre	of	“homogeneity”	and	that	the	real	
time	or	duration	is	rather	“heterogeneity”.	That	is,	Bergson	is	not	at	all	saying	that	
the	 real	 time	 and	 space	 are	 to	 be	 placed	within	 the	 same	 genus.	What	 Bergson	
attempts	 to	achieve	 through	saying	 that	 “time	 is	 space”	 is	not	a	mere	reversal	of	
the	order	between	space	and	time	considered	within	the	same	genus,	but	rather	to	
point	out	 that	 the	Kantian	space	and	 time	are	both	 the	equivalent	of	 the	 form	of	
juxtaposition	 and	 that	 the	 real	 time	 (i.e.	duration	 or	 succession	 without	 mutual	
																																																								






real	 time	 is	 in	 fact	 not	 space.	 Here,	 we	must	 take	 the	 words	 “homogeneity”	 and	
“heterogeneity”	in	their	etymological	senses	in	order	to	grasp	Bergson’s	argument.	
“Homogeneous”	means	having	the	same	origin	and	“heterogeneous”	is	to	have	the	
different	origin.	Thus,	 if	 space	 and	 time	 are	 said	 to	 be	 homogeneous,	 this	means	
that	 they	belong	 to	 the	 same	genus	or	kind	or	 that	 they	originate	 from	 the	 same	
source.	On	 the	other	hand,	 if	 real	 time	or	duration	 is	said	 to	be	“heterogeneous”,	





space	 and	 time	 in	 a	 much	 more	 fundamental	 fashion.	 As	 we	 saw,	 Kant	
distinguishes	 the	difference	between	 space	and	 time,	 or	between	exteriority	 and	






By	 saying	 that	 “time	 is	 space”,	 Bergson	 recognizes	 the	 homogeneity	 of	 Kantian	




the	 “homogeneity”	 or	 space	belongs	 to	 the	whole	 genus	 of	 time	 and	 real	 time	 is	
that	 which	 belongs	 outside	 the	 former;	 hence,	 it	 is	 that	 which	 transcends	 the	
Kantian	 a	priori	 form	 of	 intuition	 altogether.	 It	 is	 therefore	 clear	 that	 Bergson’s	
argument	does	not	amount	to	suggesting	a	mere	opposite	of	Kant’s	position.	On	the	
contrary,	 Bergson	 is	 pointing	 towards	 a	wholly	 different	way	 of	 conceiving	 time	
that	does	not	belong	to	Kantian	doctrine	of	transcendental	aesthetic.		
We	 are	 now	 in	 a	 better	 position	 to	 re-state	 our	 question.	We	 are	 overall	
interested	in	finding	out	to	what	aspect	of	the	Kantian	doctrine	the	“expression”	or	
the	 “illegitimate	 translation”	 of	 time	 with	 space	 that	 Bergson	 refers.	 The	 above	
analysis	at	least	gives	us	insight	into	what	it	is	not	and	this	negative	knowledge	can	
guide	us	 towards	 the	direction	we	must	 turn	 in	order	 to	 locate	 the	procedure	of	







We	may	recall	 that	Bergson	states	 in	 the	conclusion	 to	Time	and	Free	Will	
that	Kantian	time	is	space	because	real	time	gets	expressed	in	space.	There	are	two	
distinct	 components	 to	 this	 argument:	 one	 is	 that	 Kantian	 time	 is	 space	 –	 this	
means,	 as	 we	 have	 just	 examined	 above,	 that	 the	 whole	 territory	 of	 what	 Kant	
explains	as	time	or	the	a	priori	form	of	intuition	generally	falls	under	the	category	
of	 space	 or	 homogeneity.	 The	 second	 component	 is	 that	 Bergson’s	 argument	
locates	the	cause	of	this	homogeneity	of	time	in	the	“expression”	of	time	with	space.	
It	 is	apparent	that	Bergson	is	not	pointing	towards	the	same	thing	by	saying	that	
“time	 is	space”	and	that	“time	 is	expressed	 in	space”.	 In	 the	 first,	 “time”	refers	 to	
the	Kantian	time;	 in	 the	second,	 it	refers	 to	real	time	or	duration	which	 is	rather	
missing	 in	 Kant’s	 doctrine.	 To	 put	 it	 differently,	 the	 “time”	 which	 allegedly	 gets	
expressed	in	“space”	in	Bergson’s	argument	refers	to	the	form	of	interiority	that	is	
other	than	or	even	prior	to	what	Kant	 refers	 to	by	 the	same	 term.	As	we	can	see	
from	 the	 above	 diagram,	 the	 “time”	 of	 Bergson	 resides	 outside	 the	 proper	
problematic	of	Kant’s	transcendental	aesthetic	and	it	points	out	not	only	what	gets	
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expressed	but	also	what	gets	lost	 through	 taking	up	 the	a	priori	 form	of	 time.	For	
the	sake	of	convenience	and	clarity,	we	can	follow	Heidegger’s	vocabulary	and	call	
what	 Bergson	 refers	 to	 as	 time	 “Ur-time.”99	For	 now,	 the	 only	 thing	 we	 can	 say	
about	ur-time	is	that	its	proper	domain	is	outside	the	“ordinary	conception	of	time”	
as	 the	 sequence	 of	 “nows”	 and	 that	 an	 examination	 of	 the	 doctrine	 of	
transcendental	aesthetic	alone	would	not	give	us	any	positive	conception	of	it.	That	
is,	what	we	 can	 know	 about	 ur-time	 from	 the	 perspective	 of	 the	 transcendental	
aesthetic	is	that	it	 is	the	pure	Beyond/Other	and	that	any	positive	insight	into	the	
nature	of	what	is	being	talked	about	cannot	be	gained	through	time.	
Without	 explicitly	 inquiring	 into	 the	 nature	 of	 ur-time	 itself	 as	 of	 yet,	
however,	 we	 now	 have	 a	 clearer	 idea	 regarding	 where	 we	 should	 look	 within	
Kant’s	philosophy	 in	order	 to	 find	out	about	 the	operation	of	 “expression”.	What	
Bergson	is	pointing	out	by	placing	emphasis	on	the	expression	or	the	confusion	of	
time	and	space	is	not	between	time	and	space	within	transcendental	aesthetic	but	
rather	 between	 ur-time	 and	 time.	 The	 confusion	 is	 hence	 between	 what	 gets	
expressed	by	time	and	what	expresses	it	through	a	determinate	form	of	time	(see	
Diagram	3).	In	truth,	there	is	no	confusion	between	the	two	in	Kant’s	writings	and	
Bergson’s	 argument	 cannot	 be	 understood	 as	 a	 simple	 polemic	 against	 Kant.	 On	
the	 contrary,	 it	 can	 rather	 be	 seen	 as	 an	 original	 reading	 of	 the	 role	 of	 Kant’s	
conception	 of	 time	with	 respect	 to	 the	 paradox	 of	 free	will.	We	may	 notice,	 for	
instance,	within	 the	quotation	 from	the	conclusion	of	Time	and	Free	Will	 that	we	





26	 lecture	course.	Although	 it	 is	our	contention	 that	Bergson’s	 influence	can	strongly	be	
felt	 in	 Heidegger’s	 own	 problematisation	 of	 ur-time,	 Heidegger	 himself	 argues	 that	
Bergson	 overall	 did	 not	 successfully	 reach	 towards	 the	 phenomenon	 of	 ur-time	 since	
duration	 is	 still	 understood	 as	 “succession”.	 For	 us,	 this	 argument	 is	 unconvincing.	
Heidegger	 forcefully	 inserts	 the	 characteristic	 of	 spatialized	 time	 into	 the	 qualitative	
succession	of	duration	but	to	do	so	is	to	confuse	the	difference	between	duration	and	time.	
This	 is	odd	since	Heidegger	 is	perhaps	 the	only	 reader	of	Bergson	who	clearly	 sees	 that	
time	 and	 duration	 are	 distinct	 from	 one	 another	 and	 his	 own	 problematisation	 of	 time	
with	 respect	 to	 ontological	 difference	 makes	 little	 sense	 without	 the	 fundamental	












For	 Kant,	 establishing	 the	 concept	 of	 freedom	 is	 not	 at	 all	 the	 aim	 of	





world	 in	 terms	 of	 “what	 ought	 to	 be”.101 	Transcendental	 aesthetic	 plays	 an	
essential	 role	 in	 this	 demarcation	 between	 the	 two	 heterogeneous	 systems	 of	
reason	since	 the	a	priori	 form	of	 time	conceived	as	 the	 “condition	of	appearance	
generally”	 functions	 as	 the	 dividing	 line	 between	 the	phenomenal	world	 and	 the	






is	 ultimately	 defined	 as	 that	 which	 transcends	 the	 territory	 of	 temporary	
conditioned	world	of	phenomena.		
Thus,	Bergson’s	claim	that	Kant	confuses	time	and	space	can	rather	be	seen	
as	 a	 commentary	 upon	 how	 free	 will,	 which	 is	 the	 real	 time	 for	 Bergson,	 is	




to	 the	mere	appearance	of	 it	 and	 this	 is	 the	equivalent	of	making	 the	distinction	
between	duration	 and	 spatialized	 time	 in	Bergson’s	 vocabulary.	As	 soon	 as	Kant	










soul	 appears	 to	 us	 in	 its	 representation.	 Furthermore,	 at	 the	 end	 of	 the	
transcendental	aesthetic,	Kant	states:			
	
Our	 kind	 of	 intuition	 is	 called	 sensible	 because	 it	 is	 not	 original	







interpretation	 of	 Kant’s	 position	 than	 a	 contestation.	 Of	 course,	 Kant	 does	 not	
conceive	of	the	“Soul	itself”	as	real	time	or	as	the	sensuous	datum	of	intuition	and	
hence	 this	 is	 a	 unique	 contribution	 made	 exclusively	 by	 Bergson	 contra	 Kant.	






clear	 that	 such	 a	 thing	 is	 not	 at	 all	 available	 for	 any	 sensuous	 experience	 of	
consciousness.	The	fundamental	position	that	supports	the	very	core	of	Bergson’s	
philosophy	as	a	whole	is	to	put	forth	the	anti-Kantian	argument	that	the	Absolute	
Self	 is	 immediately	 given	 via	 a	 superior	 form	 of	 sensuous	 intuition.	 That	 is,	 by	
invoking	the	difference	in	kind	between	ur-time	and	time	and	by	calling	the	former	
the	 real	 time,	 Bergson	 seeks	 to	 throw	 light	 upon	 the	 positive	 being-there	 of	 the	
Other	of	Time	in	terms	of	its	non-Ideal	or	sensuous	presence	to	consciousness,	an	
aspect	 that	we	will	explore	 in	depth	within	Part	 II.	For	us,	 this	argument	 is	what	
qualifies	Bergson’s	philosophy	as	a	materialist	philosophy	 in	contradistinction	 to	





itself	derived	 from	Kant’s	philosophy.	This	 is	 indicative	of	 the	 fact	 that	Bergson’s	






with	 space	 within	 Kant’s	 philosophy.	 In	 order	 to	 find	 out	 about	 the	 positive	
existence	 and	 the	 precise	 nature	 of	 the	 false	 time	 for	 Bergson,	we	must	 further	
investigate	into	Bergson’s	reading	of	Kant	so	that	we	can	point	out	to	what	Kantian	
doctrine	does	the	operation	of	“illegitimate	translation”	ultimately	corresponds.	If	











homogeneity	 of	 Kantian	 space	 and	 time.	 If,	 as	 we	 clarified	 above,	 Bergson’s	
criticism	 of	 Kant	 is	 not	 directed	 towards	 the	 conception	 of	 time	 within	 the	
transcendental	 aesthetic	 per	 se,	why	 does	 Bergson	 still	 claim	 that	 Kantian	 time	
involves	 an	 “illegitimate	 translation”?	 Again,	 Bergson’s	 contestation	 essentially	
focuses	 upon	 how	 Kantian	 space	 and	 time	 are	 both	 equivalent	 to	 a	 form	 of	
juxtaposition	and	upon	how	this	in	turn	implies	that	they	are	subordinated	under	
the	idea	of	number.	If	for	Bergson	space	and	time	are	already	subordinated	under	
the	 idea	 of	 number,	 this	 is	 not	 because	 the	 latter	 stems	 from	 the	 physical	
experience	 but	 because	 those	 forms	 abide	 by	 the	 logical	 necessity	 of	 laws	 of	








act	 sui	 generis	 very	 much	 resembles	 what	 Kant	 calls	 an	 a	 priori	 form	 of	
sensibility.	 If	 we	 seek	 to	 characterize	 this	 act,	 we	 see	 that	 it	 consists	
essentially	 in	 the	 intuition,	 or	 rather	 the	 conception	 of	 an	 empty	
homogeneous	milieu.105				
		
Bergson	 boldly	 states	 that	 Kant’s	 intuition	 of	 time	 is	 not	 an	 intuition	 at	 all	 but	
“rather	the	conception”	due	to	what	he	calls	the	“sui	generis”	act.106	Here,	we	must	
understand	 that	 by	 “conception”,	 Bergson	 is	 referring	 to	 that	 which	 bears	 this	




examine	 what	 “conception”	 specifically	 means	 for	 Kant.	 At	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	
transcendental	logic,	Kant	states:		
	
Our	 cognition	 arises	 from	 two	 basic	 sources	 of	 the	 mind.	 The	 first	 is	 to	
receive	presentations	(and	is	our	receptivity	for	impressions);	the	second	is	





spontaneity	 of	 concepts).	 Through	 receptivity,	 an	 object	 is	 given	 to	 us;	
through	 spontaneity	 an	 object	 is	 thought	 in	 relation	 to	 that	 presentation	
(which	 is	 a	 mere	 determination	 of	 the	 mind).	 Intuition	 and	 concepts,	
therefore,	 constitute	 the	 elements	 of	 all	 our	 cognition.	 Hence	 neither	
concepts	without	an	intuition	corresponding	to	them	in	some	way	or	other,	




are	 the	 “two	basic	 sources	of	 the	mind”	 [Grundquellen	des	Gemüts].	 That	 is,	Kant	
defines	any	empirical	cognition	to	be	made	up	of	both	receptivity	and	spontaneity	
a	priori	 and	he	 insists	 that	 those	 two	 sources	 are	distinct	 from	one	 another	 and	
“cannot	 exchange	 their	 functions”.108	In	 his	 lecture	 course,	 Bergson	 succinctly	
describes	 that	 this	 irreducibly	 double	 source	 of	 cognition	 indicates	 that	 every	
object	 of	 knowledge	 for	 Kant	 is	 “the	 fold”	 between	 intuition	 and	 concept	 or	
between	how	we	receive	and	how	we	spontaneously	act	upon	what	we	receive.109	
Kant	 however	 supposes	 that	 the	 empirical	 unity	 of	 the	 two	 sources	 can	 be	
dissociated	 through	 “pure	 cognition”	 and	 they	 can	 be	 examined	 independently	
from	 experience	 in	 their	 respective	 transcendental	 characteristics.110	The	 results	




argument	 pertaining	 to	 the	 “illegitimate	 translation”	 can	 be	 seen	 as	 directed	
towards	 this	 illegitimate	 confluence	 between	 receptivity	 and	 spontaneity:	 while	
Kant	 conceives	 of	 time	 as	 the	 pure	 form	 of	 receptivity,	 for	 Bergson	 it	 is	 not	





this	 is	 in	 fact	 the	 case,	 Bergson’s	 claim	 that	 Kantian	 receptivity	 is	 spontaneity	





















In	 Book	 II	 of	 the	 transcendental	 logic,	 Kant	 expounds	 upon	 his	 doctrine	 of	 the	
faculty	 of	 judgment	 as	 the	 “third”	 that	 a	 priori	 mediates	 the	 unity	 between	










that	 “the	 presentation	 of	 the	 object	must	 be	 homogeneous	with	 the	 concept”	 in	
order	 for	 an	empirical	 cognition	 to	be	possible	 in	 the	 first	place.112	As	we	noted,	




spontaneous	categories	and	 the	categories	 can	be	 “applied”	 to	 intuition	 in	a	way	
that	 the	possibility	of	 the	congruence	between	 the	 two	sources	are	established	a	
priori	by	the	third	 faculty	of	 judgment.	 Insofar	as	receptivity	and	spontaneity	are	
two	heterogeneous	 sources	 of	 the	mind	 that	 are	 independent	 from	one	 another,	
the	 unity	 between	 the	 two	 in	 turn	 cannot	 be	 derived	 from	 either	 the	 power	 of	
intuition	or	 from	 that	of	 conception	exclusively.	There	must	 therefore	be	a	 third	
kind	 of	 power	 that	 is	 homogeneous	 with	 both	 of	 them	 and	 makes	 their	 unity	
possible	a	priori.113			
	 The	rationale	behind	Bergson’s	argument	thus	lies	within	Kant’s	doctrine	of	
the	 faculty	of	 judgment.	Bergson’s	claim	is	 that	 the	Kantian	conception	of	 time	 is	
not	pure	receptivity	but	rather	already	translated	into	the	form	of	spontaneity	due	
to	 the	 mediating	 faculty	 of	 judgment	 that	 determines	 it	 with	 respect	 to	 the	
categories	 of	 understanding.	We	 may	 recall	 here	 that	 Bergson	 argues	 that	 what	
Kant	 conceives	as	 the	 form	of	 succession	 is	 rather	 the	 form	of	 juxtaposition	 that	














and	spontaneity,	 the	 schema	of	 imagination	 is	 “both	 intellectual	on	 the	one	hand	
and	 sensible	on	 the	 other	 hand”.115	Resembling	 an	 abstract	 diagram	 that	 resides	
within	“the	depth	of	 the	human	soul”,	 it	 is	 that	“through	which,	and	according	to	
which,	 images	 become	 possible	 in	 the	 first	 place.” 116 	As	 opposed	 to	 the	
understanding,	 which	 is	 the	 doctrine	 that	 expounds	 upon	 the	 faculty	 of	 rules,	
judgment	 is	 the	 faculty	 to	 “subsume	 under	 rules”.117	Kant	 states:	 “whenever	 an	
object	 is	 subsumed	 under	 a	 concept,	 the	 presentation	 of	 the	 object	 must	 be	
homogeneous	with	 the	 concept.”118	That	 is,	 although	 time	 is	 said	 to	 be	 the	 pure	
form	of	 receptivity	 that	 generally	 has	 its	 source	 solely	within	 intuition	 and	does	
not	stem	from	the	spontaneous	categories	of	understanding,	the	form	of	intuition	
itself	is	however	seen	as	a	priori	congruent	with	the	spontaneous	categories	due	to	
the	 schematism	 of	 imagination	 that	 determines	 it	 towards	 the	 direction	 of	





We	 are	 now	 in	 a	 better	 place	 to	 understand	 Bergson’s	 polemic	 against	
Kantian	 conception	 of	 time.	 What	 Bergson	 calls	 the	 “illegitimate	 translation”	 or	
“expression”	of	 time	with	 space	 refers	 to	 the	 function	of	 the	 faculty	of	 judgment	
that	schematizes	the	pure	receptivity	of	ur-time	into	the	determinate	form	of	time	
that	is	in	congruence	with	the	spontaneous	categories.	This	procedure	is	said	to	be	
“illegitimate”	 since	 the	 form	 of	 intuition	 that	 is	 a	 priori	 mediated	 by	 the	
schematism	 of	 understanding	 is	 not	 pure	 receptivity	 but	 rather	 transfigured	 for	
the	benefit	 of	 the	 spontaneous	understanding.	While	 spontaneity	 and	 receptivity	
are	posited	as	distinct,	 imagination,	 in	 itself	being	 “blind”	and	 “secret”,	 is	 said	 to	
function	 in	a	way	 to	a	priori	 intervene	upon	 intuition	by	 inter-mixing	conceptual	









is	 not	 due	 to	 the	 original	 homogeneity	 of	 the	 succession/duration	 but	 to	 the	
intervention	 by	 the	 spontaneous	 form	 of	 understanding	made	 possible	 by	 the	a	
priori	function	of	the	faculty	of	judgment.		




still	 intuition	is	 that	by	which	a	cognition	refers	 to	objects	directly,	and	at	
which	all	thought	aims	as	a	means.119	
	
That	 is,	 insofar	 as	 intuition	 and	 thinking	 are	 said	 to	 be	 the	 “two	 sources	 of	 the	
mind”,	 thinking	 shall	 be	 seen	 as	 directed	 towards	 intuition/receptivity	 –	
spontaneity	 remains	 that	 which	 acts	 upon	what	 is	 received	 through	 receptivity.	
Indeed,	 time	 is	 said	 to	be	 the	 “pure”	 form	of	 intuition	 and	hence	 the	doctrine	of	
transcendental	aesthetic	supposedly	delivers	to	us	the	form	of	intuition	that	is	free	
from	 any	 empirical	 admixtures	 from	 the	 form	 of	 spontaneity.	 If	 this	 is	 the	 case,	
every	thinking	shall	be	a	thinking	about	something	that	is	received	by	intuition	and	
the	spontaneous	activity	of	thinking	shall	be	seen	as	that	which	is	attentive	towards	
and	hence	guided	by	 intuition.	As	we	saw,	however,	 this	 is	not	at	all	 the	case	 for	
Kant.	The	supposed	“purity”	of	the	receptivity	turns	out	to	be	not	so	true.	Rather,	





it	 is	 insofar	 as	 it	 is	 subsumed	 under	 spontaneous	 categories	 due	 to	 the	 a	priori	
mediation	by	imagination.	In	this	way,	thinking	is	not	subservient	to	intuition	but	










Overall,	 Bergson’s	 contestation	 of	 the	 Kantian	 conception	 of	 time	 stems	
from	the	role	that	time	plays	with	respect	to	the	possibility	of	free	will.	Since	time	




form	 of	 time	 a	 priori	 subordinated	 to	 the	 necessary	 laws	 of	 nature.	 From	 the	
standpoint	 of	 sensuous	 intuition,	 the	 absolute	 and	 free	 Self	 then	disappears	 into	
the	suprasensuous	Beyond	or	the	Other	World.	The	very	condition	of	possibility	of	
human	freedom	is	therefore	relegated	to	the	realm	of	noumena	that	is	unavailable	
to	 our	 worldly	 senses.	 Hence	 Bergson’s	 statement	 that	 “the	 paradoxes	 of	 the	
Eleatics	[are]	 the	problem	of	 free	will.”120	In	order	to	access	real	 intuition	or	real	
time,	we	must	engage	in	an	effort	to	re-discover	it	beneath	the	layer,	so	to	speak,	of	
conceptual	 understanding	 that	 covers	 it	 in	 the	 case	 of	 our	 ordinary	 imagination.	
Bergson’s	concept	of	duration,	which	is	said	to	be	pure	heterogeneity	“without	any	







As	we	 have	 pointed	 out	 earlier,	 Bergson	 has	 been	 the	 favorite	 target	 of	Marxist	











captures	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 relationship	 between	 duration	 and	 the	 Kantian	
conception	of	time?	In	a	nutshell,	the	Marxist	criticism	takes	place	through	looking	
at	 duration	 as	 the	 result	 of	 the	 historical	 development	 of	 the	 Spirit	 that	 negates	
itself	within	time.	Put	differently,	even	though	duration	is	said	to	be	heterogeneous	
and	hence	outside	of	time,	it	is	nonetheless	seen	as	a	new	expression	of	time	that	
remains	within	 time.	Here,	 to	 assert	 that	 duration	 is	 “within”	 time	 is	 the	 crucial	





become	 apparent	 that	 this	 is	 an	 obvious	 misreading.	 We	 have	 pointed	 out	 that	




the	 subsumption	 of	 the	 difference	 between	 time	 and	 duration	 in	 terms	 the	
homogeneity	 of	 time	 and	would	 therefore	 entail	 giving	 up	 the	whole	 concept	 of	
duration.	 It	 is	 clear	 then	 that	 Marxist	 criticism	 does	 not	 grasp	 duration	 in	 its	
heterogeneity	and	hence	does	not	know	what	it	is.	The	truth	is	that,	since	duration	
is	what	 it	 is	because	 it	 is	not	 time	and	since	this	very	definition	strictly	prohibits	
duration	 to	 be	 placed	 within	 time,	 duration	 cannot	 be	 seen	 as	 the	 historically	
contingent	“metaphysical	principle”	that	sprang	up	within	time.	That	is,	the	being	
of	duration	must	be	seen	as	that	which	remains	what	it	is	despite	of	the	existence	
of	 time	 that	 translates	 it	within	 itself;	 its	 heterogeneity	 is	 that	which	 belongs	 to	
duration	which	is	outside	time.		










through	 the	 historicist	 method	 and	 such	 criticism	 would	 certainly	 produce	 a	
correct	 display	 of	 materialist	 logic.	 Yet,	 in	 this	 way,	 what	 is	 read	 is	 a	 priori	






criticize	Bergson	but	 to	 inquire	 into	what	 the	method	of	 thinking	 consists	 of	 for	
Bergson.	By	doing	this,	we	can	disclose	through	what	sort	of	logic	the	misreading	
of	Bergson	takes	place	and	examine	whether	the	same	movement	can	be	produced	
out	 of	 Bergson’s	 own	 philosophy.	 Indeed,	 any	 praxis	 of	 critique	 takes	 place	 by	
taking	up	a	particular	 theoretical	 form	and	 the	knowledge	of	 the	 latter	can	be	of	
value	for	our	own	explication	of	the	Bergsonian	dialectic.		
The	 question	 for	 us	 is,	 can	 Bergson’s	 philosophy	 produce	 the	 positive	
theory	 of	 history	 and	 think	 of	 the	 determinateness	 of	 time	 itself?	 As	 we	 stated	
above,	 time	 is	 the	a	priori	 form	through	which	ur-time	or	duration	appears	to	us	
and	hence	it	is	the	determinate	form	of	time	that	is	responsible	for	making	the	ur-
time	 transcendent	with	 respect	 to	 sensuous	 intuition.	 The	 rationale	 behind	 the	
Marxist	 criticism	 that	 Bergson	 is	 a	 naïve	 metaphysician	 lies	 in	 this	 reading	 of	
duration	 “as”	 time	 that	 renders	 the	 Absolute	 Self	 transcendent	 despite	 of	 his	
opposition	 against	 Kant	 for	 doing	 the	 same.	 If	 we	 strip	 down	 the	 form	 of	 this	
criticism	to	its	basic	movement,	it	consists	in	saying	the	following:	duration	is	the	
negation	 of	 time	 and	 hence	 it	 “is”	 time.	 Here,	 although	 coming	 from	 a	 different	
route	 of	 reasoning,	 the	 way	 in	 which	 Horkheimer	 reads	 Bergson’s	 argument	
against	Kant	comes	extremely	close	to	Heidegger’s	abovementioned	interpretation.	
Just	like	Heidegger	who	treats	Bergson’s	criticism	as	the	mere	“opposite”	of	Kant’s	
original	position,	Horkheimer	 interprets	duration	as	a	mere	 “denial	of	 time”	 that	
ends	 up	 constituting	 a	 new	 form	 of	 time	 that	 again	 makes	 the	 Absolute	 Self	
transcendent	since	duration	“is”	time.	This	is	to	see	the	concept	of	duration	as	the	
product	 of	 negation,	 which	 is	 the	 internal	 differentiation	 of	 time	 that	 produces	
itself	 through	 simultaneously	 unmaking	 and	 making	 itself.	 In	 the	 eyes	 of	
Horkheimer	 and	 Heidegger,	 Bergson’s	 theory	 is	 “vulgar”	 since	 the	 concept	 of	
	 92	
duration	is	regarded	as	the	negation	of	time	within	time	and	hence	it	“is”	time.	In	
both	 cases,	 the	 relationship	 between	 duration	 and	 time	 is	 fundamentally	
misunderstood	 and	 the	 heterogeneity	 of	 duration	 is	 subordinated	 under	 a	
dialectical	movement	that	only	belongs	to	the	side	of	time,	namely,	the	movement	
of	negation.	Duration	is	thus	seen	as	a	mere	historical	instance	of	time	that	leaves	
the	 problem	 of	 time’s	 determinateness	 unthought.	 As	 a	 result,	 both	 single	 out	
Bergson’s	supposed	inability	to	grasp	time	in	terms	of	the	problem	of	its	historicity	
and	 the	 incapacity	 thereof	 to	 critique	 metaphysics	 from	 the	 standpoint	 of	 its	
historical	determinateness.		
Within	 this	 very	 criticism,	 we	 can	 clearly	 see	 that	 what	 is	 at	 play	 is	 the	
negative	movement	of	dialectic.	Bergson’s	 concept	of	duration,	which	 is	 the	very	
core	of	his	philosophy	as	a	whole,	is	treated	as	a	historically	contingent	expression	
of	time	that	has	come	into	being	out	of	the	dialectical	movement	of	the	Spirit	since	
duration	 “is”	 time	 even	 though	 it	 negates	 time.	 The	 historical	 criticism	 of	 the	




of	 time	 is	 seen	as	 the	equivalent	of	 time’s	 self-determination	and	 time	 is	 seen	as	
that	which	determines	 itself	 through	 its	negativity.	The	 copula	 “is”	 here	 signifies	




We	 have	 already	 stated	 that	 to	 treat	 duration	 as	 time	 is	 an	 obvious	misreading	
since	 the	 heterogeneity	 of	 duration	 prohibits	 such	 a	 treatment	 by	 definition.	
However,	 the	 question	 that	 we	 are	 posing	 here	 is	 whether	 Bergson’s	 own	
philosophy	 is	 capable	 of	 thinking	 about	 the	 very	 form	 through	 which	 this	
misreading	of	duration	itself	takes	place.	Thus,	the	direction	that	we	are	looking	to	
take	 is	 not	 towards	 that	 of	 duration	 but	 rather	 towards	 time	 since	what	we	 are	
interested	 is	 Bergson’s	 own	 thought	 upon	 time’s	 differentiation	 through	 its	
negativity.	As	we	will	show	in	the	next	chapter,	Bergson’s	criticism	of	Kantian	time	
does	not	stop	at	 the	point	where	 time	 is	said	 to	be	 the	 illegitimate	 translation	of	





very	 method	 of	 criticism	 that	 they	 themselves	 utilize	 is	 actually	 present	 within	
Bergson’s	own	philosophy.	The	error	of	Marxist	criticism	is	therefore	twofold.	First,	
by	misinterpreting	duration	as	 time,	 the	heterogeneity	of	duration	 is	overlooked.	
Second,	 since	duration	 is	mistaken	 as	 time,	 the	question	 regarding	 the	 theory	of	
time	within	Bergson’s	own	thought	 is	not	explicitly	posited.	More	specifically,	by	
looking	 at	 Bergson’s	 philosophy	 as	 a	 particular	 instance	 of	 the	 historical	
expression	of	the	Spirit,	the	concept	of	history	within	Bergson’s	philosophy	is	itself	
left	 unexplored.	 The	 heterogeneity	 of	 duration	 and	 time	 means	 that	 duration	
differs	in	kind	from	time	and	hence	that	it	cannot	be	subsumed	under	the	negative	





































Our	 exposition	 in	 chapter	 1	 has	 showed	 that	 Bergson’s	 confrontation	 of	 the	
Kantian	 conception	 of	 time	 in	 Time	 and	 Free	 Will	 primarily	 stems	 from	 the	
particular	 role	 time	plays	vis-à-vis	 the	paradox	of	 free	will.	More	specifically,	we	
focused	 on	 how	 the	 Kantian	 conception	 of	 time	 is	 already	 subsumed	 under	 the	
categories	 of	 the	understanding	due	 to	 the	a	priori	 intervention	of	 the	 faculty	 of	
judgment	and	how	this	inevitably	makes	pure	receptivity	transcendent.	Of	course,	
any	investigation	of	Bergson’s	philosophy	as	a	whole	cannot	be	complete	without	
examining	 the	 definite	 nature	 of	 the	 intuition	 of	 duration	 since	 it	 is	 through	 the	
unique	 conception	 of	 the	 latter	 that	 Bergson	 aims	 to	 differentiate	 his	 own	
philosophy	 from	 Kant’s.	 In	 other	 words,	 the	 central	 axis	 of	 Bergson’s	 overall	
philosophy	revolves	around	the	concept	of	duration	that	captures	pure	receptivity,	





Bergson’s	 theory	 of	 intuition	 can	 be	 understood	 as	 something	 that	 neglects	 the	
negativity	 of	 time.	 On	 the	 contrary,	 if	 time	 is	 negative	 vis-à-vis	 duration,	 it	 is	
because	 Bergson	 has	 thought	 of	 time	 as	 a	 real	 component	 of	 intuition	 and	 has	
positively	produced	a	concept	of	the	negativity	of	time	as	that	which	belongs	to	it.	
Indeed,	when	one	surveys	Bergson’s	philosophy,	it	is	easy	to	see	that	time	takes	up	
a	negative	position	 since	 it	 occupies	 the	position	of	 false	time	 as	 opposed	 to	 the	
real	time	of	duration.	This	configuration	has	given	rise	to	the	mistaken	view	that	
Bergson	 is	 staging	 a	 confrontation,	 as	 Bertrand	 Russell	 has	 put	 it,	 between	 the	
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intuition	 of	 time	 versus	 the	 intuition	 of	 duration	 mimicking	 the	 opposition	
between	 “the	 good”	 and	 “the	 bad”	 as	 if	 it	 were	 a	 moralistic	 children’s	 tale.123	
However,	 such	 a	 view	 fundamentally	 misunderstands	 the	 meaning	 of	 Bergson’s	
dualism.	 Contrary	 to	Russell’s	 interpretation,	 Bergson’s	 dualism	 is	 not	 aiming	 to	
destroy	the	legitimacy	of	time	nor	is	it	arguing	that	duration	as	opposed	to	time	is	
either	 “good”	 or	 “bad”.	 Instead	 of	 entering	 into	 a	 confrontational	 and	 mutually	
cancelling	 relationship,	 both	 time	 and	 duration	 are	 held	 within	 intuition,	 which	
contains	the	distinct	realities	of	both	the	numeric	and	the	non-numeric	experience	
of	 consciousness.	 In	 order	 to	 uncover	 the	 genuinely	 critical	 dimension	 of	
Bergsonian	philosophy,	we	shall	 continue	 to	 focus	on	 the	ways	 in	which	Kantian	
time	 is	 further	 dealt	 with.	 Rather	 than	 stopping	 short	 at	 proposing	 a	 one-sided	
denial	 of	 time	 through	 the	 concept	 of	 duration,	 Bergson’s	 theory	 of	 intuition	
includes	what	can	be	called	a	retrieval	of	time	that	goes	back	to	and	further	extends	





mark	that	 the	 intuition	of	a	homogeneous	space	 is	already	a	step	towards	
social	 life.	 […]	 Our	 tendency	 to	 form	 a	 clear	 picture	 of	 this	 externality	 of	
things	 and	 the	 homogeneity	 of	 their	 medium	 is	 the	 same	 as	 the	 impulse	
which	leads	us	to	live	in	common	and	to	speak.	But,	in	proportion	to	as	the	
conditions	 of	 social	 life	 are	 more	 completely	 realized,	 the	 current	 which	
carries	our	conscious	states	from	within	outwards	is	strengthened;	little	by	
little	 these	 states	 are	made	 into	objects	or	 things;	 they	break	off	not	only	
from	 one	 another,	 but	 from	 ourselves.	 Henceforth	we	 no	 longer	 perceive	
them	 except	 in	 the	 homogenous	milieu	 […].	 Thus	 a	 second	 self	 is	 formed	
which	 obscures	 the	 first,	 a	 self	 whose	 existence	 is	 made	 up	 of	 distinct	















now	 treated	 as	 that	 which	 belongs	 to	 “a	 second	 self	 that	 covers	 over	 the	 first”.	
Similarly,	the	immediate	givenness	of	duration	is	now	said	to	break	off	from	itself	
and	to	turn	into	something	“we	no	longer	perceive”	except	in	time.	What	changes	
within	 this	 configuration	 is	 the	 particularity	 of	 the	 voice	 through	 which	 the	
subjectivity	 of	 the	 “we”	 is	 articulated	 in	 relation	 to	 duration	 and	 time.	 When	
Bergson	argues	that	duration	is	the	real	time,	it	is	certainly	within	the	intuition	of	
duration	 that	 the	 selfhood	 of	 the	 “we”	 is	 seen	 to	 reside.	 However,	 in	 direct	
opposition	 to	 identifying	 the	 subject	 with	 duration,	 Bergson	 also	 conceives	 of	
another	subjective	position	by	saying	that	this	“we”	within	duration	gets	displaced	
from	itself	and	becomes	established	as	the	second	self	that	resides	within	time.			
For	 us,	 this	 crucial	 change	 in	 perspective	 is	 a	 testimony	 to	 the	 fact	 the	
aspect	 of	 duration	 does	 not	 exhaust	 Bergson’s	 theory	 of	 intuition.	 Rather,	 apart	
from	duration,	Bergson’s	 theory	of	 intuition	must	be	seen	as	containing	within	 it	
an	 explicit	 conception	 of	 time	 as	 its	 distinct	 component.	 Contrary	 to	 how	 it	 is	
traditionally	dealt	with,	the	Bergsonian	account	of	intuition	is	not	the	movement	of	
abandoning	the	determinate	form	of	time	and	merging	with	the	Absolute	Self	(as	a	
simple	 anti-Kantianism	 that	 stresses	 its	 ahistoricism).	 Although	 this	 is	 true	with	
respect	to	duration	as	it	comprises	one	half	of	the	logic	of	intuition	as	a	whole,	we	
must	 also	 acknowledge	 that	 Bergson’s	 theory	 of	 intuition	 accounts	 for	 and	
contains	within	itself	the	opposite	movement	that	goes	from	duration	to	time	as	a	
distinct	 type	 of	 dialectical	movement.	 In	 comparison	 to	 the	 first	movement	 that	
leaves	 time	 behind	 as	 negative	 and	 false,	 the	 second	 movement	 retrieves	 the	
negative	and	explicates	time’s	coming	into	being	as	the	real	basis	of	the	derivative	
self.	Taken	 in	 isolation,	 the	 latter	 is	 the	movement	 that	 conditions	 the	 fall	of	 the	
Absolute	 Self	 that	 gives	 rise	 to	 the	 subjectivity	 of	 the	 derivative	 “I”	within	 time.	
From	the	subjective	viewpoint	of	the	second	self,	it	is	rather	duration	that	becomes	
the	obscure	 and	 invisible	 object	 for	 the	 self	 and	 time	 is	 now	 seen	on	 the	 side	of	
concrete	and	 lived	reality	of	 the	 I.	Overall,	 then,	 the	 “reality”	of	duration	and	 the	
“falsity”	of	time	do	not	derive	their	meanings	from	whether	or	not	they	exist	within	






movement	 to	 correspond	 to	 the	 critical	 dimension	 of	 his	 philosophy	 since	 it	 is	
what	 gives	 rise	 to	 a	 materialist	 conception	 of	 the	 historicity	 of	 consciousness.	
Unlike	 the	movement	 that	 explains	 the	 apprehension	 of	 the	ahistorical	Absolute	
Self	 by	 exiting	 the	 limit	 of	 the	 finite	 determinate	 self,	 the	 opposite	 movement	
corresponds	 to	 the	 movement	 of	 history	 out	 of	 which	 the	 a	 priori	 form	 of	
receptivity	 emerges	 as	 its	 product.	 The	 consequences	 of	 this	 configuration	 are	
enormous.	 If	 it	 is	 indeed	 true	 that	Bergson’s	method	of	 intuition	contains	within	
itself	 this	 opposite	 movement	 that	 goes	 from	 duration	 to	 time	 and	 hence	 is	
constitutive	of	the	condition	of	the	finite	self,	this	means	that	Bergson’s	theory	of	












initial	 criticism?	 If	 retrieval	means	 to	pick	up	something	 that	was	once	set	aside,	
would	it	not	undo	the	novelty	of	Bergson’s	position	vis-à-vis	Kant?	That	is,	with	the	
retrieval	of	time,	would	not	Bergson	also	bring	back	the	idealist	metaphysics	of	the	
Absolute	Self?	To	answer	all	 these	question,	we	must	 first	 ask	another	one:	how	
can	 Bergson	 maintain	 his	 initial	 objection	 against	 the	 Kantian	 metaphysical	
transcendence	of	the	Absolute	Self	while	also	resuscitating	time	through	the	notion	
of	the	second	self?		
	 We	 shall	 come	 back	 to	 this	 question	 at	 the	 end	 of	 this	 chapter	 since	 we	
cannot	 concretely	 deal	 with	 it	 without	 having	 first	 examined	 the	 more	 precise	




that	 Bergson’s	 method	 of	 intuition	 can	 be	 seen	 as	 a	 materialist	 reversal	 of	 the	
idealist	 dialectic,	 which	 overcomes	 nihilism	 as	 the	 perpetual	 return	 of	 onto-
theological	metaphysics.126	With	this	overall	aim	in	view,	the	specific	task	of	Part	I	
is	 to	 elucidate	 the	 critical	 aspect	 of	 the	method	 of	 intuition	 and	 argue	 that	 this	
aspect	 is	 compatible	 with	 the	materialist	 conception	 of	 history.	Whether	 or	 not	
Bergson’s	 retrieval	 of	 time	brings	back	 the	 transcendence	of	 the	Absolute	 Self	 is	
equivalent	to	asking	whether	or	not	Bergson’s	method	of	intuition	considered	as	a	
materialist	method	of	thinking	is	capable	of	overcoming	nihilism.		
Before	we	 tackle	 this	question	directly,	we	must	 first	 examine	 if	 and	how	
Bergson’s	method	 of	 intuition	 in	 fact	 contains	 a	 reversal	 of	 the	 Idealist	 dialectic	
and	 if	 it	 is	 capable	 of	 supporting	 the	 materialist	 conception	 of	 the	 historical	
determination	 of	 consciousness.	 The	 outcome	 of	 this	 inquiry	 will	 depend	 upon	
knowing	in	what	way	Bergson	retrieves	Kantian	time	and	towards	which	direction	
he	 extends	 the	Kantian	 problematic	 through	 the	 retrieval.	 As	Heidegger	 notes,	 a	
genuine	 retrieval	 is	 “the	 opening-up	 of	 its	 original,	 long	 concealed	 possibilities,	
through	the	working-out	of	which	it	is	transformed”.127	In	other	words,	a	retrieval	
of	Kantian	conception	of	time	is	an	elaboration	upon	Kant’s	original	project	so	as	to	
transform	 and	 deepen	 its	 problematic	 towards	 a	 new	 direction.	 The	 question	






Memory.	As	we	will	 explain	below,	Matter	and	Memory	principally	puts	 forth	 the	
concept	 of	 memory	 and	 it	 is	 this	 latter	 concept	 that	 can	 be	 read	 as	 Bergson’s	
retrieval	of	Kantian	time.	Yet,	as	we	have	seen	in	the	passage	from	Time	and	Free	









After	 Kant,	 experience	 implies	 space	 and	 time	 as	 a	 necessary	 condition.	
Thus	space	and	time	are	anterior	 to	and	 independent	of	experience.	Here,	
an	 empiricist	would	 respond	 that	 the	history	must	be	 taken	 into	 account.	
This	is	so	for	the	experience	of	the	present	which	is	built	upon	an	indefinite	
number	 of	 past	 experiences.	 The	 alleged	 forms	 may	 well	 be	 only	 habits.	
They	 would	 be	 imprinted	 from	 the	 outside	 to	 the	 inside,	 as	 the	 spirit	
registering	the	successions	and	juxtapositions.128		
	














synthesis	 between	 empiricism	 and	 transcendental	 philosophy	 in	 a	 way	 that	
reconciles	 them	 through	 elevating	 or	 sublating	 the	 opposition	 between	 the	
empirical	 and	 the	 transcendental	 at	 a	 higher	 level.	 That	 is,	 just	 like	 the	





128	Bergson,	 Cours	 III.	p.152.	 It	 seems	 that	 Bergson	 is	 referring	 to	 Felix	 Raivaisson’s	De	
L’Habitude.	Ravaisson’s	work	is	referenced	at	the	beginning	of	L’Idée	de	Lieu	chez	Aristotle	
(Bergson’s	 second	 doctoral	 dissertation)	 and	 as	we	 can	 see	 from	 “The	Life	and	Work	of	
Ravaisson”	 in	 the	 Creative	 Mind,	 Bergson	 was	 familiar	 with	 Ravaisson’s	 work.	 For	 an	
excellent	 review	 of	 the	 historical	 importance	 of	 the	 concept	 of	 habit	 as	 well	 as	 the	






transcendental	 through	 a	 materialist	 reconceptualization	 of	 Kant’s	 theory	 of	
judgment.	As	we	discussed	in	the	previous	chapter,	Bergson’s	criticism	of	Kantian	





concept	 of	 duration	 and	 seeks	 to	 capture	 the	 real	 form	of	 receptivity	 before	 the	
intervention	 of	 the	 faculty	 of	 judgment	 alters	 it	 towards	 the	 benefit	 of	
spontaneity/conception.	Now,	if	Bergson	in	fact	retrieves	time	as	a	real	existence,	










causes	 and	 thus	 our	 superficial	 psychic	 life	 comes	 to	 be	 pictured	without	
any	great	 effort	 as	 set	out	 in	 a	homogeneous	medium.	But	 the	 symbolical	
character	 of	 such	 a	 picture	becomes	more	 striking	 as	we	 advance	 further	
into	 the	depths	of	 consciousness:	 the	deep-seated	 self	which	ponders	and	
decides,	 which	 heats	 and	 blazes	 up,	 is	 a	 self	 whose	 states	 and	 changes	
permeate	 one	 another	 and	 undergo	 a	 deep	 alteration	 as	 soon	 as	 we	




Here,	 Bergson	 clearly	 delineates	 and	 names	 the	 new	 conceptual	 context	 of	 the	
retrieval	 of	 time	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 distinction	 between	 “the	 surface	 ego”	 [le	 moi	




131	Jean	 Hyppolite	 regards	 this	 distinction	 between	 the	 two	 aspects	 of	 the	 self	 as	 the	
central	 component	 of	 Bergson’s	 philosophy	 that	 resonates	 with	 phenomenology	 and	
existentialism.	 See	 Hyppolite,	 J.,	 (1971).	 Figures	De	 La	 Pensée	 Philosophique.	Paris:	 PUF.	
pp.444.		
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illegitimate	 translation	 of	 duration,	 he	 then	moves	 on	 to	 reclaim	 this	 very	 same	
time	 in	terms	of	one	of	 the	“two	aspects	of	 the	self”.	 Instead	of	directly	attacking	
time	via	 the	 concept	 of	 duration,	Bergson	here	 switches	his	 standpoint	 and	now	
posits	that	there	are	in	fact	two	separate	aspects	to	the	self/ego.	On	the	one	hand,	
the	 so-called	 surface	 ego,	 which	 comes	 into	 being	 out	 of	 the	 “contact”	 [touche]	
between	the	self	and	the	external	world,	appears	to	 itself	 in	terms	of	 the	form	of	
“mutual	 externality”	 (i.e.	 time	 as	 the	 form	 of	 juxtaposition).	 On	 the	 other,	 the	
immediate	givenness	of	duration,	or	the	self	“whose	states	and	changes	permeate	
one	another”,	recedes	into	the	depth	of	one’s	interiority	and	gets	covered	over	by	
the	 symbolism	 of	 the	 surface	 ego	 that	 represents	 it	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 determinate	
form	of	time.			
	 Albeit	 in	 a	 preliminary	 way,	 we	 can	 see	 Bergson’s	 unique	
reconceptualization	 of	 Kant’s	 theory	 of	 judgment	 through	 the	 project	 of	 the	
retrieval.	 At	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	 quoted	 passage,	 he	 states:	 “our	 ego	 comes	 in	
contact	 with	 the	 external	 world	 at	 its	 surface”.	 The	 “surface”	 of	 the	 self	 is	 in	
constant	 contact	with	 the	world	 and	 this	 “contact”/“touch”	between	 the	 self	 and	
the	external	world	 is	 seen	as	 that	which	produces	 the	determinate	 form	of	 time.	
That	 is,	 like	 a	 lump	 of	 clay	 that	 gets	 shaped	 by	 a	 potter,	 the	 surface	 of	 the	 self	
receives	 its	 determinate	 form	 from	 the	 direct	 touch	 of	 the	 world	 and	 comes	 to	
appear	as	if	it	were	the	transcendental	form	of	intuition.	For	us,	this	primacy	of	the	
touch	vis-à-vis	 the	coming	 into	being	of	 time	suggests	 that	Bergson’s	 retrieval	of	
time	stems	from	a	materialist	reconceptualization	of	Kant’s	theory	of	judgment.	It	
is	 materialist	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 the	 touch,	 which	 is	 an	 empirical/material	 force	
exerted	at	 the	 level	of	 the	body,	 is	regarded	as	 the	pre-transcendental	cause	that	
gives	rise	to	the	form	of	time	as	its	product.		
	 Here,	this	primacy	of	the	touch	is	where	we	begin	to	catch	a	glimpse	of	the	
uniquely	 Bergsonian	 conception	 of	 the	 empirical-material	 Life,	 which	 is	
problematized	in	relation	to	his	reconceptualization	of	Kant’s	theory	of	judgment.	
To	 repeat	 the	 point	 we	 have	 made,	 Bergson’s	 contestation	 of	 Kantian	 time	 is	
largely	 directed	 towards	 the	 function	 of	 judgment	 that	 a	 priori	 subordinates	
receptivity	 under	 spontaneity.	 Having	 said	 that,	 our	 task	 in	 this	 chapter	 is	 to	
demonstrate	 that	 this	 very	 mechanism	 of	 a	 priori	 subsumption	 that	 Bergson	
criticizes	 acquires	 a	 positive	 value	 within	 the	 new	 project	 of	 the	 retrieval.	 Our	




arguing	 that	 “Life	 is	 not	 determined	 by	 consciousness,	 but	 consciousness	 by	
life”.132			
	 The	 specificity	 of	 Bergson’s	 materialism	 can	 be	 understood	 through	
grasping	 the	 special	 kind	 of	 empirical	 exteriority	 that	 the	 touch	 of	 the	 external	
world	 assumes	 vis-à-vis	 consciousness.	When	 one	 hears	 that	 the	 world	 directly	
touches	 us	 and	 that	 this	 empirical	 experience	 gives	 shape	 to	 the	 surface	 of	 our	
existence,	 one	 might	 assume	 that	 the	 “exteriority”	 of	 the	 touch	 and	 the	 “taking	
shape”	of	the	surface	ego	is	what	takes	place	within	space.		This	is	however	not	the	
case.	The	“exteriority”	of	the	touch,	or	perhaps	we	can	say	the	objective,	sensuous	
materiality	 of	 this	 corporeal	 force,	 rather	 points	 towards	 a	 radical	 form	 of	
exteriority	that	is	other	than	and	prior	to	the	constitution	of	the	sensuous	“world”	
in	 space.	 We	 have	 pointed	 out	 that	 in	 Kant’s	 doctrine,	 the	 faculty	 of	 judgment	
schematizes	 receptivity	 towards	 the	 direction	 of	 spontaneity	 and	 this	 is	 what	
Bergson	points	out	as	the	procedure	of	“illegitimate	translation”,	or	“expression”	of	
time	with	 space.	 It	 is	 this	 very	 procedure	 of	 expression	 that	 Bergson	 positively	
reconceives	through	the	retrieval	(See	Diagram	5).	That	is,	the	a	priori	procedure	
of	 expression	 is	what	determines	 the	determinate	 form	of	 time	and	 the	material	
force	of	 the	touch,	which	 is	conceived	as	the	cause	of	 the	passage	of	ur-time	into	






This	 leads	 us	 to	 the	 conclusion	 that	 the	 very	 sensuous	materiality	 of	 the	
force	of	the	touch,	which	comes	from	and	itself	located	within	the	external	world,	
is	 not	 exterior	 or	 material	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 it	 is	 part	 of	 the	 external	 series	 of	
sensuous	phenomena	that	appears	to	the	subject	in	space.	If	the	touch	of	the	world	
is	 indeed	 the	 force	 that	 causes	 the	coming	 into	being	of	 the	determinate	 form	of	
time/surface	ego,	the	sensuous	world	which	appears	to	the	subject	as	external	to	it	
is	 rather	conditioned	by	 the	special	kind	of	 sensuousness	and	 it	 is	 the	derivative	
product	of	 the	more	radical	 form	of	exteriority	that	 itself	does	not	appear	within	
the	 world.	 	 Put	 succinctly,	 the	 sensuous	 materiality	 of	 the	 force	 of	 the	 touch	 is	
posited	 as	 that	 which	 transcends	 the	 totality	 of	 the	 sensible	 world	 and	 hence	
constitutes	 itself	 into	 a	 radical	 alterity	 vis-à-vis	 the	 internal	 consistency	 of	 the	
time-bound	 consciousness.	 The	 touch,	 therefore,	 is	 the	 supra-sensuous	
sensuousness	 that	differs	from	what	 is	ordinarily	perceived	as	residing	within	the	
external	 world	 of	 sensuous	 materiality.	 This	 materiality	 of	 the	 supra-sensuous	
sensuousness,	 which	 is	 what	 we	 must	 focus	 our	 attention	 on	 in	 order	 to	 delve	
deeper	 into	 Bergson’s	 project	 of	 the	 retrieval	 of	 time,	 can	 be	 described	 more	
accurately	in	terms	of	its	obscurity	and	otherness	that	is	not	accessible	within	the	
ordinary	world	of	the	sensible.		
We	 must	 stress	 once	 again	 that	 to	 prioritize	 the	 empirical	 sensuous	
materiality	 over	 the	 a	 priori	 condition	 of	 experience	 is	 not	 a	 simple	 anti-
Kantianism.	 In	 fact,	 Kant	 himself	 had	 a	 great	 intimation	 of	 this	when	 he	 says	 in	
Critique	of	Pure	Reason:		
	
schematism	 of	 our	 understanding,	 i.e.,	 its	 schematism	 regarding	




Here,	 Kant	 notes	 that	 judgment’s	 function	 to	 harmonize	 the	 two	 heterogeneous	
sources	 of	 cognition	 through	 the	 transcendental	 schematism	 is	 an	 “art”	 [Kunst]	
whose	 “true	 handle”	 [wahre	Handgriffe]	 remains	 “secret”/”hidden”	 [verborgene]	
from	 view.	 Kant	 uses	 the	 word	 “handle”,	 which	 clearly	 indicates	 his	 intimation	
towards	 an	 obscure	 sort	 of	 material	 sensuousness	 that	 constitutes	 the	 art	 of	




posits	 the	 realm	 of	 obscurity	 as	 the	 world	 of	 pure	 intelligibility	 devoid	 of	
sensuousness	and	turns	it	 into	the	Ideal	realm.	Bergson’s	retrieval	of	time	in	this	
sense	 takes	 the	 route	 of	materialism	 and	 seeks	 the	 origin	 of	 time	 in	 the	 radical	
alterity	 of	 the	 supra-sensuous	 sensuousness	 of	 the	 touch.	 The	 peculiar	 kind	 of	
empiricism	 that	 Bergson	 puts	 forth	 is	 therefore	 not	 a	 simple	 contradiction	 of	
Kant’s	transcendental	philosophy.	Instead	of	opposing	the	a	priori	and	a	posteriori	
as	 incompatible	 with	 one	 another,	 the	 new	 empiricism	 of	 Bergson	 explains	 the	






The	 above	 analysis	 gives	 us	 insight	 into	 the	 preliminary	 way	 in	 which	 Bergson	
reconceptualizes	 Kant’s	 theory	 of	 judgment	 from	 a	 uniquely	 materialist	
perspective.	 But	 before	moving	 on	 to	 the	 analysis	 of	Matter	 and	Memory,	 let	 us	
elaborate	 further	upon	the	meaning	of	 this	 “materialism”	by	turning	towards	the	
particularity	of	 the	surface	ego.	As	we	mentioned	earlier,	Bergson	states	 that	 the	
formation	of	 time	 is	 a	 step	 towards	 “social	 life”,	 or	 towards	 “liv[ing]	 in	 common	
and	speak[ing]”.	We	have	remarked	that	this	is	a	clear	indication	that	the	retrieval	
of	time	is	where	the	problem	of	the	“social”	enters	into	his	philosophy.		Yet	if	this	is	
the	 case,	 it	 already	 implies	 that	 the	 question	 of	 the	 reality	 of	 time	 cannot	 be	
dissociated	from	human	beings’	need	to	live	within	society.	This	testifies	to	the	fact	
that	 the	 fundamental	 problem	 concerning	 human	 beings’	 irreducibly	 political	
existence	 is	 indeed	 accounted	 for	 by	 Bergson	 long	 before	 the	 more	 explicitly	
“political”	 The	 Two	 Sources	 of	 Morality	 and	 Religion.	 By	 extension,	 this	 further	
implies	 that	 the	 project	 of	 the	 retrieval	 of	 time	 simultaneously	 constitutes	 a	
political	critique	of	the	force	of	society	upon	the	formation	of	the	individual	ego.	
	 In	order	to	clarify	our	understanding	of	the	relationship	between	the	being	
of	 time	 and	 society,	 let	 us	 follow	 Bergson’s	 footsteps	 and	 go	 back	 to	 the	 scene	
where	 Kant	 defines	 time	 in	 Critique	 of	 Pure	Reason.	We	 began	 our	 investigation	
into	Bergson’s	reading	of	Kant	with	a	remark	that	 time	 is	seen	as	one	of	 the	two	




space	 and	 time	 are	 the	 power	 to	 be	 affected	 (receptivity)	 and	 concepts	 of	
understanding	 are	 the	 power	 to	 affect	 (spontaneity).	 Furthermore,	 we	 need	 to	
emphasize	here	that	the	peculiarity	of	 time-bound	intuition	 is	defined	by	Kant	 in	




real	 existence	 means	 that	 this	 operation	 is	 a	 laying	 bare	 of	 our	 transcendental	
power	 for	 passive-active	 affection	which	 constitutes	 us	 as	 finite	Man.136	Thus,	 if	
Bergson	 in	 fact	 retrieves	 time	 through	reconceiving	 it	 in	 terms	of	 its	genesis,	we	
can	 claim	 that	 this	 retrieval	 is	 what	 constitutes	 a	 genetic	 anthropology,	 or	 the	
discourse	on	the	genesis	of	the	essence	of	Man.		The	genesis	of	time	is	constitutive	
of	the	coming	into	being	of	the	essence	of	Man,	since	it	is	the	horizon	for	finite,	thus	
properly	 human	 knowledge.	 If	we	 can	 borrow	 the	 expression	 from	Levinas,	 this	
project	can	be	also	seen	as	a	Bergsonian	egology	since	it	explains	the	constitution	
and	the	coming	into	being	of	the	power	which	makes	up	our	human	Ego	as	such.137		




as	 the	 transcendental	 given,	 i.e.,	 a	 passage	 is	 made	 from	 the	 immutable	 and	
necessary	structure	that	pre-formulates	the	world	a	priori,	into	as	that	which	comes	
into	being.	We	can	therefore	no	longer	agree	with	Kant	when	he	says	that	“(t)ime	is	










Bergson	 and	 the	 image	 of	 Hegel	 that	 Catherine	 Malabou	 depicts.	 Time	 reclaimed	 by	
Bergson	can	be	seen	as	plastic	form;	it	is	made	possible	by	“a	capacity	to	receive	form	and	
a	 capacity	 to	 produce	 form.”	Or,	 to	 borrow	Derrida’s	 reading	 of	 the	 concept,	 to	 retrieve	




	 Going	 back	 to	 our	 earlier	 remark	 about	 the	 place	 of	 society	 in	 Bergson’s	
philosophy,	what	is	important	for	us	to	notice	is	that	Bergson	furthermore	defines	
the	genesis	of	 the	essence	of	Man	 in	 terms	of	 its	being	within	society.	That	 is,	 the	
power,	 which	 constitutes	 us	 as	 human	 beings,	 or	 the	 time,	 which	 grounds	 the	
appearance	of	the	world	for	derivative	beings,	is	contemporaneous	with	the	force	
of	society.	As	Marx	states:	“the	human	essence	 is	no	abstraction	 inherent	 in	each	
single	individual.	In	its	reality,	 it	 is	the	ensemble	of	the	social	relations”.140	As	for	
Marx	 so	 for	 Bergson,	 the	 essence	 of	 human	 beings	 is	 conceived	 to	 be	 socially	
constructed.	The	Bergsonian	style	of	anthropology	is	necessarily	an	anthropology	
that	 sees	 an	 individual	 as	 a	 social	 individual.	 The	 theoretical	 refutation	 of	
homogeneous	 time	 therefore	 fundamentally	 contains	 an	 irreducible	 political	
dimension	and	the	retrieval	of	time	is	simultaneously	an	exposure	of	Man	as	social	
individual.	 In	 other	 words,	 the	 transcendental	 condition	 of	 experience	 that	
constitutes	the	essence	of	Man	is	inseparable	from	Man’s	being	within	society	and	
the	 genesis	 of	 time	 is	 simultaneously	 the	 genesis	 of	 society	 in	 and	 through	 the	
individual.			
	 One	 might	 object	 here	 that	 it	 is	 not	 until	 his	 last	 major	 work,	 The	 Two	
Sources	 of	 Morality	 and	 Religion	 that	 Bergson	 directly	 engages	 with	 the	
problematic	of	society	and	politics	as	a	central	subject	matter.	This	view,	of	course,	
is	 correct	 from	 the	 standpoint	 that	 sees	 “politics”	 as	 a	 distinct	 subject	 matter	
exclusively	 dealing	with	 demarcated	 activities	 that	 deserve	 to	 be	 called	 political	
and	 separate	 from	 philosophical	 problems	 concerning	 the	 nature	 of	 reality	 as	 a	
whole.141	However,	 by	 paying	 special	 attention	 to	 the	 project	 of	 the	 retrieval	 of	
time,	it	becomes	evident	that	the	political	is	not	a	peripheral	problem	for	Bergson.	
On	 the	 contrary,	 it	 takes	 up	 one	 of	 the	 indispensable	 issues	 located	 at	 the	 very	
heart	of	his	philosophy	which	concerns	the	coming	into	being	of	time.	As	we	have	
seen,	 the	 new	 conceptual	 context	 of	 surface	 ego	 he	 introduces	 through	 the	
retrieval	 is	 in	 fact	 simultaneously	 defined	 as	 social	 in	 its	 fundamental	 character.	
Put	 differently,	what	 Bergson	means	 by	 surface	 ego	 is	 strictly	 coterminous	with	
what	 he	 calls	 the	 “social	 ego”	 (moi	 social)	 in	 The	 Two	 Sources	 of	 Morality	 and	
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Religion.142	Indeed,	 in	 all	 of	 his	 writing	 throughout	 his	 entire	 career,	 whenever	
Bergson	 engages	 in	 a	 retrieval	 of	 time,	 there	 is	 a	 reference	 to	 society.	 Thus,	 the	
project	 of	 retrieving	 time	 is	 fundamentally	 inseparable	 from	 his	 view	 of	
homogeneous	 time	 as	 the	 condition	 of	 social	 subjectivity.	 The	 Two	 Sources	 of	
Morality	and	Religion	is	by	no	means	the	only	work	that	focuses	upon	the	subject-
matter	 of	 the	 social.	 A	 close	 reading	 reveals	 that	 Bergson	 is	 in	 fact	 asking	 the	
question	concerning	society	as	soon	as	he	commences	the	retrieval	of	time	in	Time	
and	Free	Will.	The	problematization	of	society	serves	as	the	broader	context	within	





critique	at	 its	core.	To	retrieve	time	as	the	basis	of	Man	as	social	 individual	 is,	 in	
Marx’s	 words,	 a	 “negative	 revelation”	 whereby	 one	 is	 exposed	 to	 the	 lack	 of	
freedom	at	the	core	of	one’s	existence.143	Thus,	Bergson’s	confrontation	with	Kant	
in	fact	contains	two	parts	at	once	–	one	is	his	theoretical	refutation;	the	other	is	the	




as	a	whole	 to	define	 the	political.	We	must	 seek	not	a	philosophy	 “of”	politics	 in	
Bergson,	but	a	genuine	political	potency,	which	permeates	his	philosophy	through	
and	through.	On	this	matter,	we	can	perhaps	borrow	from	Sartre	who	put	it	most	
adequately:	 in	 order	 for	 philosophy	 to	 qualify	 as	 the	 foundation	 for	 politics,	 we	
must	 “plunge	man	back	 into	 the	world”,	 and	give	 “full	measure	 to	man’s	agonies	















Up	 until	 now,	 we	 have	 talked	 about	 how	 Bergson	 prefigures	 the	 project	 of	 the	
retrieval	 in	 Time	 and	 Free	 Will.	 Let	 us	 move	 on	 to	 Matter	 and	 Memory	where	
Bergson	 fully	 turns	 towards	 an	 exposition	 of	 how	 time	 comes	 into	 being.	 Our	
fundamental	argument	is	that	Matter	and	Memory	is	the	work	that	retrieves	Kant’s	
doctrine	 of	 schematism	 from	 a	 new	materialist	 standpoint.	 Instead	 of	 inquiring	
into	the	real	status	of	time	that	differs	from	Kantian	conception,	what	Bergson	asks	
now	 is	 with	 what	 definite	 mechanism	 and	 within	 which	 realm	 of	 reality	 the	
mediation,	or	the	“illegitimate	translation”,	of	duration	into	time	in	fact	takes	place.	










of	 judgment,	 he	 chooses	 to	 start	 from	 a	 perspective	 where	 image	 “exists	 in	
itself.”146	In	relation	 to	such	a	 theme,	as	we	already	pointed	out	 in	Benjamin	and	
Horkheimer’s	 criticisms,	Matter	 and	Memory	has	 predominantly	 been	 treated	 in	
terms	of	its	anti-Kantianism.	Merleau-Ponty	also	highlights	in	his	1948	lecture	that	
the	 very	 starting	 point	 of	 Matter	 and	 Memory:	 “[Bergson]	 did	 not	 follow	 the	
itinerary	of	Kantian	philosophy”	and	thus	there	is	a	“naïveté”	which	prevents	him	
from	 adequately	 treating	 the	 problem	 of	 the	 cogito	 as	 well	 as	 the	
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crucial	 aspect	 which	 allows	 critics	 to	 repeatedly	 point	 out	 that	 Bergson’s	
philosophy	 is	 at	 bottom	 unable	 to	 take	 history	 and	 self-critique	 seriously.	 The	
work	 is	 traditionally	 interpreted	 as	 denoting	 a	 “naïve”	 or	 uncritical/ahistorical	
positivity	and	therefore	leaning	towards	vulgar	metaphysics.148		
From	the	outset,	therefore,	it	seems	that	the	correct	way	of	interpreting	this	
work	 is	 to	 solely	 focus	 upon	 its	 anti-Kantian	 affirmationism.	 Contrary	 to	 such	 a	
view,	it	is	our	argument	that	Matter	and	Memory	strongly	carries	forward	the	task	
of	 retrieving	 Kantian	 time	 by	 focusing	 on	 the	 aspect	 first	 touched	 upon	 only	
negatively	in	Time	and	Free	Will	–	the	illegitimate	translation	of	time	into	space	(or,	
of	 duration	 into	 time).	 While	 in	 his	 previous	 work,	 Bergson	 highlights	 this	
“illegitimacy”	as	a	kind	of	violence	that	turns	time	into	the	equivalent	of	the	fourth	
dimension	of	space,	his	effort	is	now	directed	towards	disclosing	how	exactly	such	




In	 short,	 what	 we	 see	 in	 Matter	 and	 Memory	 is	 a	 retrieval	 of	 Kantian	
doctrine	of	schematism	in	terms	of	his	new	conception	of	Memory.	If	Kantian	time	
is	 once	 relegated	 as	 the	 false	 receptivity	 due	 to	 the	 schematism,	 it	 is	 this	 very	
mechanism	 that	 Bergson	 retrieves	 in	 terms	 of	 a	 new	 perspective	 and	 positively	






we	 have	 shown	 earlier,	 the	 operation	 that	 Bergson	 points	 out	 in	 Kant	 as	
“illegitimate	 translation”	corresponds	 to	 the	 function	of	 transcendental	 faculty	of	
judgment	in	Critique	of	Pure	Reason.		
Through	 the	 retrieval	 of	 judgment	 in	 terms	 of	 his	 new	 conception	 of	
memory,	 what	 was	 hitherto	 seen	 as	 the	 illegitimate	 translation	 now	 transforms	
																																																								





into	 a	 positively	 reconceived	 function	 of	 “adaptation	 of	 the	 real”	 [adaptation	du	
reel]	or	“attention	to	life”	[attention	à	la	vie].149	The	mediation	of	judgment	is	thus	
given	 a	 positive	 value	 and	 is	 now	 spoken	 of	 as	 that	 which	 aligns	 human	
consciousness	 with	 reality	 and	 life.150	Thus,	 far	 from	 going	 only	 towards	 the	
opposite	direction	against	Kant,	Bergson	makes	a	definite	return	to	Kantian	time	
as	 one	 of	 the	 two	 transcendental	 elements	 of	 the	 method	 of	 intuition.	 The	
centrality	 of	 society	 is	 also	 firmly	 present	 within	 this	 conversion	 since	 this	
adaptation	of	the	real/attention	to	life	is	said	to	be	aimed	towards	“the	interests	of	
practice	 and	 to	 the	 exigencies	 of	 social	 life.”151	Here,	 not	 only	 Bergson	 again	
stresses	 the	 fundamentally	 social	 characteristics	 of	 time	 as	 the	 basis	 of	 Kantian	
apparent	 reality,	 but	 he	 also	 further	 clarifies	 the	 nature	 of	 social	 reality	 as	 the	
sensuous	milieu	within	which	 the	 individual	must	 live,	or	must	 support	 its	 vital	
need	 (besoin).	 The	 retrieval	 of	 time	 in	Matter	 and	 Memory	 thus	 puts	 forth	 the	
material	need,	or	the	individual’s	vital/practical	interest	as	the	determining	factor	
for	the	coming	into	being	of	time.		
Yet,	what	makes	 it	 possible	 for	Bergson	 to	 retrieve	 the	Kantian	 faculty	 of	
judgment	 in	 terms	of	 the	 “interests	of	practice”	and	 “vital	need”?	Whence	comes	
this	 Idea	of	Life	 from	which	the	faculty	of	 judgment	as	well	as	the	schematism	of	
time	are	retrieved?	Everything	happens	as	if	the	concept	of	memory	is	introduced	
as	the	subsidiary	of	Life;	concomitantly,	the	activity	of	memory,	which	establishes	
the	 peculiarly	 human	 form	 of	 experience	 for	 Bergson,	 is	 seen	 as	 the	 internally	
purposive	 and	 self-organized	 being	 that	 exists	 in	 and	 for-itself.	 Thus,	 although	
Bergson	 successfully	 retrieves	 the	 determinate	 form	 of	 time	 as	 a	 real	 existence	
within	the	field	of	intuition	in	Matter	and	Memory,	the	self-subsistence	of	Life	from	
which	time	is	retrieved	seems	to	re-introduce	his	philosophy	back	into	the	Idealist	
Metaphysical	 tradition	where	 the	Absolute	 Self	 is	 relegated	within	 the	 sphere	 of	
transcendence	with	 respect	 to	 intuition.	 As	we	 touched	 upon	 earlier,	 if	 Bergson	
brings	back	the	Kantian	conception	of	 time,	 there	 is	 the	danger	that	 the	retrieval	
might	also	bring	back	the	transcendence	of	the	Absolute.	The	important	question	
we	must	ask	therefore	is:	how	can	Bergson	account	for	the	reality	of	time	without	











time	 stems	 from	 a	 radicalization	 of	 this	 concept	 of	 “natural	 end”	 since	 human	
perception	comes	to	be	treated	in	terms	of	 its	participation	within	the	immanent	
activity	 of	 Life.	 Overall,	 the	 difference	 between	 the	 two	 philosophers	 is	 that	
Bergson	starts	from	the	concept	of	Life	and	then	deduces	human	perception	as	the	
by-product	of	Life’s	 internal	purposiveness	whereas	Kant	only	 treats	natural	end	
as	 the	 “regulative	 principle”	 of	 reflective	 judgment	 “which	 can	 only	 lie	 in	 the	
Idea”.153	The	result	is	that	the	genesis	of	time	in	Bergson	stems	from	Life’s	internal	











The	 afferent	 nerves	 are	 images,	 the	 brain	 is	 an	 image,	 the	 disturbance	
traveling	 through	 the	 sensory	 nerves	 and	 propagated	 in	 the	 brain	 is	 an	
image	 too.	 If	 the	 image	 which	 I	 term	 cerebral	 disturbance	 really	 begot	
external	 images,	 it	 would	 contain	 them	 in	 one	 way	 or	 another,	 and	 the	





By	 “image”,	 here	Bergson	 is	 not	 referring	 to	 the	 familiar	 conception	 of	 image	 as	
“representation”.	 Image	 for	 Bergson	 exists	 “in-itself”	 and	 it	 therefore	 refers	 to	







Merleau-Ponty	 notes,	 Bergson’s	 starting	 point	 differs	 from	 the	 Kantian	
transcendental	framework	that	sees	an	image	as	a	priori	synthesized	by	the	faculty	
judgment.	That	is,	rather	than	starting	from	the	position	where	matter	can	only	be	
intuited	 as	 phenomenon	 which	 is	 a	 priori	 ordered	 by	 forms	 of	 intuition/time	
(which	 is	 in	 turn	 conditioned	 by	 faculty	 of	 judgment),	 Bergson	 begins	 the	work	
with	 putting	 forth	 a	 conception	 of	 the	 “material	 world”	 whereby	 the	 faculty	 of	
judgment	has	not	yet	taken	its	effect.		
		Like	 Schopenhauer’s	 “world	 as	 will”,	 insofar	 as	 it	 is	 defined	 as	 “self-
existing”,	 the	 image	 here	 refers	 to	 a	 view	 of	 the	 universe	 as	 comprised	 of	




or	 in	 us.	 	That	 is,	 the	 image	 is	 not	 defined	 as	 an	 object	 given	 to	 the	 subject	 as	
phenomenon.	Time	has	no	place	in	the	world	as	image	since	it	is,	in	principle,	only	
effective	 in	 the	 world	 of	 phenomena	 conditioned	 by	 the	 subject.	 The	 world	 of	
image	 instead	denotes	a	viewpoint	where	 the	duality	of	object/subject	 is	not	yet	
applicable	 and	 where	 the	 ideality	 of	 the	 world	 conditioned	 by	 the	 derivative	
human	consciousness	is	altogether	excluded.157	In	this	universe,	we	are	ourselves	






any	 perception	 is	 necessarily	 a	 human	 perception?	 Does	 this	 not	 imply	 an	
anachronism	after	Kant?	Or,	as	critics	point	out,	is	this	made	possible	only	through	
a	 positivistic	 naiveté	 which	 ignores	 the	 Marxist	 historical	 constitution	 of	 our	
subjectivity?	To	be	sure,	the	assertion	of	the	material	world	as	self-existing	image	
																																																								




157	For	 a	 reading	 that	 specifically	 focuses	 upon	 the	 uniqueness	 of	 the	 first	 chapter	 of	




is	 itself	 supported	 by	 a	 distinct	 theory	 of	 what	 Bergson	 calls	 the	 “pure”	 or	
“impersonal	 perception”,	 which	 is	 said	 to	 be	 true	 only	 “in	 theory”	 but	 not	 “in	
fact”.159	A	full	exposition	of	this	notion	cannot	be	pursued	here	since	this	can	only	
come	 to	 light	 with	 respect	 to	 the	 more	 detailed	 explication	 of	 the	 concept	 of	
duration	 in	 Part	 II.	 But	 the	 theory	 of	 pure/impersonal	 perception	 involves	 a	
radicalization	of	Kant’s	theory	of	the	internal	purposiveness	of	Life,	as	evidenced	in	
the	 latter’s	 treatment	 of	 teleological	 judgment,	 which	 is	 in	 turn	 made	 possible	
through	 Bergson’s	 unique	 conception	 of	 the	 experience	 of	 Duration.	 That	 is,	
through	the	immediate	experience	of	duration	that	unites	the	self-intuition	of	the	





world	 as	 self-existing	 image	 stems	 from	 this	 perspective	 that	 regards	 oneself	 as	
partaking	within	the	 internally	purposive	Life	of	 the	Absolute.	The	question	here	
is:	 what	 is	 the	 particular	 role	 of	 this	 conception	 in	 the	 work	 in	 its	 entirety?	 If	
Bergson	stopped	short	at	putting	forth	the	view	of	the	world	as	self-existing	image	
and	 if	 this	 were	 the	 only	 image	 of	 the	world	 that	 Bergson	 chose	 to	 uphold,	 the	
central	argument	of	Matter	and	Memory	would	merely	constitute	a	one-sided	anti-
Kantianism.	 However,	 this	 is,	 in	 fact,	 not	 at	 all	 the	 case.	 Although	 the	 argument	
presented	 in	 the	 first	 chapter	 is	 the	 crucial	 foundation	 of	 the	 entire	Matter	 and	
Memory	 and	 the	 following	 discussions	 regarding	 the	 nature	 of	memory	must	 be	
understood	strictly	with	reference	to	it,	the	conception	presented	in	this	chapter	is	
simultaneously	what	permits	 the	development	of	 another	 view	of	 reality	 to	 take	
root.	 That	 is,	 the	 concept	 of	 the	 world	 as	 self-existing	 image	 is	 that	 from	which	
Bergson	performs	his	retrieval	of	Kantian	time	in	a	way	that	makes	it	possible	for	
him	 to	 surpass	Kant	 precisely	 by	 returning	 to	 the	 latter.	 Accordingly,	 as	we	will	
argue	in	our	subsequent	discussion	of	Memory,	the	internal	purposiveness	of	Life	
is	determined	both	as	the	source	and	the	end	of	derivative	consciousness.	







How	 is	 it	 that	 this	 perception	 is	 consciousness,	 and	why	 does	 everything	




in-itself	 existence	 of	 the	 world	 per	 se	 but	 rather	 the	 coming	 into	 being	 of	 the	
peculiarly	subjective	experience	which	seems	to	exist	as	if	it	is	“my”	experience.	As	
we	noted,	the	point	of	departure	is	the	world	as	self-existing	image,	which	contains	
me	within	 it,	 rather	 than	 as	 something	 existing	 for	me.	But	 the	question	now	 is,	
how	is	 it	 that	 this	 image	of	 the	world	which	exists	 in	and	for	 itself	becomes	 “my”	
consciousness?	 Or,	 how	 is	 it	 that	 this	 internally	 purposive	 material	 world	 then	
comes	 to	 appear	 as	 if	 it	 is	 produced	 by	 and	 within	 consciousness?	 This	 is	 the	
second	important	step	of	Bergson’s	argument	which	leads	him	towards	inquiring	
into	 the	 nature	 of	 Memory	 on	 which	 he	 devotes	 the	 rest	 of	 the	 book	where	 he	
explicates	its	centrality	vis-à-vis	the	subjective,	“spiritual”	dimension	of	reality.		
	 To	fully	appreciate	the	role	of	the	conception	of	the	world	as	image,	i.e.	the	
theory	of	 pure	perception,	we	must	 examine	 it	 in	 relation	 to	 this	 second	 step	of	
Bergson’s	 overall	 argument,	 namely	 the	 function	 of	 Memory	 vis-à-vis	 human	
consciousness	 (the	 examination	 of	 memory	 will	 be	 pursued	 in	 detail	 in	 the	
following	 section).	 Whereas	 the	 theory	 of	 pure	 perception	 explains	 our	
participation	within	 the	 self-existing	world,	which	 effectively	 dispels	 the	 trap	 of	
solipsism,	 the	 theory	 of	 memory	 explains	 how	 the	 same	 world	 comes	 to	 be	
pictured	 as	 representation	 for	me.	Bergson	 therefore	 insists	 that	perception	 and	
memory	are	different	in	nature	and	their	difference	cannot	be	understood	as	mere	
difference	in	degree.	Yet,	Bergson	notes	that	the	ordinary	human	perception	is	the	
mixture	 between	 the	 two	 and	 it	 is	 memory’s	 contact	 with	 the	 internal	
purposiveness	 of	 Life	 that	 conditions	 the	 coming	 into	 being	 of	 the	 derivative	 or	
human	consciousness.	That	is,	although	they	are	said	to	be	different	in	kind,	there	
is	a	point	of	contact	between	perception	and	memory	so	that	the	nature	of	human	
consciousness	may	be	understood	 in	 terms	of	 its	 relative	distance	 from	the	pure	






not	 in	 terms	 of	 disinterested	 speculation	but	 rather	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 impersonal	
drive	for	action	stemming	from	the	inner	purposiveness	of	Life.	That	is,	as	Bergson	
clearly	states	in	chapter	four,	human	consciousness	is	ultimately	directed	towards	
and	conditioned	by	 the	need	 for	 the	 “exigencies	of	 social	 life”,	 and,	 as	he	puts	 it,	
“[that]	which	 is	 commonly	 called	 a	 fact	 is	 not	 reality	 as	 it	 appears	 to	 immediate	
intuition”	but	it	is	already	conditioned	for	the	sake	of	action.161		
	 What	matters	here	is	noticing	the	importance	of	starting	from	the	world	of	
self-existing	 image	 rather	 than	 from	 the	 side	 of	 subjective	 consciousness.	 If	 one	
begins	 from	 the	 side	 of	 consciousness	 and	 subsequently	 posits	 the	 world	 in	
relation	to	it,	one	has	no	other	choice	but	to	admit	the	absurd	hypothesis	that	the	
whole	 universe	 is	 contained	 within	 consciousness	 and	 to	 inevitably	 turn	 the	
objective	 reality	 of	 the	 external	 world	 into	 a	 complete	 mystery.	 In	 this	 way,	 as	
Bergson	 states,	 no	 adequate	 explanation	 concerning	 the	 transition	 from	 the	
sensibility	 to	 understanding	 is	 possible	 since	 the	 former	 is	 posited	 as	 the	
derivative	product	 of	 the	 latter	 even	 though	 its	 substantial	 basis	 remains	 a	 total	
mystery.162	On	the	contrary,	if	one	begins	with	the	objective	reality	of	the	world	as	
existing	by	itself	outside	of	one’s	consciousness	so	as	to	explain	the	transition	from	
the	 objective	 to	 the	 subjective	world,	 one	 can	 deduce	 how	 it	 is	 possible	 for	 the	
objective	world	to	be	alienated	from	itself	and	to	be	seen	as	a	representation	for	
consciousness.	 In	 other	 words,	 by	 beginning	 the	 exposition	 from	 the	 non-
conceptual	 realm	 of	 image,	 the	 conceptual	 mediation	 of	 the	 world	 acquires	 its	
foundation	within	the	impersonal	realm	of	pure	perception.	The	essential	nature	of	
















purposiveness	 of	 the	 living	 body	 to	 be	 in	 an	 economic	 relationship	 with	 its	
surrounding	 environment. 165 	This	 economic	 relationship	 is	 a	 relationship	 of	
sensuous	suffering	(subir)	and	to	be	a	sensuous	suffering	being	means	to	be	open	
to	 the	 ensemble	 of	 received	 actions	 from	 one’s	 surroundings	 and	 its	 reaction	 to	
“the	greater	or	lesser	advantage	which	it	can	derive”.166	That	is,	in	order	for	a	being	



















and	Nietzsche,	 then,	 for	Bergson,	 too,	 in	order	 to	derive	 the	objective	 essence	of	
Man	–	 the	 true	essence	rather	 than	essence	 in	an	estranged	form	–	one	must	not	






remain	 bout	 up	 with	 a	 totality,	 is	 positively	 to	 be	 somewhere,	 in	 the	 home,	 to	 be	















As	 we	 have	 remarked,	 what	 Bergson	 addresses	 after	 the	 abovementioned	
exposition	is	the	transition	from	the	self-existing	world	of	image	to	the	subjective	
consciousness.	Whereas	 the	 objective	world	 of	 image	 is	 said	 to	 be	 only	 true	 “in	
theory”,	 Bergson	 is	 now	 interested	 in	 how	 this	 impersonal	 perception	 makes	 a	
transition	 into	 a	 factual	perception	with	distinctly	 subjective	 characteristics.	The	
former	 relates	 to	 the	 in-itself	 being	which	 is	part	 of	 things	 (the	world	 as	 image)	
and	the	latter	only	grasps	the	being	for	us	or	the	world	of	human	perception	which	
is	alienated	from	the	in-itself	reality.	If	pure	perception	corresponds	to	the	world	
as	 image	where	 time	 is	 not	 yet	 present,	 then	 in	 order	 for	 us	 to	 inquire	 into	 the	
retrieval	of	time	we	must	examine	through	what	definite	procedure	the	in-itself	of	
image	passes	 into	the	 image	 for-us.	This	 is	 tantamount	to	saying	that	 to	examine	
the	 nature	 of	 this	 passage	 is	 also	 to	 pinpoint	 how	exactly	 time	 as	 the	 derivative	
power	which	constitutes	us	as	surface/social	ego	ultimately	comes	into	being.		
Our	 reading	of	Bergson’s	 treatment	of	 this	problem	 in	Kant	has	been	 that	
this	passage	 is	 enacted	by	 the	 illegitimate	 translation	by	 the	 faculty	of	 judgment	
since	 it	 is	 that	 which	 a	 priori	 mediates	 and	 subsumes	 intuition	 under	 the	
categories	 of	 understanding.	 This	means,	 as	Heidegger	 notes,	 that	we	 can	 locate	
the	functioning	of	imagination	as	the	source	from	which	time	springs	forth	insofar	
as	 time	 is	 already	 mediated	 by	 imagination.	 The	 principal	 task	 of	 Matter	 and	
Memory	from	chapter	2	onwards	is	to	examine	the	definite	nature	of	this	mediating	
mechanism	in	terms	of	the	function	of	Memory,	which	is	the	focus	of	this	section.	
Bergson	 states:	 “it	 is	 memory	 above	 all	 that	 lends	 to	 perception	 its	 subjective	
character”. 171 	If	 pure	 perception	 is	 obtained	 via	 subtracting	 memory	 from	
perception,	 to	examine	 the	nature	of	 factual	perception	he	must	now	 investigate	





function	equivalent	 to	 that	of	 the	Kantian	 faculty	of	 imagination.	As	 it	 is	 the	case	
with	Kantian	imagination,	which	is	“a	necessary	ingredient	of	perception	itself”,172	
Bergsonian	 memory	 is	 not	 a	 secondary	 activity	 of	 the	 mind	 that	 occurs	 after	 a	
concrete	 perception.	 As	 he	 puts	 it:	 “concrete	 perception,	 however	 short	 we	
suppose	it,	is	already	a	synthesis	made	by	memory”173	and	therefore	memory	must	
be	 construed	 also	 as	 a	 necessary	 or	 a	priori	 component	 of	 our	 concrete	 human	
perception.	 If	 our	 hypothesis	 is	 correct,	 in	 the	 same	 way	 that	 the	 function	 of	
judgment	 is	 the	 source	of	 time	 for	Kant,	 it	 follows	 that	memory	 for	Bergson	 can	
also	be	seen	as	the	proper	site	where	time	springs	forth.		
In	 order	 to	 test	 our	 hypothesis,	 let	 us	 return	 to	 the	 notion	 of	 the	 “self-
existing	 image”.	 We	 made	 a	 brief	 comment	 above	 regarding	 the	 resemblance	
between	 this	 “in-itself”	 of	 the	 image	 and	 Kant’s	 teleological	 judgment.	 We	 may	
recall	here	that	in	the	Critique	of	Judgment,	Kant’s	thesis	on	the	faculty	of	judgment	
acquires	a	 further	elaboration	 through	another	distinction	between	 two	kinds	of	
judgment	 –	 determinative	 and	 reflective	 judgment.	 Determinative	 judgment	 is	 a	
form	 of	 judgment	 whereby	 “the	 universal	 is	 given,	 [and]	 then	 the	 power	 of	
judgment,	which	subsumes	the	particular	under	it,	is	determining.”174	In	short,	this	
type	 of	 judgment	 is	 conditioned	 by	 the	 transcendental	 schematism	 which	




synthesis	 indeed	starts	 from	the	empirical	object	of	encounter	but	 is	nonetheless	





power	 of	 imagination	 in	 Anthropology	 from	 a	 Pragmatic	 Point	 of	 View.	 Rather,	 what	 is	
conceived	as	“productive”:	the	original	presentation	of	the	object	is	already	a	synthesis	of	
memory	 for	 Bergson.	 See	 Kant,	 I.,	 ([1764-1803]	 2007).	 Anthropology,	 History,	 and	
Education.	Trans.	M.	Gregor,	 P.	 Guyer,	 R.	 B.	 Louden,	H.	Wilson,	A.	W.	Wood,	G.	 Zoller,	 A.	












particular	 is	given,	 for	which	the	universal	 is	 to	be	 found”.178	That	 is,	 rather	 than	
starting	 from	 the	 universal	 and	 then	 move	 down	 (descending)	 toward	 the	
particular	 individual	 via	 the	 way	 of	 a	 priori	 subsumption/synthesis,	 reflective	
judgment	works	via	 “ascending	from	the	particular	 in	nature	to	the	universal”.179	
This	 means	 that	 the	 particular	 given	 is	 initially	 without	 concepts	 and	 thus	 one	
must	 seek	 hitherto	 unknown	 concepts	 and	 produce	 unified	 experience	 in	 a	 new	
way.	In	the	first	version	of	the	introduction	to	the	Critique	of	Judgment,	Kant	states	
that	 this	 reflection	 indicates	 not	 a	 schematic,	 i.e.,	 “mechanical”,	 subsumption	 of	
things	under	concepts,	but	that	it	operates	“technically”	or	“artistically.”180	It	is	so	
described	 since	 one	must	 create	 a	 concept.	 Thus	we	have,	via	 Kant,	 two	distinct	
ways	 (determinative	 and	 reflective	 judgment)	 in	which	 imagination	 functions	 as	









two	different	 types	of	recognition.	On	 the	one	hand,	 there	 is	 the	 type	of	memory	
that	 is	 called	 “habit-memory”	 (souvenir-habitude).	 At	 bottom,	 habit-memory	












this	 faculty	 of	 automatic	 habit-memory	 supports	 what	 he	 calls	 the	 process	 of	
“inattentive	recognition”	(reconnaissance	par	distraction).183	As	Deleuze	states,	this	
refers	to	the	process	of	recognizing	usual	objects	“which	occupy	a	large	part	of	our	
daily	 life:	 this	 is	 a	 table,	 this	 is	 an	 apple,	 this	 the	 piece	 of	 wax,	 Good	 morning	
Theaetetus.”184	It	 is	 called	 inattentive	 since	 it	 requires	 no	 conscious	 attention	 to	
recollect	 past	memory	 for	 it	 to	 function.	 In	 fact,	we	 are	 hardly	 conscious	 of	 this	
procedure	to	an	extent	that	“[we]	might	believe	it	innate”.185			
On	the	other	hand,	there	is	another	kind	of	memory	called	“memory-image”	
(image-souvenir).186	In	 comparison	 to	 habit-memory,	which	 requires	 no	 effort	 of	
consciousness	to	recollect	past	in	the	present,	memory-image	comes	to	us	when	“a	
call	 (appel)	 is	made	 to	 the	 deeper	 and	more	 distant	 regions	 of	memory”	 by	 our	





ourselves,	 of	 an	 actively	 created	 image”.189	It	 is	 a	 projection	of	 the	past	 onto	 the	
object	of	perception	beyond	the	automatic	habit-memory	since	the	image	that	one	
grasps	 is	 not	 given	 to	 us	 habitually	 but	 must	 be	 further	 recalled	 from	 the	 past	


























the	 present.	 Now,	 the	 function	 of	 external	 perception	 in	 the	 present	was	 earlier	
deduced	in	chapter	1	of	Matter	and	Memory	in	terms	of	its	economic	relation	with	
the	 external	 environment	 for	 the	 sake	 of	 the	 individual’s	 survival	 or	 life.	 Thus,	
impure	memory,	inasmuch	as	it	is	recollection	of	a	region	of	the	past	in	the	present	
perception,	is	memory	which	has	turned	towards	sensible	action.		
	 This	 conception	 of	memory	 is	 a	 refashioning	 of	 Kantian	 critical	 judgment	
since	the	latter	is	seen	as	directed	towards	speculative	interest	of	reason	or	pure	
“scientific”	 knowledge.190	Here	 Bergson	 reconceives	 this	 postulate	 and	 turns	 the	
function	 of	 memory	 towards	 “attention	 to	 life”,	 or	 towards	 “adaptation	 to	 the	
present	 circumstances”.191	Memory	 is	 that	 which	 a	 priori	 mediates	 any	 factual	
perception	of	the	world	but	this	takes	place	to	the	service	of	one’s	survival	or	life.		
Is	 the	 fact	 that	mediation	 takes	place	 for	 life	 still	 the	 case	 for	memory-image,	 or	
what	 we	 could	 call	 attentive	 recognition?	 Memory-image,	 to	 be	 sure,	 is	
characterised	 as	 having	 more	 to	 do	 with	 representation	 since	 it	 involves	 “an	
inhibition	 of	 movement,	 an	 arresting	 action”.192		 Nonetheless,	 Bergson	 firmly	
maintains	 that	 “the	 phenomena	 of	 inhibition	 are	 merely	 a	 preparation	 for	 the	












195	MM	 101/246-247,	 168-169/307-308:	 “memory,	 laden	 with	 the	 whole	 of	 the	 past,	









Bergson	explains	 in	 chapter	3	 that	 the	mechanism	of	memory	as	a	whole	can	be	
illustrated	in	terms	of	an	inverted	cone:	the	tip	of	a	cone	(which	touches	the	plane)	
representing	 the	 present	 perception	 and	 the	 base	 of	 the	 cone	 representing	 the	
motionless	 totality	 of	 the	 pure	 past.196	Impure	 memory,	 which	 furnishes	 our	
perception,	 is	 “the	 double	movement	 of	 contraction	 and	 expansion”	which	 takes	
place	between	the	two	poles	of	the	pure	present	and	of	pure	memory.	On	the	one	
hand,	 the	 downward	 movement,	 or	 contraction	 of	 the	 past,	 corresponds	 to	
inattentive	 recognition	 (determinative	 judgment,	 as	 it	 were)	 made	 possible	 by	
habit-memory.197		As	we	can	see	in	the	figure,	this	contraction	is	a	narrowing	down	
or	“crystallisation”	(cristalliser)	of	the	past	into	the	present.	On	the	other	hand,	the	
upward	movement	 refers	 to	 the	 process	 of	 attentive	 recognition,	which	 ascends	











aspects	 of	 the	 objects	 of	 perception.	 As	 it	 is	 obvious	 in	 the	 diagram	 above,	 the	
movement	of	attentive	recognition	is	made	up	of	going	up	towards	the	pure	past	
but	 in	 order	 for	 pure	memory	 to	manifest	 itself	 as	memory-image	 and	 as	 actual	







we	 cannot	 even	 speak	 of	 this	 memory	 in	 the	 present	 since,	 by	 virtue	 of	 its	
definition,	pure	memory	stays	where	 it	 is	 in	 the	realm	of	 the	pure	past	and	does	
not	become	a	part	of	the	present.	Whether	automatic	or	not,	the	function	of	impure	
memory	as	 the	retrieval	of	 the	past	 in	 the	present	 is	 for	 the	past	 to	be	useful,	or	
active.	And,	to	return	to	a	point	we	have	made	in	previous	sections,	to	be	useful	or	




of	 action	 upon	 things”	 (la	 puissance	 de	 son	 action	 sur	 les	 choses).198	The	 sole	







springing	 forth	 out	 of	memory.	 If	 it	 is	 indeed	 the	 case,	 as	 Heidegger	 notes,	 that	
imagination	is	the	source	of	time	for	Kant,	the	fact	that	Bergson	retrieves	Kantian	
faculty	of	 judgment	via	 the	concept	of	memory	ultimately	means	 that	memory	 is	
the	source	of	time	for	Bergson.	Time	is	born	out	of	the	above	process	of	memory’s	




present	 as	 a	 schema	 of	 perception.	 In	 other	 words,	 impure	 memory	 is	 posited	
nothing	less	than	the	source	of	time.	It	is	indeed	one	of	his	fundamental	claims	that	
the	activity	of	recollection,	or	process	of	recognition,	is	a	priori	aided	by	the	brain’s	
automatic	 grafting	 of	 objects	 under	 “schema”	 (schème)199	and	 this	 schema	 of	
perception	comprises	time.	Bergson	states:	
	
[Beneath]	 concrete	 extensity,	 a	 network	 of	 which	 the	 meshes	 may	 be	
altered	 to	 any	 shape	whatsoever	 and	 become	 as	 small	 as	we	 please:	 this	
substratum	 which	 is	 merely	 conceived,	 this	 wholly	 ideal	 scheme	 of	
arbitrary	 and	 indefinite	 divisibility,	 is	 homogeneous	 space	 […]	 we	 are	






within	 a	 discussion	 of	 aphasia	 in	 chapter	 2,	 our	 reading	 that	 points	 to	 the	
correspondence	between	memory	and	the	faculty	of	judgment	makes	it	more	than	
obvious	that,	by	“schema”,	he	has	in	mind	a	correlate	of	the	Kantian	schematism.	In	




of	 perception	 and	 “shows	 our	 thought	 the	 way”	 (montre	 à	 notre	 pensée	 le	
chemin).202 	It	 is	 therefore	 evident	 that	 Bergson	 knows	 well	 that	 time	 is	 this	
“abstract	schema”	(schème	abstrait)	supplied	to	us	by	imagination	for	Kant.	We	see	














practical	 interest	 due	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 it	 is	 a	 product	 of	 memory	 insofar	 as	 it	 is	
already	turned	towards	present	perception.		
In	 short,	 Kantian	 time	 is	 refashioned	 by	 Bergson	 as	 “the	 schema	 of	 our	
action”	 (les	 schème	 de	 notre	action),203	or	 a	 “motor	 schema”	 (schème	moteur)204	
instead	 of	 “form	 of	 contemplation”	 deployed	 for	 the	 interest	 of	 speculative	
reason.205	And	 insofar	 as	memory	 is	 the	 source	 of	 time	 as	 the	 schema	 of	 action,	
memory	is	the	measure	of	our	“power	of	action	upon	things”	(la	puissance	de	son	
action	sur	les	choses).206	Granted,	time	is	still	seen	by	Bergson	as	the	condition	for	
any	perception	which	happens,	 as	 it	were,	without	our	conscious	effort.	 In	other	
words,	 we	 are	 “automatically	 acted” 207 	upon	 by	 the	 schema	 as	 any	 factual	
perception	of	the	world	is	prepared	a	priori	by	it.	Yet	Bergson	explains	that	this	is	
so	because	the	schema	is	supplied	automatically	or	habitually	by	the	brain	for	the	
benefit	 of	 action	 alone.	 Again,	 since	 the	 function	 of	 perception	 is	 to	 establish	
economic	relation	with	the	environment,	the	aim	of	impure	memory,	as	well	as	the	
schema,	which	is	produced	by	it,	is	necessarily	seen	as	directed	towards	economic	




as	 time	 as	 the	 schema	 of	 perception	 comes	 into	 being	 ahead	 of	 our	 conscious	
perception,	the	ways	in	which	the	world	is	a	priori	ordered	is	in	accordance	with	





sense	 in	which	we	attribute	 to	 the	word	 “being”	 is	a	priori	 supplied	 to	us	by	 the	
schema	of	time.	Thus,	in	line	with	Heidegger’s	statement,	Bergson	also	displays	full	
























downward	 movement	 of	 habit-memory	 detects	 resemblances	 between	 objects	
(“perception	of	 resemblances”)	 and	 thus	 aids	 our	mind	 to	 recognize	 them	based	
upon	 their	 commonality	 with	 other	 objects.	 The	 upward	 movement	 of	 the	
memory-image,	on	 the	other	hand,	seeks	 the	 individual	differences	(“recollection	
of	differences”)	of	objects	as	in	the	case	for	the	principle	of	specification	or	species	
and	thus	it	is	the	faculty	of	noticing	individual	specificities,	namely	species.211	The	




be	 established	 and	Bergson	 explains	 this	 in	 terms	 of	 a	maintenance	 of	 a	 certain	











of	 living	 it.”213	What	 this	 third	 principle	 does	 in	 a	 nutshell	 is	 to	 subordinate	 and	
contain	 individual	 difference	 under	 resemblance	 and	 commonality	 within	 a	
schema.	Just	like	the	function	of	memory-image	is	still	to	render	the	past	useful	in	
the	present	and	become	part	of	present	perception,	difference	 is	only	recollected	
to	 an	 extent	 that	 the	 equilibrium	 of	 the	 mind	 and	 its	 continuity	 with	 general	
resemblance	 is	 maintained.	 In	 Deleuze’s	 words,	 “difference	 becomes	 an	 object	 of	
representation	 always	 in	 relation	 to	 a	 conceived	 identity,	 a	 judged	 analogy,	 an	
imagined	opposition	or	a	perceived	similitude.”214	
The	general	 idea,	 then,	 is	 that	which	appears	between	the	two	currents	of	
memory	 and	 establishes	 what	 is	 analogous	 to	 Kant’s	 “systematic	 unity	 of	
nature”.215	Here,	again,	while	he	perfectly	reconstitutes	the	Kantian	transcendental	
logical	 principles	 in	 terms	of	 the	 function	of	memory,	Bergson	 subordinates	 this	
retrieval	under	the	primary	motivation	for	the	individual’s	survival	rather	than	for	
speculative	 contemplation	 –	 insofar	 as	 impure	 memory	 is	 directed	 towards	 the	
action	in	the	present,	our	symbolic	representation	of	the	world	in	terms	of	genera	
and	species	is	necessarily	executed	from	the	perspective	of	our	practical	interests.	
















this	 requires	 a	 thorough	analysis	 of	Bergson’s	 conception	of	duration.	 It	 suffices	 to	note	
that	Deleuze	reads	Heidegger	vis-à-vis	Bergson’s	explication	of	memory	as	a	 retrieval	of	
the	Kantian	 faculty	 of	 imagination.	His	 criticism	of	Heidegger	 seems	 to	 stem,	 then,	 from	
the	latter’s	shortcomings	in	seeing	an	alternative	method	of	grasping	the	world	other	than	
















of	 imagination,	 the	world	 of	 “pure	 perception”	 gets	 covered	 over	 by	 the	a	priori	
synthesis	of	memory.	Consequently,	we	come	to	live	in	the	world	of	memory	as	the	
transcendental	 condition	 of	 experience,	 which	 seems	 “as	 if”	 cut	 off	 from	 the	
immediate	reality	of	the	self.	There	then	arises	what	Bergson	calls	the	“second	self”	
in	Time	and	Free	Will,	which	now	assumes	 the	dominant	 condition	of	experience	
that	 covers	over	our	 immediate	experience	of	 the	world.	Between	Time	and	Free	






manner,	 this	 homogeneous	 time	 is	 now	on	 the	 side	 of	 the	 real	 through	 the	 new	
concept	of	memory.	Again,	 in	Matter	and	Memory,	pure	perception	is	only	said	to	
be	 true	 in	 theory	rather	 than	being	 the	 immediate	 reality	 and	 this	 indicates	 that	
time	 is	 now	 nearer	 to	 us	 than	 duration	 and	 that	 the	 latter	 recedes	 in	 the	
background.	Many	dualisms	within	Bergson’s	works	can	be	said	to	stem	originally	
from	this	distinction	between	time	and	duration.	False	criticisms	have	taken	place	
due	 to	 the	 failure	or	unwillingness	 to	 reconcile,	 or	 to	properly	 acknowledge,	 the	
very	nature	of	 this	dualism.	 In	 fact,	such	criticisms	have	tended	to	stage	artificial	






actualism”,	 “continuity	 vs.	 discontinuity”,	 “flow	 vs.	 repose”,	 or	 “feeling	 vs.	
intellect”.220		
In	order	for	us	to	adequately	grasp	what	is	at	stake	here,	we	need	to	explore	
the	 nature	 of	 this	 duality	 itself.	 It	 is	 our	 contention	 that	 the	 duality	 of	 time	 and	
duration	and	their	seeming	contradiction	stem	from	Bergson’s	unique	contribution	
to	 the	post-Kantian	project	 of	 reversing	Platonism.	Through	his	 abovementioned	
treatment	of	Kantian	time	as	that	which	comes	into	being	out	of	memory,	Bergson	
effectively	reverses	the	order	of	 the	 famous	Platonic	dualism	between	the	visible	
and	 the	 intelligible	 world.	 Bergson’s	 view	 here	 closely	 resembles	 that	 of	
Schopenhauer	 who	 sees	 no	 problem	 in	 juxtaposing	 Plato	 and	 Kant	 on	 this	 very	
subject	 matter. 221 	By	 referring	 to	 Kantian	 time	 as	 the	 milieu	 of	
“surface”/”superficial”	 existence,	 Bergson	 is	 re-interpreting	 Kant	 in	 terms	 of	 the	
allegory	 of	 the	 cave	 in	 Plato’s	 Republic.222	We	 may	 briefly	 recount	 that	 in	 the	
dialogue,	 Socrates	 explains	 that	 the	 state	 of	 uneducated	 humans	 resemble	
prisoners	who	are	forced	to	see	the	play	of	shadows	on	a	dark	cave	wall	and	are	
made	 to	believe	 that	what	 they	see	 is	 in	 fact	 the	 true	 reality.223	Here,	 the	play	of	
shadows	 that	 the	 prisoners	 see	 represents	 the	 “visible	 realm”	 [τόπος	 ὁρατός],	
which	 is	 the	 pre-intellectual	 realm	 of	 sense	 perception	 (imagination/image	 and	
																																																								
220	The	 details	 of	 these	 debates	 cannot	 be	 fully	 covered	 here	 since	 this	 would	 cause	
considerable	diversion	 from	 the	purpose	of	 the	present	 chapter.	As	we	 touched	upon	 in	
the	 introduction,	 there	 is	 an	 implicit	 assumption	 of	 an	 internal	 confrontation	 within	
Bergson’s	 thought	 which	 asks	 us	 to	 choose	 one	 over	 another,	 as	 it	 were,	 and	 this	 is	
detrimental	 in	 grasping	 his	 thought	 as	 a	 whole	 thus	 leading	 us	 towards	 a	 devastating	
hermeneutic	 failure.	 For	 an	 excellent	 exposition	 on	 the	 status	 of	 the	 dualism	 and	 the	












word,	 “lived”	 account	 of	 the	 faculty	 of	 intelligence.	 His	 opposition	 to	 Plato	 is	 of	 course	






belief)	 that	 supplies	 us	with	 nothing	 but	 confused	 opinion/doxa	 [δόξα].224	In	 the	
Definitions,	we	 find	 that	 doxa	 refers	 to	 “fluctuation	 in	 reasoning;	 the	 thinking	
which	is	led	by	reason	to	the	false	as	well	as	the	true.”225	In	other	words,	it	is	of	the	
order	of	becoming.	In	order	to	go	beyond	the	realm	of	doxa	and	grasp	the	reality	
itself,	 Socrates	 suggests	 that	 one	 must	 make	 an	 “upward	 journey”	 towards	 the	
intelligible	realm	[τόπος	νοητός]	so	that	the	 idea	or	being	of	things	 is	grasped	via	
reason	through	the	power	of	thinking.226		
Now,	when	Bergson	 refers	 to	Kantian	 homogeneous	 time	 as	 the	 basis	 for	
the	 surface	 as	well	 as	 social	 ego,	 he	 is	 alluding	 to	 this	 Socratic	 allegory	 since	by	
“surface”	we	are	led	to	imagine	a	kind	of	projection	screen,	or	the	“communicating	
surface”	 [la	surface	de	communication]	where	 “the	shadow	of	 the	self	 [l’ombre	du	
moi]	 projected	 into	 homogenous	 space”	 comes	 to	 “obscure”	 duration	 and	
ultimately	prompts	us	to	lose	contact	with	reality:227		
	
[Little]	by	 little	 these	 states	are	made	 into	objects	or	 things;	 they	become	
detached	not	only	from	one	another,	but	from	ourselves.	Henceforth	we	no	
longer	perceive	them	except	in	the	homogeneous	milieu	in	which	we	have	
set	 their	 image,	 and	 through	 the	word	which	 lends	 them	 its	banal	 colour.	
Thus	a	second	self	is	formed	which	obscures	the	first,	a	self	whose	existence	






comes	 into	 being	 as	 part	 and	 parcel	 of	 real	 human	 existence,	 he	may	 be	 said	 to	
effectively	 generate	 a	 re-interpretation	 of	 Plato’s	 allegory	 in	 terms	 of	 a	modern,	
post-Kantian	worldview.		





















the	 illusory	 world	 of	 sensibility,	 which	 must	 be	 overcome	 with	 our	 power	 of	






It	 is	 well	 known	 that	 Nietzsche	 proclaimed	 his	 philosophy	 as	 reversed	
Platonism,	 yet	 the	 same	 can	 be	 said	 of	 Bergson.	 By	 turning	 memory	 into	 the	
instrument	of	our	forgetfulness,	Bergson	reverses	the	Platonic	order	between	the	
sensuous	world	of	the	“below”	and	the	suprasensuous	world	of	the	“beyond”	and	
identifies	 the	 latter	 as	 the	 apparent	 reality.	 This	 implies	 that	 an	 attainment	 of	
Truth	cannot	be	done	through	recollection,	or,	as	Bergson	says,	through	a	kind	of	
“fleeing”	 [fuir]	 into	 the	 realm	 of	 the	 suprasensible.230	The	 problem	 rather	 stems	
from	our	flight	into	the	suprasensible	and	it	is	the	question	of	coming	back	down	
to	 the	 sensible	 realm	 as	 our	 true	 home.	 However,	 it	 is	 important	 for	 us	 to	
remember	 that	 Bergson	 enters	 into	 the	 above	 terrain	 through	 the	 retrieval	 of	
Kantian	time.	The	retrieval	results	into	the	reversal	of	Platonism	because	it	is	Kant	
who	 reverses	 Platonism	 in	 the	 first	 place.	 As	 Deleuze	 says,	 it	 is	 Kant	 who	 first	









also	 invite	 back	 the	 same	 “error”	 of	 positing	 the	 unknowable,	 transcendent	
“beyond”	 this	 time	 as	 the	 world	 of	 sensibility?	232	As	 Heidegger	 says	 regarding	
Nietzsche’s	reversed	Platonism:		





Does	 then	 the	dualism	of	Matter	and	Memory	signify	 a	 kind	of	 resurrection,	 or	 a	
continuation	of	Platonic	“metaphysics”,	which	is,	according	to	Heidegger,	reducible	
to	 an	onto-theology?234	Indeed,	 as	we	 have	 explained	 so	 far,	 one	 of	 the	 essential	
doctrines	of	Kant’s	critical	philosophy	is	that	the	receptivity	of	intuition	is	a	priori	
covered	 over	 by	 the	 spontaneity	 of	 understanding	 and	 this	 implies	 the	 original	
diminution	 of	 our	 receptive	 power	 due	 to	 the	 a	 priori	 intervention	 of	 the	
suprasensuous	categories	upon	 the	sensuous	receptivity.	Thus,	 for	Kant,	 it	 is	not	
that	 the	activity	of	pure	reason	would	 free	us	 from	the	shackles	of	our	sensuous	
perception;	 in	 fact,	 any	 sense	 perception	 is	 condemned	 to	 dwell	 within	 the	
transcendental	 ideality	 of	 the	 world.	 The	 world	 “beyond”	 once	 occupied	 by	 the	
suprasensuous	 realm	 is	now	replaced	with	 the	world	of	 the	 things	in	themselves,	
which	is	regarded	to	lie	outside	of	the	confines	of	the	“possible	experience”.	Indeed,	
the	thing	in	itself	is	called	“noumenon”	and	we	can	interpret	it	in	a	Platonic	way	as	
that	which	 is	merely	 imagined	 by	 the	 shackled	 creature	 that	 lacks	 the	 power	 to	
perceive	it	directly.		
Let	 us	 ask	 again,	 then:	 Does	 not	 Bergson	 also	 retrieve	 the	 unreachable	
world	of	the	thing	in	itself	as	the	correlate	of	the	Platonic	“beyond”,	this	time	as	the	
world	of	“pure	perception”	which	is	said	to	be	only	true	in	theory?	We	have	already	
seen	 in	 our	 analysis	 of	 Time	 and	 Free	 Will	 that	 Bergson	 goes	 beyond	 Kant’s	












us	 suspect	 that	 such,	 in	 fact,	 is	 the	 case.	 For	 instance,	 as	 Meillassoux	 suggests,	
Deleuze	says	in	What	Is	Philosophy?	that	“pure	immanence”	only	happens	once	in	
the	 first	 chapter	 of	 Bergson’s	 Matter	 and	 Memory,	 seemingly	 indicating	 that	
transcendence	 looms	 over	 his	 philosophy	 from	 that	 point	 onward.235	What	 is	 at	
stake	 here	 is	 not	 only	 the	 status	 of	 Bergson’s	 reversed	 Platonism	 but	 also	 the	






form	of	representation,	one	also	 loses	 the	power	of	putting	 forth	a	revolutionary	
“no”	to	the	conditioned	surface	appearance	of	the	world.	Seen	in	this	light,	it	is	thus	
natural	 that	 Bergson	 therefore	 has	 become	 the	 favorite	 polemical	 target	 within	
Marxism	due	to	his	supposed	inability	for	negation.		
It	 is	against	such	a	reading	 that	we	have	emphasized	 the	real	existence	of	
time	 in	Bergson’s	philosophy.	The	 theory	of	memory	 in	 fact	 explains	 the	 coming	
into	 being	 of	 time	 as	 the	 basis	 of	 the	 so-called	 surface/social	 ego,	 which	 is	
equivalent	to	the	Marxist	conception	of	ideological	consciousness.	The	problem	is	
that	 this	 retrieval	 of	 time,	 albeit	 in	 a	 reverse	 manner,	 seemingly	 re-invites	
transcendence	at	 the	heart	of	Bergson’s	philosophy	along	with	 the	possibility	 for	
putting	forth	a	socio-political	criticism.	To	retrieve	time	as	a	real	existence	would	
seem	 to	 be	 the	 same	 thing	 as	 to	 reinstate	 the	 Platonic	 dualism	 once	 again	 and	
envisage	 the	 “true	 world”	 behind	 the	 veil	 of	 the	 apparent	 reality.	 Yet	 the	 latter	
would	 be	 the	 case	 only	 if	 we	 saw	 Bergson’s	 reversed	 Platonism	 as	 a	 “vulgar	
dualism”	 [dualism	vulgaire],	 as	 Bergson	 himself	 puts	 it.236	With	 regard	 to	 such	 a	
dualism,	we	need	to	keep	in	mind	that	if	Bergson	makes	an	original	contribution	to	
philosophy	 in	Matter	 and	Memory,	 it	 is	 not	 through	 the	 reproduction	 of	 Kant’s	
reversal	of	Platonism	in	 terms	of	 the	analysis	of	 the	subjective	condition.	Rather,	
Bergson	makes	possible	a	unity	of	two	seemingly	mutually	exclusive	philosophical	
movements:	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 by	 retrieving	 time	 and	 re-introducing	 a	 reversed	
																																																								









All	 the	 difficulties	 raised	 by	 this	 problem,	 either	 in	 vulgar	 dualism,	 or	 in	
materialism	 and	 idealism,	 come	 from	 considering,	 in	 the	 phenomena	 of	




the	material	 and	mental	 realities	mirrored	 in	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	 copy	
and	 the	 original.	 First,	 two	 distinct	 systems	 of	 reality	 are	 posited	 –	 one	 is	 the	
suprasensuous	 system	 of	 ideas	 and	 the	 other	 is	 the	 sensuous	 system	 of	 bodies.	
Vulgar	dualism	then	sets	either	of	the	two	as	the	true	substance	of	reality	and	then	
seeks	to	deduce	the	other	in	terms	of	the	other	half	of	the	dualism.238	In	the	case	of	
subjective	 idealism,	material	reality	 is	 thus	conceived	to	be	the	representation	of	
the	idea.	On	the	other	hand,	materialism	supposes	that	the	system	of	 ideas	is	the	





There	 is,	 as	Bergson	points	out,	 a	 “dialectical	 artifice”	 at	work	within	 this	
scenario	 and	 its	 origin	 is	 “entirely	 metaphysical.”240 	Although	 the	 qualitative	
difference	 between	 the	 idea	 and	 matter	 is	 first	 posited,	 this	 difference	 is	
subsequently	 erased	 or	 mediated	 at	 the	 second	 instance	 through	 an	 “an	
unconscious	 trick	 of	 intellectual	 conjuring”	 that	 converts	 one	 in	 terms	 of	
another.241	No	doubt,	 this	dialectical	movement	 is	 itself	explained	 in	 terms	of	 the	
function	 of	 memory,	 which	 mediates	 and	 translates	 duration	 into	 time.	 As	 we	














Bergson	 positively	 explains	 the	 mechanism	 behind	 the	 a	 priori	 synthesis	 of	









our	 thought	within	vulgar	dualism	has	 its	 roots	 in	 the	supposed	“insufficiency	of	
our	faculty	of	perception”.244	Either	the	mind	or	the	body	is	seen	to	lie	outside	of	
our	 intuition	 and	 the	 dialectic	 is	 there	 to	 supplement	what	we	 do	 not	 perceive.	
That	 is,	 one	 half	 of	 dualism	 is	 seen	 to	 be	 within	 the	 infra-perceptive	 realm	 of	





dualism,	 the	 configuration	 is	 the	 same	as	 long	 as	 the	boundary	between	 the	 “up	
above”	 and	 “down	 below”	 is	 drawn	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 limit	 of	 intuition.	 This	
supplementary	thinking	is	philosophy	itself	and	as	Bergson	argues,	it	is	born	out	of	
the	insufficiency	of	perception.245		
As	we	will	 see	 in	 greater	 detail	 in	 Part	 II,	while	 Bergson	 situates	 himself	
within	 the	 framework	 of	 Kantian	 reversed	 Platonism,	 he	 does	 not	 rely	 upon	







intuition	and	not	beyond	 it.	 In	 the	“Method	to	Be	Followed”	section	of	chapter	4,	
Bergson	states	that	his	method	of	philosophizing	makes	it	possible:	
	
to	seek	experience	at	 its	source,	or	rather	above	 that	decisive	 turn	where,	
taking	 a	 bias	 in	 the	 direction	 of	 our	 utility,	 it	 becomes	 properly	 human	
experience.	[…]	The	relativity	of	our	knowledge	may	not,	then,	be	definitive.	




through	 abstract	 reasoning	 due	 to	 the	 insufficiency	 of	 intuition,	 Bergsonian	
dualism	makes	an	actual	contact	with	it.	What	this	means	is	that	the	thing	in-itself	
is	 sensuously	 intuited	 by	 Bergson	 via	 a	 kind	 of	 enlarged	 perception.	 Both	 the	
spiritual	 and	 the	 material	 reality	 are	 defined	 in	 terms	 of	 their	 positive	
characteristics	since	the	duality	is	not	posited	in	terms	of	what	belongs	to	intuition	
and	what	does	not.	Rather,	the	body	and	mind	belong	to	two	kinds	of	intuition	–	or,	




Bergson’s	 philosophy	 is	 capable	 of	 putting	 forth	 a	 socio-political	 criticism	 of	
ideological	 subjectivity.	 Yet,	 this	 fact	 alone	 does	 not	 lead	 us	 to	 conclude	 that	
Bergson	therefore	goes	back	to	Kant’s	reversed	Platonism	or	that	Bergson	merely	
“completes”	Western	metaphysics	 as	 onto-theology.	With	 Bergson,	 in	 a	 way,	 the	
“here	below”	and	 the	 “up	above”	are	both	 in	 this	world	and	 the	going-beyond	or	
the	transcending	of	apparent	reality,	so	to	speak,	is	done	within	 intuition	and	not	
through	a	flight	into	abstract	reasoning.	
	 Furthermore,	 the	dialectical	 distinction	between	 the	below	and	 the	 above	
are	 here	 made	 not	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 knowable	 and	 the	 unknowable.	 Rather,	 the	
Kantian	 speculative	 knowledge	 of	 apparent	 reality	 is	 reinterpreted	 in	 terms	 of	
“ordinary	or	useful	knowledge”	[connaissance	usuelle	ou	utile];	what	was	hitherto	
treated	as	the	unknowable	thing	in-itself	is	now	made	available	to	our	intuition	as	






those	 transcendental	 elements	 signifies	 a	 capacity	 for	 dialectical	 negation	 and	
affirmation.		
We	 have	 focused	 primarily	 on	 the	 status	 of	 time	 in	 Part	 I	 since	 it	




is	 not	 negative	 in	 the	 sense	 of	 reducing	 the	 immediate	 sensuousness	 into	 non-
being	and	presenting	the	truth	of	the	world	only	in	terms	of	the	truth	of	spiritual	
mediation.	Rather,	the	truth	of	the	spiritual	mediation	is	regarded	as	only	one	half	
of	 Truth,	 the	 half	 that	 pronounces	what	 is	 true	 from	 a	 perspective	 of	 the	 socio-
historically	conditioned,	relatively	determined	fashion.248	The	negative	capacity	of	
intuition	is	the	capacity	to	be	aware	of	and	negate	this	relatively	determined	being	
of	 the	negative.	 	 It	 is	 therefore	a	kind	of	negation	of	negation	–	 it	 is	a	capacity	to	






































permanence	 no	more	 belongs	 to	 the	will,	 considered	 as	 thing-in-itself,	 or	 to	 the	
pure	subject	of	knowing,	to	the	eternal	eye	of	the	world,	than	does	transitoriness,	











What	 are	 you	 looking	 for,	 my	 lamenting	 heart?	 What	 is	 it	 that	 rouses	 your	
indignation	 against	 a	 system	 to	 which	 my	 intellect	 cannot	 make	 the	 slightest	
objection?	This:	 I	want	 something	which	 lies	beyond	mere	mental	presentations,	





























In	 Part	 I,	 we	 elaborated	 upon	 Bergson’s	 retrieval	 of	 time	 from	 a	 distinctly	
materialist	standpoint.	By	demonstrating	that	the	“illegitimate	translation”	of	time	
into	 space	 is	 in	 fact	 accounted	 for	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 function	 of	memory,	we	 have	
shown	 that	 Bergson’s	 theory	 of	 intuition	 contains	 within	 itself	 the	 distinct	
dialectical	movement	that	goes	from	duration	to	time.	This	dialectical	movement	in	
turn	 conditions	 the	 genesis	 of	 the	 derivative	 subjectivity	 of	 the	 human	 being	 in	
view	of	the	“attention	to	Life”.	What	we	established	in	the	previous	chapters	is	how	
time,	 as	 the	 a	 priori	 condition	 of	 the	 derivative	 self,	 comes	 into	 being	 out	 of	
consciousness’	partaking	of	material	Life.	Based	on	this,	we	have	established	that	
this	 novel	 understanding	 of	 time	 corresponds	 to	 Bergson’s	 materialist	
reconceptualization	of	time	in	a	way	that	constitutes	his	unique	theory	of	history.		
Given	the	above,	the	task	of	Part	II	is	to	investigate	the	nature	of	duration	as	
the	 irreducible	 half	 of	 what	 the	 method	 of	 intuition	 apprehends.	 Whereas	 the	
concept	 of	 time	 signifies	 the	 negative	 side	 of	 Bergson’s	 dialectic,	 the	 concept	 of	
duration	 is	what	makes	up	 its	affirmative	side.	The	 leading	question	for	us	 is	 the	
following:	 how	 can	 the	 immediate	 givenness	 of	 the	 Self	 be	 apprehended	 within	
intuition	 provided	 that	 pure	 perception	 gets	 covered	 over	 by	 memory	 and	
becomes	 the	 obscure	 object	 for	 derivative	 consciousness?	 With	 what	 distinct	
method	 of	 intuition	 can	 Bergson	 maintain	 the	 theory	 of	 duration	 after	 time	 is	
retrieved	 as	 a	 real	 existence?	 To	 answer	 these	 questions,	 we	 must	 take	 the	
renewed	reality	of	 time	 into	consideration	and	examine	how	Bergson’s	 theory	of	
intuition	can	possibly	contain	within	 itself	 the	apprehension	of	something	that	 is	
hidden	within	time-bound	consciousness.		
This	 investigation	 cannot	 commence	 without	 first	 acknowledging	 the	
familiar	 oppositions	 raised	 against	 the	 concept	within	 the	 context	 of	materialist	
philosophy.	As	we	have	touched	upon	earlier,	if	duration	is	the	immediately	given	
Absolute	 Self	 within	 intuition,	 how	 can	 this	 conception	 be	 understood	 as	
something	 other	 than	 the	 counterexample	 that	 blatantly	 ignores	 and	 destroys	
Bergson’s	materialism?	In	order	to	undertake	our	exploration	into	the	concept,	we	
must	 first	 at	 least	 clear	 out	 the	 obstacle	 that	 lies	 ahead	 of	 us	 and	 demonstrate	
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beforehand	 that	 the	 theory	 of	 duration	 can	 still	 be	 considered	 within	 the	
framework	 of	 materialism.	 Indeed,	 one	 can	 hardly	 deny	 that	 the	 concept	 of	







stems	 from	 the	 concept	 of	 duration	 since,	 as	 the	 French	 title	 of	 his	 dissertation	
clearly	 states,	 duration	 as	 the	 “real	 time”	 points	 to	 the	 immediate	 data	 of	
consciousness.	Insofar	as	it	is	said	to	point	to	what	is	immediately	given,	duration	is	
that	which	goes	beyond	or	dismantles	the	Kantian	condition	of	possible	experience.	
In	other	words,	 it	 really	 refers	 to	 a	direct	 and	unmediated	grasping	of	 reality	 as	
such	in	an	absolute	fashion.	Or,	to	employ	Kantian	vocabulary,	duration	points	to	a	
theoretical	 position	 that	 affirms	 the	 thing-in-itself	 as	 the	 actual	 object	 of	 one’s	
experience	 –	 an	 obvious	 sign	 that	 Kant’s	 warning	 against	 “transcendence”	 is	
ignored.	251						
The	perceived	problem,	 in	 this	 case,	 is	 that	Bergson’s	 insistence	upon	 the	
truth	 of	 immediate	 reality	 is	 seen	 as	 essentially	 antithetical	 to	Marxist	 historical	








of	 their	material	 life-process,	which	 is	empirically	verifiable	and	bound	 to	
material	 premises.	Morality,	 religion,	metaphysics,	 all	 the	 rest	 of	 ideology	
and	their	corresponding	forms	of	consciousness,	 thus	no	 longer	retain	the	
semblance	 of	 independence.	 They	 have	 no	 history,	 no	 development;	 but	












Morality,	 religion,	 and	 metaphysics	 are	 here	 given	 the	 status	 of	 “the	 phantoms	
formed	 in	 the	 human	 brain”,	 which	 only	 possesses	 a	 “semblance	 of	
independence”.253	As	 Althusser	 famously	 argued,	 this	 move	 by	 Marx	 seems	 to	
indicate	 a	 decisive	 departure	 from	 philosophy;	 it	 is	 a	move	which	 differentiates	
Marxism	 from	 “ideological	 philosophy”	 that	 pretends	 to	 have	 no	 determinate	
ground	 in	material	 history.254	What	 is	 put	 forth	 as	 independent	 truth	 is	 thereby	
counteracted	 as	 a	 historically	 contingent	 fabrication.	 The	 concept	 of	 duration	
therefore	naturally	appears	to	be	the	Achilles’	heel	of	Bergsonism.		
	 Here,	 as	 soon	 as	 we	 attempt	 to	 come	 face	 to	 face	 with	 the	 concept	 of	
duration	within	the	context	of	radical	politics,	we	come	across	a	severe	obstacle.	If	
duration	is	indeed	the	immediate	givenness	of	the	Absolute	Self,	it	is	seemingly	ill	
advised	 from	 the	 outset	 for	 any	 political	 thinking	 to	 take	 the	 concept	 seriously.	
Before	we	examine	 the	nature	of	 the	 concept,	 there	 is	 a	 clear	warning	posted	 in	
front	 of	 us:	 if	 one	 is	 to	 show	 allegiance	 to	 Marxism,	 one	 must	 dismiss	 such	 a	
concept	 as	 a	mere	 ideological	 illusion.	 Is	 it	 not,	 after	 all,	 a	 product	 of	 Bergson’s	
“Judeo-Christian”	 enthusiasm,	 which	 must	 be	 overcome	 since	 Marx	 clearly	 says	




How	 can	 we	 proceed	 from	 here?	 It	 certainly	 seems	 that	 the	
abovementioned	warning	 sign	 commands	 us	 to	 dismiss	 the	 concept	 of	 duration	
altogether	in	order	to	save	other	aspects	of	Bergson’s	philosophy	from	the	trap	of	
Idealism.	 Let	 us,	 however,	 take	 a	 different	 approach	 and	 instead	 examine	 the	
																																																								
252	Marx	&	Engels,	The	German	Ideology,	p.42.	
253	Louis	 Althusser	 extracts	 the	 formula	 of	 philosophy	 as	 ideology	 out	 of	 the	 above	 and	
also	explicitly	singles	out	Bergson	as	one	of	the	“pitiful”	examples	of	French	philosopher-
ideologues.	See	Althusser,	L.,	([1965]	1969).	For	Marx.	Trans.	B.	Brewster.	London:	Verso.	
p.25.	 “This	 is	 the	 pitiful	 history	 of	 French	 philosophy	 in	 the	 130	 years	 following	 the	







conceptual	 structure	 of	what	 is	 being	 said	 in	 the	 above	warning	 so	 that	we	 can	
determine	whether	the	road	ahead	can	be	secured	in	any	way.			
The	 gist	 of	 the	 claim	 against	 duration	 that	we	have	 just	mentioned	 is	 the	
following:	 insofar	 as	 it	 is	 put	 forth	 as	 the	 immediate	 reality	 beyond	
representation/time,	the	concept	of	duration	falls	prey	to	ideological	illusion.	The	
claim	is	launched	from	a	standpoint	that	treats	the	concept	of	duration	itself	as	an	
object	 of	 political	 criticism.	 However,	 this	 seems	 odd	 since	 in	 Part	 I,	 we	 have	
already	 shown	 that	 the	Bergsonian	 retrieval	 of	 time	 is	 equivalent	 to	 the	Marxist	
theme	 of	 the	 critique	 of	 ideology.	 Given	 our	 exposition	 of	 the	 realism	of	 time	 in	




forth	 the	reality	of	 time,	since	 time	 is	 the	historically	constituted	a	priori	form	of	
intuition,	it	necessarily	negates	the	givenness	of	the	immediate	reality	and	turns	it	
into	its	other.		
What,	 however,	 does	 it	 mean	 to	 say	 that	 duration	 must	 be	 a	 priori	





duration,	 the	very	object	of	 criticism	within	 the	 claim	rather	 resides	within	time	
and	it	hence	does	not	even	face	duration.	In	fact,	therefore,	what	the	claim	speaks	
of	 is	not	at	all	duration	but	rather	 its	 illusory	shadow.	Although	 the	definition	of	
duration	is	precisely	that	which	is	not	conditioned	by	time,	the	critique	of	duration	
as	 ideology	deals	with	 it	 in	an	 inverted	fashion	that	confuses	 it	with	 its	 temporal	
mediation.		
Duration	 must	 be	 a	 priori	 conditioned	 by	 time:	 this	 means	 that	 duration,	
although	it	is	put	forth	as	that	which	is	not	conditioned	by	time,	is	only	interpreted	
as	 an	 appearance	within	 time.	 Insofar	 as	 the	 criticism	 of	 duration	 considers	 not	







prepared	by	 the	 concept	 of	 time	blocking	 our	 vision.	 Before	 even	 examining	 the	
concept	 of	 duration,	 the	 operation	 of	 critique	a	priori	 renders	 it	 impossible	 and	
does	 not	 permit	 itself	 to	 face	 duration	 directly	without	 turning	 it	 into	 its	 other.	
Although	the	operation	of	mystification	itself	stems	from	the	criticism,	the	concept	
of	 duration	 is	 thus	 magically	 rendered	 responsible	 for	 this	 mystification.	 The	


















relegate	duration	 into	the	status	of	non-existence.	As	 long	as	 those	two	elements	
are	 supposed	 to	 be	 mutually	 exclusive,	 we	 do	 not	 grasp	 Bergson’s	 method	 of	
intuition.				
Why,	however,	is	such	a	dualism	desirable	to	begin	with?	Is	not	the	critique	
of	 ideology	 enough	 by	 itself?	 For	 us,	 the	 dualism	 of	 time	 and	 duration	 or	 the	
dualism	 of	 negativity	 and	 affirmativeness	 as	 the	 two	 sides	 of	 the	 dialectic	 is	







The	supreme	paradox	of	historical	materialism	is	 that	 it	 is,	at	one	and	the	
same	time,	the	only	truth	of	History	and	a	total	indetermination	of	the	Truth.	
The	totalising	thought	of	historical	materialism	has	established	everything	
except	 for	 its	 own	 existence	 […]	 we	 do	 not	 know	 what	 it	 means	 for	 a	
Marxist	historian	to	speak	the	truth.	Not	that	his	statements	are	 false	–	 far	
from	 it;	 but	 he	does	not	 have	 the	 concept	 of	Truth	at	 his	 disposal.	 In	 this	
way,	Marxism	presents	 itself	to	us,	as	 ideologists,	as	an	unveiling	of	being,	







damage	 since	 to	 condemn	 the	 untruth	 of	 all	 truths	 as	 historically	 contingent	
ideology	necessarily	contains	 its	own	philosophical	standpoint	as	 the	very	object	
of	 criticism.	The	 theory	of	 time,	 put	 forth	 as	 that	which	necessarily	destroys	 the	
theory	 of	 duration,	 is	 bound	 to	 destroy	 itself.	 That	 is,	 political	 criticism	 ends	 up	








mechanical	repetition	of	 the	Marxist	overcoming	of	 the	Hegelian	“negation	of	 the	
negation”.	 The	 birthplace	 of	 Marxist	 materialism	 is	 the	 realization	 that	 Hegel’s	
“absolute	 consciousness”	which	 negates	 negation	 is	 itself	 abstract	 and	 therefore	









(negation	of	 the	negation	of	negation)?	This	would	be	absurd.	Marx’s	 solution	 to	
the	 problem	 of	 idealism	 does	 not	 amount	 to	 abstractly	 negating	 the	 negation	 of	
negation,	 but	 instead	 positively	 establishes	 the	 dialectical	 method	 upon	 the	
sensuous	material	reality	or	what	he	calls	Life	process	[Lebensprozeß].	Life	process	
is	not	reached	via	an	abstract	negation,	since	negation	of	the	negation	of	negation	
still	 overlooks	 material	 Life	 that	 serves	 as	 the	 source	 of	 abstraction.	 Insofar	 as	
duration	as	 immediate	 reality	 is	negated	as	 the	negation	of	negation,	 this	 in	 fact	
amounts	 to	 reproducing	 alienating	 abstraction	 once	 more,	 and,	 as	 Marx	 says,	
remains	“doubtful	of	 itself”.258	There	arises,	then,	a	disconcerting	fact:	to	criticise,	
that	 is	 to	 say,	 to	negate	 duration	as	 ideology	 is	 to	 trap	 criticism	 itself	within	 the	
realm	of	 abstract	 thought.	 As	 long	 as	what	 it	 sees	 as	 its	 object	 of	 negation	 is	 an	
abstraction,	 this	negation	of	abstraction	is	still	an	abstraction	and	hence	 it	 is	still	
alienated	from	sensuous	reality.259		
Let	us	be	clear.	Behind	the	mask	of	Marx	as	an	anti-philosopher,	there	is	a	
veritable	 philosopher	 who	 conceives	 of	 the	 Absolute	 Truth	 that	 serves	 as	 the	
affirmative	foundation	of	reality.	The	last	sentence	of	Marx’s	German	Ideology	that	
we	 quoted	 above	 reads	 in	 the	 following	 way:	 “[l]ife	 is	 not	 determined	 by	
consciousness,	but	consciousness	by	life.”	From	the	perspective	of	the	“materialist	
method,”	 he	 argues	 that	 it	 is	 erroneous	 to	 assume	 that	 consciousness	 is	
independent	and	has	no	history	outside	itself.	On	the	contrary,	consciousness	is	a	
contingent	product	of	the	mediating	caprice	of	Life	and	it	is	Life	that	is	treated	as	
the	 primary	 Subject	 that	 is	 self-affirming	 and	 Absolute.	 Herein	 lies	 the	 secret	 of	
Marx’s	philosophy.	Materialism	puts	forth	the	critique	of	philosophical	truths	but	
this	 is	done	through	the	affirmation	of	Life	as	the	first	principle.	Life	 itself	points	
towards	 something	 that	 cannot	 be	 seen	 as	 a	 contingent	 product	 of	 history.	 Life	
then	is	what	makes	history	itself	possible	and	it	is	its	primary	substance.		
Yet,	 the	pressing	question	we	must	ask	at	 this	point	 is:	 if	 it	 is	not	an	 Idea	
and	hence	not	an	abstract	object	of	thought,	how	does	one	reach	the	knowledge	of	
this	so-called	Life?	Where	can	we	find	it	in	relation	to	our	consciousness	and	how	
do	 we	 protect	 ourselves	 from	mistaking	 it	 for	 its	 illusory	 shadow?	 In	 the	 same	
																																																								
258	Ibid.		
259	Feuerbach,	 L.,	 ([1843]	 1986).	 Principles	 of	 Philosophy	 of	 the	 Future.	Trans.	 M.	 Vogel.	
Cambridge:	Hackett.	pp.48-49.	§30.	“He	(Hegel)	negates	thought	–	that	is,	abstract	thought	
–	 but	 he	 does	 so	 while	 remaining	 within	 abstractive	 thought	 with	 the	 result	 that	 his	
negation	of	abstraction	still	remains	abstraction.”		
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paragraph	 of	 German	 Ideology,	 Marx	 states:	 “[i]n	 direct	 contrast	 to	 German	
philosophy	which	descends	 from	heaven	 to	 earth,	 here	we	 ascend	 from	earth	 to	
heaven.”260	We	can	understand	that	“heaven”	is	the	Idea	and	the	“earth”	is	Life	and	
that	Marx’s	materialist	 dialectic	 is	 established	 through	 reversing	 the	 relations	 of	
subordination	 between	 the	 two.	 Yet	 if	 this	 materialist	 reversal	 renders	
philosophical	 consciousness	 as	 the	 contingent	 product	 of	 the	 Life	 process,	 with	
what	 method	 can	 one	 access	 the	 real	 realm	 of	 Life	 itself	 and	 ensure	 that	
materialism	be	securely	based	upon	this	knowledge	of	the	Absolute?	Certainly,	it	is	
not	 so	 difficult	 to	 understand	 what	 Life	 is	 not	 after	 the	 materialist	 reversal	 of	
dialectic.	As	it	is	proclaimed	in	the	Theses	on	Feuerbach,	material	Life	is	not,	first	of	
all,	the	Idea	that	philosophical	consciousness	makes	of	it	and	it	is	not,	therefore,	an	
object	 of	 abstract	 intuition	 [Anschauung].261	In	 defiance	 of	 the	 latter,	 it	 is	 said	 to	
reside	within	the	“sensuous	human	activity”	or	“practice”.262	Yet	how	can	we	place	
ourselves	 within	 the	 realm	 of	 sensuous	 practice	 given	 that	 we	 are	 first	 and	





After	 the	 reversal	 of	 idealist	 dialectic,	 Life	 assumes	 the	 place	 of	 the	 first	
principle	 and	 cannot	 be	 treated	 as	 a	 contingent	 product	 of	 history.	 Yet,	without	
directly	facing	the	question	regarding	the	knowledge	of	Life,	this	returns	us	back	to	




was	 accomplished	 by	 Marx.263	To	 explore	 the	 concept	 of	 duration	 within	 the	
context	of	materialism	 is	 to	 examine	 the	 concept	 in	 terms	of	 this	question:	what	
constitutes	the	foundation	of	thought	after	the	putative	“reversal	of	metaphysics”?	In	
order	to	commence	our	task	of	facing	duration,	we	must	give	the	truth	of	time	all	it	







duration	 in	 a	 way	 that	 does	 not	 destroy	 the	 validity	 of	 the	 former.	 Albeit	 in	 a	












as	 a	 starting	 point	 of	 our	 inquiry.	 The	 very	 definition	 of	 duration	 is	 that	 it	 is	 an	
immediate	reality	beyond	temporal	mediation	and	this	means	that	duration	cannot	



























form	 of	 a	 transcendental	 dualism:	 it	 consists	 of	 consciously	 apprehending	 and	
synthesizing	two	distinct	transcendental	elements	–	time	and	duration.	Our	thesis	
therefore	allows	for	the	distinctness	of	those	elements	as	well	as	their	mutual	non-
contradiction.	 In	 a	nutshell,	 our	premise	 regarding	duration	 is	 the	 following:	 the	
conscious	 apprehension	 of	 duration	 gives	 the	method	 of	 intuition	 its	 irreducible	
capacity	 for	 Affirmation.	 Whilst	 the	 apprehension	 of	 time	 corresponds	 to	
intuition’s	 capacity	 for	 negation,	 the	 apprehension	 of	 duration	 gives	 intuition	 its	
affirmative	capacity,	which	differs	in	kind	from	that	of	negation.	As	we	pointed	out	
above,	 if	 the	 theory	 of	 time	 contributes	 towards	 the	 negation	 of	 metaphysical	
truths	as	ideological-historical	construction,	duration,	which	is	the	immediate	data	
of	consciousness	differing	in	kind	from	time,	constitutes	the	affirmation	of	Truth	in	
a	way	 equivalent	 to	Marx’s	 primary	 affirmation	 of	 Life-process.	Affirmation	 here	
takes	on	the	sense	of	apprehending	the	causa	sui,	which	constitutes	the	capacity	of	
the	method	of	intuition	to	affirm	the	Absolute	Self	in	its	in-itself	immediacy.		
Having	 said	 this,	 special	 care	 is	 needed	 in	 order	 to	 determine	 the	precise	
meaning	of	this	“affirmation”.	Insofar	as	we	put	forth	the	argument	that	both	time	
and	 duration	 shall	 be	 granted	 their	 real	 existence	 within	 intuition	 and	 that	
duration	is	that	which	differs	in	kind	from	time	(duration	≠	time),	the	meaning	of	




in	examining	the	nature	of	 its	affirmative	capacity	 in	a	way	that	 is	different	 from	
and	yet	does	not	contradict	the	capacity	for	negation.	In	the	previous	chapters,	we	





for	us	 is:	 given	 that	duration	differs	 from	 time,	 in	what	 sense	 can	we	 say	 that	 it	
gives	the	method	of	intuition	the	capacity	for	affirmation?	What	is	the	exact	sense	
in	 which	 duration	 allows	 the	 method	 to	 affirm	 the	 in-itself	 being	 of	 reality?	 As	
opposed	to	saying	“no”,	affirmation	clearly	refers	to	a	putting	forth	of	a	“yes”.	It	is	
an	 upholding	 of	 something	 in	 a	 way	 that	 assures	 its	 unshakable	 validity	 in	 its	
existence.	 In	 other	 words,	 affirmation	 affirms	 being	 in	 a	 way	 that	 grants	 the	
unshakable	Truth	of	 the	 latter.	Yet	 in	what	way	can	we	understand	the	nature	of	
this	affirmation	and	how	can	we	go	about	examining	the	concept	of	duration?	Is	it	
sufficient	to	look	at	it	merely	as	a	non-Kantian	conception	of	time?	The	key	for	this	
investigation	 lies	 in	understanding	 that	duration	 in	 fact	 takes	up	 the	place	of	 the	
Kantian	 conception	 of	 freedom,	 which	 belongs	 to	 the	 domain	 of	 questioning	




The	 concept	 of	 duration	 [la	durée]	 is	 first	 put	 forth	 in	 Bergson’s	 doctoral	
dissertation,	Time	and	Free	Will.	We	know,	from	the	various	descriptions	given	in	




in	 contradistinction	 to	Kant’s	 theory	of	 time.	Bergson’s	 argument	 is	 that	Kantian	
time	is	nothing	other	than	space	or	spatialized	time	and	that	real	time	is	duration.	
Naturally,	 one	would	 assume	 that	 the	meaning	 of	 the	 concept	 of	 duration	 could	
then	be	 investigated	 by	 setting	Kantian	 time	 as	 its	 background	 since	 duration	 is	
put	forth	in	a	way	that	counteracts	Kantian	theory	of	time.	In	this	way,	Bergson’s	





undergoes	certain	mutation/evolution	when	saying	 that	 time	A	changes	 into	 time	B.	Yet	




to	 imply	 that	 duration	 can	 be	 understood	 as	 a	 new	 theory	 of	 time	 that	 replaces	
Kantian	time.		
The	 fundamental	 meaning	 and	 the	 purpose	 of	 us	 putting	 forth	 the	
transcendental	dualism	of	 intuition	 is	 to	argue	against	 such	a	view	and	establish	
the	 position	 that	 duration	 and	 time	 differ	 from	 one	 another	 but	 that	 their	
difference	is	not	something	that	leads	toward	a	cancelation	of	one	over	the	other.	




duration	 is	 not	 the	 equivalent	 of	 Kantian	 time.	 Rather,	 the	 proper	 domain	 of	
questioning	to	which	the	concept	of	duration	belongs	is	the	problem	of	the	other	of	
time	 or	 freedom.	 Granted,	 duration	 expresses	 Bergson’s	 unique	 view	 of	 time	
insofar	as	it	is	not	Kantian	time	but	this	“not”	needs	to	be	seen	as	pointing	towards	
the	particularity	of	duration	as	that	which	belongs	to	the	realm	of	the	other	of	time.	
In	 other	 words,	 duration	 is	 to	 be	 seen	 as	 that	 which	 makes	 a	 theoretical	
intervention	 into	 Kantian	 conception	 of	 freedom	 and	 it	 is	 in	 terms	 of	 this	
problematization	of	freedom	that	Bergson	devises	the	concept	of	duration.		
In	 the	 preface	 to	 Time	 and	 Free	 Will,	 Bergson	 declares:	 “[the]	 problem	
which	I	have	chosen	is	one	which	is	common	to	metaphysics	and	psychology,	the	
problem	 of	 freedom”. 265 	This	 confirms	 our	 point:	 duration	 is	 Bergson’s	
philosophical	creation	par	excellence	but	the	problem	against	which	it	is	put	forth	
is	 not	 time	but	 freedom.	Kantian	 time	becomes	 an	 important	 topic	 of	 discussion	
since	 it	 is	 that	 which	 covers	 freedom	 and	 turns	 it	 into	 its	 other.	 This	 time	 that	
covers	 freedom	 is	 real	 and,	 in	 this	 way,	 Bergson	 certainly	 accounts	 for	 the	
experience	of	freedom’s	hiddenness	from	our	ordinary	consciousness	(the	surface	





To	 distinguish	 time	 and	 duration	 transcendentally,	 or	 to	 give	 a	 distinct	





possibility	 for	 revolutionary	 politics.	 If	 time	 were	 to	 be	 seen	 as	 that	 which	
conditions	 our	 subjectivity	 into	 the	 social/surface	ego	 and	 if	 it	were	 seen	 as	 the	
only	 condition	 for	 our	 existence	 as	 such,	 historical	 criticism	 would	 be	 nothing	
other	 than	a	deterministic	description	of	 the	necessity	 of	 the	passive	 suffering	of	
the	individual.	It	would	be	no	different	from	a	nihilist	longing	towards	non-existing	
alternatives,	 towards	 the	 illusion	of	how	things	are.	On	 the	 contrary,	 any	politics	
and	criticism	must	stem	from	the	affirmation	of	our	unconditioned/free	self	so	that	
we	 can	 build	 confidence	 in	 the	 force	with	 which	 an	 alternative	 reality	 can	 be	
shaped	against	the	persistence	of	the	past	determinations.	This	amount	to	saying	
that	 beside	 the	 vision	 of	 how	 things	 are,	 there	must	 be	 another	 vision,	which	 is	
capable	of	affirming	how	things	ought	to	be.	Besides	the	reality	of	how	things	are	









In	 order	 to	 determine	 the	 direction	 of	 the	 investigation	 into	 the	 concept	 of	
duration,	 let	 us	 revisit	 the	 passage	 from	 the	 “Error	 of	Kant”	 section	 of	Time	and	
Free	Will:		
	
[Kant]	 thought	 that	 consciousness	 was	 incapable	 of	 perceiving	 psychic	
states	 otherwise	 than	 by	 juxtaposition,	 forgetting	 that	 a	 milieu	 in	 which	
these	 states	 are	 set	 side	by	 side	and	distinguished	 from	one	another	 is	of	
course	 space,	 and	 not	 duration.	 […]	 Thus	 freedom	 was	 made	 into	 an	
incomprehensible	 fact	 [un	 fait	 incompréhensible].	 And	 yet,	 owing	 to	 his	
unlimited	though	unconscious	confidence	in	this	inner	apperception,	whose	
scope	 he	 tried	 to	 restrict,	 his	 belief	 in	 freedom	 remained	 unshakable.	 He	










the	 Kantian	 conception	 of	 time.	 As	 we	 can	 see,	 Bergson	 points	 out	 that	 Kant’s	
conception	 of	 time	 is	 responsible	 for	 rendering	 the	 “genuine	 free	 self”	
transcendent	to	which	he	replies	by	putting	forth	the	concept	of	duration.	Now,	let	
us	 focus	 our	 attention	 upon	 the	 statement	 “genuine	 free	 self,	 which	 is	 indeed	
outside	 space”	 [qui	 est	 en	 effect	 étranger	 à	 l’espace].	 This	 indicates	 that	 while	
Kantian	conception	of	freedom	raises	it	to	the	“sphere	of	noumena”.	While	Bergson	





which	 is	 the	 primary	 form	 of	 intuition	 that	 a	 priori	 mediates	 our	 receptivity	 in	
accordance	 with	 the	 categories	 of	 the	 understanding.	 By	 the	 “genuine	 free	 self,	
which	 is	 indeed	outside	space”,	we	must	 therefore	understand	that	Bergson	 is	 in	
fact	 saying:	 duration	 is	 indeed	 outside	 of	 time	 and	 hence	 the	 proper	 field	 of	









Bergson is situating himself within Kant’s conception of freedom in terms of, let us say, 
without-time-ness. Just like Kant, Bergson indeed envisages freedom as that which lies 
outside of time and duration is the concept that intervenes into the theorization of the 
realm of without-time-ness as the realm where freedom properly resides.267 Having 
																																																								
267	We	 are	well	 aware	 of	 Bergson’s	 remark	 in	 the	 second	 introduction	 to	 Creative	Mind	
against	“getting	outside	of	time”	[sortie	du	temps]	(CM	31/1271).	By	setting	our	agenda	in	
terms	 of	 examining	 duration	 as	 the	 concept	 of	 the	 other	 of	 time,	 we	 are	 not	 ignoring	
Bergson’s	warning	since	the	meaning	of	this	“getting	outside	of	time”	solely	depends	upon	
what	 is	 meant	 by	 “time”.	 The	 time,	 which	 Bergson	 prohibits	 us	 from	 exiting	 [sortir]	 in	
Creative	Mind,	is	not	Kantian	time	but	duration	–	duration	is	outside	of	Kantian	time	but	it	
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acknowledged Bergson’s agreement with Kant on the question of freedom, we must 
now ask: what perceived shortcomings in Kant’s theorization prompt Bergson to put 




Bergson	 states:	 “owing	 to	 his	 unlimited	 though	 unconscious	 confidence	 [une	
confiance	 illimitée,	mais	 inconsciente]	 in	 this	 inner	 apperception,	whose	 scope	he	
tried	to	restrict,	his	belief	[il	croyait]	in	freedom	remained	unshakable.”	Taking	this	
statement	 into	 account,	 the	 precise	 nature	 of	 Bergson’s	 disagreement	 can	 be	
summarised	 as	 follows:	 Kant	 makes	 a	 mistake	 of	 regarding	 freedom,	 which	 is	
indeed	outside	of	time,	as	an	object	of	belief	rather	than	that	of	knowledge.	In other 
words, it is not that Bergson disagrees with Kant because freedom is seen as the other of 
time. Rather, he disagrees with Kant and puts forth the concept of duration exactly 
because the Kantian freedom/without-time-ness is a mere “belief” [croyance] and not a 
knowledge [connaissance]. What Bergson wants to accomplish through the concept of 
duration is to turn the realm of without-time-ness into an object of knowledge. This 
reveals that his	polemic	is	not	a	simple	negation	but	a	constructive	addition	to	or	an	




materialist	 capacity	 for	 affirmation.	The	key	 is	 to	 examine	 this	 “affirmation”	 in	 a	
way	that	differs	in	kind	from	time’s	negativity	so	that	we	can	grant	reality	to	both	
affirmation	and	negation	without	cancelling	one	against	another	and	 to	maintain	
both	 the	 critique	 of	 the	 historically	 conditioned	 subjectivity	 as	 well	 as	 the	
materialist	method	of	affirming	the	Absolute	Self	that	grounds	the	critique.	In	this	
chapter,	 in	 preliminary	 preparation	 to	 the	 task,	 we	 will	 investigate	 the	 Kantian	
doctrine	 of	 freedom	 so	 that	 we	 can	 later	 more	 accurately	 point	 out	 how	
Bergsonian	conception	of	freedom	differs	from	it	and	how	it	endows	the	method	of	
intuition	with	 a	uniquely	materialist	 capacity	 for	 affirmation.	 In	 this	 chapter,	we	
shall	 confine	 the	 investigation	 to	 the	 Kantian	 conception	 of	 freedom	 from	which	
																																																																																																																																																																		
is	 nonetheless	 time	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 it	 is	 the	 other	 transcendental	 form	 of	 intuition	
posited	besides	Kantian	time.		
	 154	






analogous	 to	 Marx’s	 when	 he	 puts	 forth	 a	 materialist	 criticism	 of	 Hegel’s	
idealism.268	Seen	 through	 this	 lens,	 we	 will	 argue	 that	 the	Kantian	 treatment	 of	
freedom	can	be	seen	as	idealistic	since	it	is	a	position	that	treats	without-time-ness	
as	 the	 pure	 Idea,	 which	 may	 be	 beyond	 the	 reach	 of	 one’s	 concrete	 sensuous	
experience	 but	 is	 nonetheless	 affirmed	 via	 the	 operation	 of	 the	 supra-sensuous,	
intellectual	 intuition.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 Bergson’s	 position	 will	 be	 seen	 as	 a	
materialism	since	it	points	toward	a	special	type	of	sensuous	experience	and	not	an	
idea	 of	 reason.	 That	 is,	 duration	 is	 the	 sensuously	 intuited	 “immediate	 data	 of	
consciousness”	 but	 such	 an	 “immediacy”	 differs	 in	 kind	 from	 the	 Kantian	
immediacy	of	the	idea	of	reason.	As	we	will	see,	duration	implies	a	transcendental	
affirmation	 of	 freedom	 as	 concrete	 material	 sensuousness.	 Of	 course,	 the	
sensuousness	 of	 duration,	 by	 virtue	 of	 the	 formula	 of	 time	 ≠	 duration,	 differs	 in	
kind	 from	 Kantian	 sensuousness.	 What	 Kant	 refers	 to	 by	 the	 “sensible”,	 or	
“sensibility”	 is	a	priori	mediated	by	time	since	time	is	 the	transcendental	 form	of	
sensibility.	 In	other	words,	Kantian	 sensuousness	 refers	 to	 the	 experience	of	 the	
world	 in	 terms	 of	 its	mediation	via	 the	 categories	 of	 the	 understanding.	Kantian	
without-time-ness,	accordingly,	is	“supra-sensuous”,	i.e.,	that	which	is	situated	only	
within	 the	 intellectual/intelligible	 realm.	 For	 Kant,	 time	 serves	 the	 role	 of	
demarcating	the	world	in	terms	of	the	sensible	and	the	supra-sensible	realms	and	
the	 affirmation	 of	 the	 supra-sensible	 takes	 place	 via	 the	 affirmation	 of	 the	 pure	
Idea,	which	 is	an	equivalent	of	 regarding	 its	negativity	as	its	affirmativeness.	We	
will	thus	make	it	clear	that	Bergson’s	real	issue	is	not	that	the	world	is	separated	in	
terms	 of	 within	 and	without-time-ness	 along	 the	 line	 of	 time.	 It	 is	 just	 that	 the	
realm	of	freedom	as	without-time-ness	is	also	seen	as	a	kind	of	sensuousness	since	
it	 is	within	duration	and	 hence	 actually	 experienced	 as	 the	 object	 of	 knowledge.	
																																																								
268	By	this	distinction,	we	are	not	speaking	of	Bergson’s	overall	philosophy	as	that	which	
can	 be	 either	 characterised	 as	 materialism	 or	 idealism	 nor	 are	 we	 arguing	 that	 Marx’s	
philosophy	 is	 solely	materialist.	 Transcendental	 Dualism	 of	 Intuition	 itself	 forbids	 us	 to	
make	 such	 a	 one-sided	distinction.	Rather,	what	we	 are	 discussing	here	 solely	 concerns	
the	status	of	duration,	which	is	one	half	of	the	dualism.		
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From	 this	 standpoint,	we	will	 argue	 that	duration	 is	not	 an	object	 of	 intellectual	









Before	 going	 any	 further	 into	 our	 investigation,	 we	 need	 to	 pause	 here	 for	 a	
moment	 to	make	 a	 preliminary	 clarification.	We	will	 uncover	what	 is	meant	 by	
Kantian	 conception	 of	 freedom	 as	 belief	 in	 the	 section	 that	 follows,	 yet	 it	 is	
necessary	 to	 distinguish	 our	 field	 of	 inquiry	 with	 respect	 to	 another	 kind	 of	
freedom	already	mentioned	in	the	beginning	of	our	thesis.		
We	 indicated	 in	 the	 introductory	part	of	 this	 thesis	 that	we	are	ultimately	
interested	 in	 extracting	 intuition	 as	 the	 dialectical	 method	 of	 thinking,	 which	 is	
said	 to	 be,	 in	Matter	and	Memory,	 a	 synthesis	 of	 feeling	 and	 idea.	We	may	 recall	
that	 this	synthesis,	 in	 turn,	 is	also	said	 to	be	 freedom,	or	“free	act.”269	Yet,	 in	 fact,	
this	synthetic/methodological	kind	of	freedom	is	put	forth	along	with	another	kind	
of	 freedom	 that	 differs	 from	 the	 former.	 When	 inquiring	 into	 the	 concept	 of	
duration	as	 freedom,	we	must	know	clearly	which	domain	of	questioning	we	are	




Freedom	 is	 not	 hereby,	 as	 has	 been	 asserted,	 reduced	 to	 sensible	
spontaneity.	 At	 most,	 this	 would	 be	 the	 case	 in	 the	 animal,	 of	 which	 the	
psychical	life	is	mainly	affective.	But,	in	man,	the	thinking	being,	the	free	act	




“human”	 freedom,	 which	 he	 wants	 to	 put	 forth	 as	 the	 legitimate	 philosophical	
method	and	the	other	is	the	“affective”	kind	that	belongs	to	animal.	As	such,	when	





effectively	 saying	 that	 the	 first	 kind	 of	 freedom	 synthesizes	 the	 other	 as	 its	
component.	The	animalistic	or	the	“affective”	kind	of	freedom	is	something	that	the	
active	human	freedom	synthesizes	and	simultaneously	differs	from.	
	 Duration,	 as	 we	 stated,	 is	 a	 part	 of	 what	 the	 method	 of	 intuition	
incorporates	and,	thus,	this	leads	us	to	conclude	that	if	duration	refers	to	a	kind	of	
freedom,	 it	 refers	 to	 the	 “affective”	 kind	 of	 freedom	 or	 to	 “feeling”,	 which	 is	
synthesized	 by	 the	 “free	 act”.	 The	 latter	 is	 the	 ultimate	 fruit	 of	 our	 overall	
investigation	since	it	corresponds	to	the	final	shape	of	the	method	of	intuition	as	a	
whole.	Freedom	of	duration	is	that	which	the	method	sees	as	its	component	and	the	








Let	 us	 examine	 the	 specificity	 of	 the	 Kantian	 doctrine	 of	 freedom.	 Following	
Bergson’s	comments,	the	aspect	we	must	pay	attention	to	is	how	Kant’s	conception	




dogmatic	 and	 illusory	usages	 of	 reason?271	We	 can	hardly	 deny	 that	Kant’s	main	
project,	at	least	in	the	Critique	of	Pure	Reason,	is	to	clearly	demarcate	the	territory	
of	 rational	 and	 sound	 knowledge	 and	 to	 play	 the	 role	 of	 a	 guardian	 of	 human	
sobriety	 that	 judges	 and	 persecutes	 any	 archaic	 metaphysical	 claims	 launched	
from	any	anti-scientific	points	of	view.	Bergson’s	depiction	however	gives	us	 the	
exact	 opposite	 impression.	 Rather	 than	 a	 dispeller	 of	 belief	 and	 a	 guardian	 of	
sound	 knowledge,	 he	 describes	 Kant	 as	 a	 firm	 believer.	 His	 reading	 is	 therefore	
quite	unconventional	 to	an	extent	 that	 it	 is	 in	perfect	contradiction	with	how	his	
thought	 is	 commonly	 regarded.	 Stranger	 still,	 when	 we	 focus	 upon	 the	 way	 in	





“anti-intellectual”,	 or	 “mystical”	 precisely	 due	 to	 his	 alleged	 anti-Kantianism,	 a	
close	 reading	of	 his	 criticism	of	Kant’s	 notion	of	 freedom	 in	 fact	 shows	 that	 it	 is	
Bergson	who	criticizes	Kant	for	the	endorsement	of	belief.		
How	is	it	possible	for	Bergson	to	put	forth	such	an	unconventional	image	of	
Kant	 and,	 at	 the	 same	 time,	 present	 himself	 as	 more	 of	 a	 Kantian	 than	 Kant	





namely	 the	 world	 of	 intelligibility	 that	 transcends	 the	 time-bound	 world	 of	
phenomena.	 “Belief”	 therefore	 does	 not	 refer	 to	 a	 kind	 of	 operation	 that	 is	
antithetical	 to	 philosophical	 reasoning.	On	 the	 contrary,	Kant’s	 overall	 system	of	





agreement	 with	 Kant’s	 conception	 of	 freedom	 as	 the	 other	 of	 time	 and	 his	
contestation	against	Kant	does	not	stem	from	this	aspect	per	se.	This	indicates	that	
the	unique	characteristic	of	the	concept	of	duration	(which,	for	us,	constitutes	the	
materialist	 method	 of	 affirmation)	 cannot	 be	 understood	 without	 first	
acknowledging	its	proximity	to	Kant’s	conception	of	freedom	as	an	object	of	belief.	
To	put	 it	more	 simply,	Bergson’s	method	of	 affirmation	 can	be	 seen	as	 a	 certain	
modification	of	the	method	that	was	first	brought	forth	by	Kant	with	regard	to	his	













the	 legislation	 of	 human	 reason	 (philosophy)	 has	 two	objects,	 nature	 and	









other	 is	 that	 of	 “freedom”	 [freiheit].273	The	 causality	 of	 nature	 refers	 to	 “the	
connection,	in	the	world	of	sense,	of	one	state	with	a	previous	state	upon	which	the	
state	follows	according	to	a	rule”;	it	is,	in	other	words,	the	causality	of	what	occurs	




The	 concept	 of	 freedom	 is	 the	 product	 of	 this	 very	 division,	 but	 what	 is	 this	
division	itself?	While	affirming	the	totality	of	the	“sensible	world”,	i.e.,	the	world	of	
phenomena,	as	that	which	 is	subjected	to	the	 law	of	“causality	of	nature”,	via	 the	
division	Kant	also	points	out	that	another	kind	of	world	can	be	envisaged,	which	is	

















of	 sensibility	 is	 none	 other	 than	 time.	 It	 is	 time	 that	 grounds	 the	 world	 of	
sensibility	 and	 turns	 it	 into	 a	 transcendental	 ideality	 “for	 us”.	 It	 is	 through	 time	
that	every	occurrence	is	a	priori	conditioned	by	necessary	laws	and	unfolds	within	
causal	chains	of	temporal	successions.	However,	along	with	this	temporal	vision	of	
the	 universe,	we	need	 something	 else	 that	 goes	 beyond	 it.	 For	Kant,	 to	 conceive	
that	this	sensible	world	is	the	sole	essence	of	reality	is	to	subordinate	every	human	
action	 under	 the	 universal	 laws	 of	 natural	 causality	 and	 thereby	 sacrifice	 any	
possibility	for	genuine	human	freedom.	In	this	way,	any	human	action,	too,	must	be	
subordinated	to	such	natural	laws277	and,	as	Bergson	concurs,	“automatism	would	
cover	 over	 freedom.” 278 	That	 is,	 if	 the	 causality	 of	 nature	 governs	 not	 the	
appearance	 but	 the	 thing-in-itself,	 this	 would	 inevitably	 imply	 that	 no	 human	
action,	 or	 no	 self-sufficient	 action	 issuing	 forth	 from	 an	 autonomous	 will,	 is	
conceivable.	 Accordingly,	 if	 the	 causality	 of	 freedom	 refers	 to	 the	 independence	
from	 the	 law	of	natural	 causality	within	 the	world	of	 sense,	 this	means	 that	 that	
which	 constitutes	 the	 law	 of	 the	 causality	 of	 freedom	 is	 independent	 from	 time.	





within	 this	 operation	of	 division.	This	 operation	 is	 a	 direct	 grasping	of	 time	 and	





277	This	 view	 of	 the	 world	 is	 not	 so	 different	 from	 what	 Schelling	 later	 criticizes	 as	 a	
misunderstanding	regarding	“pantheism”	implied	by	any	“system	of	reason”,	which	is	seen	
to	 inevitably	 lead	 to	a	 fatalism	devoid	of	human	 freedom.	See	Schelling,	F.	W.	 J.,	 ([1809]	
2006).	 Philosophical	 Investigations	 into	 the	 Essence	 of	 Human	 Freedom.	Trans.	 J.	 Love,	 J.	
Schmidt.	 Albany:	 SUNY	 Press.	 p.11.	 Schopenhauer	 rightly	 points	 out	 the	 hidden	
congruence	between	Kantianism	and	Schelling’s	treatise	on	freedom.	See	Schopenhauer,	A.,	








or	 moral/ethical	 order	 simultaneously.	 This	 preserves	 their	 distinctiveness	
without	 letting	 them	 being	 mixed	 and	 confused	 with	 regard	 to	 one	 another.280	
What	Kant	wants	to	establish	by	putting	forth	the	duality	of	nature	and	freedom	is	
not	at	all	 to	solely	draw	attention	to	their	antinomy.	As	Schopenhauer	notes,	 this	




to	 two	heterogeneous	 uses	 of	 reason	 (speculative	 and	practical).	 	 Therefore,	 the	
concept	of	freedom	can	be	seen	as	the	product	of	this	division	and	its	very	being	is	
affirmed	 along	with	 its	 nature	 of	 being	 the	 Other	 of	 Time.	 For	 Kant,	 freedom	 is	







Given	 that	 Kant	 secures	 a	 place	 for	 freedom	 as	 without-time-ness	 within	 his	
system	of	philosophy,	what	we	must	investigate	now	is	the	particular	way	in	which	
freedom	is	affirmed	by	Kant	since	this	 is	where	Bergson’s	disagreement	with	the	
latter	ultimately	 lies.	After	dividing	 the	world	 in	 terms	of	 the	difference	between	
the	causality	of	nature	and	freedom,	how	does	Kant	claim	the	affirmative	validity	
of	 the	 latter?	How	 does	 Kant	 apprehend	 freedom	with	 respect	 to	 his	method	 of	
philosophy?	If,	as	 it	was	argued	to	be	the	case	within	the	Critique	of	Pure	Reason,	











of	 freedom	 as	 without-time-ness.	 Rather,	 the	 real	 issue	 pertains	 to	 how	 this	
without-time-ness/freedom	 is	 affirmed;	 it	 is	 against	 Kant’s	 manner	 of	
apprehending	without-time-ness	 that	Bergson	puts	 forth	his	 polemic.	At	 bottom,	




reason	 […	 ]	 shows	 in	 what	 we	 call	 Ideas	 a	 spontaneity	 so	 pure	 that	 it	
thereby	goes	far	beyond	anything	that	sensibility	can	ever	afford	it,	[…]	As	a	
rational	being,	 and	 thus	as	a	being	belonging	 to	 the	 intelligible	world,	 the	
human	being	can	never	think	of	the	causality	of	his	own	will	otherwise	than	
under	 the	idea	of	freedom;	 for,	 independence	 from	the	determining	causes	
of	 the	 world	 of	 sense	 (which	 reason	 must	 always	 ascribe	 to	 itself)	 is	
freedom.282		
	
As	 we	 explained	 above,	 freedom	 is	 the	 causality	 of	 the	 world	 insofar	 as	 it	 is	
independent	 from	time.	Yet,	 this	causality	of	 freedom	is	said	to	be	a	mere	“idea”.	




sense	 experience	 but	 merely	 on	 reason’s	 self-assertion.	 Due	 to	 these	
characteristics,	 the	 idea	 is	 also	 called	 the	 “problematic”	 concept”. 285 	It	 is	
“problematic”	 since	 it	 is	 a	 concept	 that	 contains	 no	 contradiction	 but	 whose	
objective	 reality	 cannot	 be	 cognized/understood	 due	 to	 its	 nature	 of	 having	 no	
correspondence	with	any	objects	of	sensibility.	The	idea	does	not	refer	to	anything	
within	 the	 sensuous	 manifold	 of	 intuition	 but	 it	 emerges	 out	 of	 reason’s	 self-
assertion	outside	of	the	realm	of	the	sensible.			
	 The	 important	point	of	 the	matter	at	hand	 for	us	 is	 to	examine	with	what	
legitimate	means	Kant	affirms	the	validity	of	this	supra-sensuous	idea.	How	do	we	
know	if	freedom	is	real	if	it	is	formulated	as	that	which	goes	beyond	the	sensuous	
reality?	 Shouldn't	we	 be	 rather	 sceptical	 towards	 such	 a	 supra-sensuous	 entity?	












regards	 their	 hyperphysical	 use”.287	The	 “critique”	 is	 therefore	 a	 “tribunal”	 set	
forth	to	reason	in	a	way	that	“will	make	reason	secure	in	its	rightful	claims	and	will	
dismiss	all	baseless	pretensions”.288		
	 In	 other	words,	 the	Platonic	 conception	 of	 the	 idea	 is	 invoked	by	Kant	 so	
that	 we	 be	 aware	 of	 its	 problematic	 transcendence.	 As	 opposed	 to	 the	 Platonic	
version,	 the	 Kantian	 dialectic	 is	 a	 critical	 dialectic,	 which	 guards	 against	 the	
problematic	movement	beyond	the	realm	of	the	sensible/apparent	reality.	Insofar	
as	 we	 associate	 Kant’s	 critical	 philosophy	 with	 the	 Critique	 of	 Pure	 Reason,	 the	
function	 of	 “critique”	 seems	 to	 have	 no	 other	 roles	 than	 limiting	and	prohibiting	




since	 what	 is	 sensible	 and	 what	 derives	 from	 the	 understanding	 are	
improperly	mixed	 together,	 like	 squares	and	 circles,	 it	 often	happens	 that	










world	 of	 things	 in-themselves,	 is	 deemed	 necessary	 in	 order	 to	 restrict	 the	















this	 sense	 that	 The	 Groundwork	 for	 the	 Metaphysics	 of	 Morality	 is	 said	 to	 be	
“nothing	more	 than	 the	 search	 for	 and	 establishment	 of	 the	 supreme	principle	of	
morality”	and	this	principle	is	revealed	to	be	none	other	the	uncritical	affirmation	
of	 the	 idea	 of	 freedom. 291 	The	 Idea,	 which	 problematically	 transcends	 the	
boundary	of	sensibility,	is	now	affirmed	as	the	foundation	without	which	the	whole	
of	 his	moral	 philosophy	 is	 inconceivable.	 Rather	 than	 restricting	 the	 idea’s	 false	
claim	 to	 validity	 through	 pointing	 out	 its	 illusory	 nature,	 this	 second	 system	 of	
















the	 testimony	 to	 the	 fact	 that	belief	 is	 the	 indispensable	part	of	Kant’s	 system	of	
reason.	Provided	 that	one	makes	a	 clear	distinction	between	 the	speculative	and	
practical	 uses	 of	 reason,	 inasmuch	 as	 Kant	 prohibits	 a	 transcendence	 into	 the	











We	 are	 now	 in	 a	 better	 place	 to	 understand	 the	 actual	 content	 of	 Bergson’s	
criticism.	 Kant	 conceives	 of	 freedom	 in	 terms	 of	 without-time-ness,	 since	 the	
capacity	to	determine	ourselves	freely	necessarily	implies	our	independence	from	
the	causality	of	nature	or	 the	world	of	 time.	Yet,	 since	 freedom	 is	defined	 in	 this	
way	 as	 without-time-ness,	 or	 the	 other	 of	 time,	 the	 very	 possibility	 of	 freedom	
becomes	incomprehensible:	without-time-ness	cannot	be	seen	as	something	given	
within	 sense	 perception	 since	 it	 is	 outside	 of	 time	 as	 the	 very	 transcendental	
condition	of	intuition.	If	freedom	were	in	fact	given	within	one’s	intuition	or	time,	
the	very	definition	of	freedom	as	without-time-ness	collapses	and	turns	into	mere	




shift	 in	 perspective	 with	 regard	 to	 the	 status	 of	 the	 supra-sensuous	 idea.	
Paradoxically,	within	the	sphere	of	practical	philosophy,	the	virtuality	of	the	idea	is	
not	 a	 cause	 of	 skeptical	 concern	 but	 rather	 an	 equivalent	 to	 its	 affirmativeness.	
Kant	mentions	the	motive	behind	this	shifting	attitude	in	the	Groundwork	as	well	
as	 in	 the	preface	 to	 the	Critique	of	Practical	Reason.	 	According	 to	him,	 to	have	a	
critique	 of	 pure	 practical	 reason	 is	 “futile”	 [vergeblich]	 since	what	 is	 required	 is	
nothing	more	than	to	show	a	pure	“there	is”	of	practical	reason	[es	reine	praktische	
Vernunft	 gebe].293	In	 direct	 contradiction	 to	what	we	 saw	 in	 the	Critique	of	Pure	





The	 abovementioned	 shift	 between	 the	 speculative	 and	 the	 practical	






(which	 belongs	 to	 speculative	 philosophy)	 criticizes	 the	 validity	 of	 the	
suprasensible	 as	 a	 mere	 subjective	 fancy	 of	 pure	 reason.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	
looking	at	 the	 same	division	between	 the	 sensible	 and	 the	 suprasensible	 realms,	
the	 second	 dialectical	 movement	 (which	 belongs	 to	 practical	 philosophy)	 heads	
towards	an	affirmation	of	the	suprasensible	idea	as	the	foundation	of	reason’s	self-
determination.	 Indeed,	 this	 duality	 of	 the	 dialectic	 is	 itself	 necessary	 since	
philosophy	 “cannot	 give	 up	 the	 concept	 of	 nature	 any	 more	 than	 that	 of	
freedom.”294	Yet,	Kant	also	states	that	“we	shall	never	be	able	to	comprehend	how	
freedom	 is	 possible.”295	In	 other	 words,	 due	 to	 the	 definition	 of	 freedom	 as	
without-time-ness,	 freedom	must	 be	 affirmed	 even	 if	we	 cannot	 comprehend	 its	
possibility.	 Does	 not,	 then,	 the	 incomprehensibility	 or	 unavailability	 of	 freedom	
equally	 invite	our	skepticism	 towards	 it?	How	can	we	affirm	something	which	 is	
not	given	to	us	via	sensuous	intuition?		
Let	 us	 take	 a	 look	 at	 two	 contradictory	 statements	Kant	 puts	 forth	 in	 the	
Critique	of	Judgment.	On	the	one	hand,	Kant	states:			
	









of	 which	 would	 be	 excessive	 from	 a	 theoretical	 point	 of	 view)	 can	 be	
established	through	practical	 laws	of	pure	reason,	and,	in	accordance	with	
these,	in	real	actions,	and	thus	in	experience.	–	it	is	only	one	among	all	the	















treated	 as	 a	 “fact”	 at	 the	 same	 time?	 Inscrutability	 and	 factuality	 seem	 to	 be	










conception	 of	 freedom	 mentioned	 at	 the	 end	 of	 Time	 and	 Free	 Will.	 We	 have	







	 With	 the	 above	 analyses	 in	 mind,	 let	 us	 turn	 towards	 the	 broader	
implications	of	Bergson’s	polemic	vis-à-vis	our	concern	for	dialectical	affirmation.	
We	 began	 our	 investigation	 into	 Kant’s	 conception	 of	 freedom	 since	 we	 are	
interested	 in	understanding	exactly	how	the	apprehension	of	duration,	which	we	
argue	 as	 one	 of	 the	 two	 transcendental	 elements	 of	 Bergsonian	 intuition,	
constitutes	 a	 certain	 capacity	 for	 affirmation	 in	 a	 way	 that	 differs	 in	 kind	 from	
time’s	negativity.	It	is	within	this	context	of	investigating	into	the	particular	nature	
of	 duration’s	 affirmative	 capacity	 that	 we	 examined	 the	 Kantian	 conception	 of	
freedom.		
In	 what	 sense	 of	 the	 term	 can	 we	 understand	 freedom	 as	 the	 proper	
background	of	examining	the	affirmative	capacity	of	duration?	How	does	freedom	





of	 any	 external	 influences.	 The	 meaning	 of	 affirmation	 resides	 in	 this	 way	 of	
defining	freedom	as	time’s	other:	since	it	refers	to	the	ground	of	reasoning	in	terms	
of	 its	 independence	 from	 time	 and	 since	 time	 is	 the	 condition	 that	 relatively	




Absolute,	 i.e.	 that	 which	 is	 in-itself	 and	 absolved	 from	 all	 external	 relations	 of	
determinations.298	The	 free	 self	 is	 the	 Absolute	 since,	 by	 definition,	 it	 is	 not	
relatively	determined	or	mediated	by	anything	other	than	itself	and	thus	must	be	
an	object	of	pure	affirmation.		
As	 we	 stated	 in	 the	 beginning,	 the	 proper	 background	 from	 which	 the	
concept	 of	 duration	 emerges	 and	 is	 differentiated	 is	 not	 time	but	 the	 concept	 of	
freedom.	If	this	is	indeed	the	case,	it	can	be	said	that	the	concept	of	duration	is	put	
forth	 within	 this	 Kantian	 framework	 that	 defines	 freedom	 in	 terms	 of	 the	
affirmation	 of	 the	 Absolute	 Self.	 Accordingly,	 it	 can	 be	 said	 that	 the	meaning	 of	






For	 if	 perchance	 the	moments	 of	 real	 duration,	 perceived	 by	 an	 attentive	
consciousness,	permeated	one	another	 instead	of	 lying	side	by	side,	and	 if	
these	moments	 formed	 in	 relation	 to	 one	 another	 a	 heterogeneity	within	
which	 the	 idea	 of	 necessary	 determination	 lost	 every	 shred	 of	 meaning,	
then	 the	 self	 grasped	 by	 consciousness	would	 be	 a	 free	 cause,	we	 should	
have	 absolute	 knowledge	 of	 ourselves	 [connaîtrions	 absolument	 nous-
mêmes].299		
	
The	 above	 quotation	 indeed	 shows	 that	 Bergson	 situates	 himself	 within	 the	
Kantian	conception	of	 freedom	as	without-time-ness	and	hence	what	he	seeks	 to	
																																																								
298	In	 a	 lecture	 course	 on	 Schelling	 in	 Freiburg	 University,	 Heidegger	 speaks	 of	 the	
“Absolute”	 within	 the	 German	 Idealist	 tradition	 in	 terms	 of	 “relationlessness”:	 “What	 is	
different	 about	 the	way	German	 Idealism	understands	philosophy?	 […]	Philosophy	 is	 the	
intellectual	intuition	of	the	Absolute.	[…]	This	absolute	relationlessness	to	anything	else,	this	









Absolute	 but	 the	 concept	 of	 duration	 is	 the	 Absolute	 since	 Bergson	 also	 sees	
duration	in	terms	of	time’s	other.	However,	Bergson’s	conception	of	the	Absolute	
must	differ	significantly	 from	that	of	Kant	since	 it	 is	put	 forth	against	Kant.	Thus	
the	 problem	 for	 us	 is	 the	 following:	 while	 situating	 himself	 within	 the	 Kantian	
framework	 of	 conceiving	 freedom	 as	 the	 Absolute,	 how	 does	 Bergson’s	 own	
conception	still	differ	from	it?	The	framework	through	which	we	can	examine	the	
meaning	of	affirmation	that	we	ascribe	to	duration	has	so	far	been	mapped	out;	it	
is	 now	 a	 question	 of	 distinguishing	 the	 difference	 between	 the	 Kantian	 and	 the	
Bergsonian	 conceptions	 of	 the	 Absolute	 and	 to	 know	 the	 specific	 significance	 of	
what	the	Kantian	conception	of	the	Absolute	entails	vis-à-vis	dialectical	affirmation.		
What	 Bergson	 criticizes	 as	 “belief”	 in	 Kant’s	 conception	 can	 be	 seen	 as	 a	
particular	way	of	affirming	the	Absolute	and	it	is	to	this	very	method	that	Bergson	
is	raising	his	objection.	In	other	words,	this	is	a	question	regarding	the	dialectical	
method	 with	 which	 the	 affirmativeness	 of	 the	 Absolute	 is	 affirmed	 beyond	 the	
critical	 skepticism	 that	 Kantianism	 is	 known	 for.	 To	 be	 precise,	 by	 pointing	 out	
Kant’s	 “belief”	 in	 freedom,	Bergson	 is	 criticizing	 and	distancing	himself	 from	 the	
idealist	 method	 of	 affirming	 the	 Absolute,	 i.e.,	 the	 post-critical	 method	 of	 the	
negation	of	negation.	Bergson	 is	 opposed	 to	 this	method	because	 the	Absolute	 is	
only	 affirmed	as	 the	 Idea	of	Reason,	 i.e.,	as	a	 supra-sensuous	object,	which	 is	not	
fully	 affirmative	 but	 rather	 remains	negative	with	 respect	 to,	 as	 Schelling	would	
say,	the	thatness	of	the	Absolute.300	As	opposed	to	the	Kantian	idealism,	Bergson’s	
concept	 of	 duration	 implies	 a	materialist	 affirmation	 of	 the	 Absolute.	 Duration	
constitutes	 Bergson’s	materialism	with	 regard	 to	 the	 Absolute	 since	 it	 is	 not	 an	
affirmation	 of	 the	 Absolute	 as	 the	 idea	 of	 reason	 but	 of	 what	 is	 actually	 given	




300	Schelling,	 F.	 W.	 J.,	 ([1972]	 2007).	 The	 Grounding	 of	 Positive	 Philosophy:	 The	 Berlin	
Lectures.	Trans.	B.	Matthews.	Albany:	SUNY	Press.	p.147.		




affirmation	 does	 not	 deny	 the	 being-there	 of	 the	 Idea,	 but	 still	 distinguishes	
between	the	Being	of	the	Idea	and	the	Other	Being	that	the	Idea	affirms	as	its	object,	
i.e.,	 the	 content	 of	 the	 Idea.	 In	 other	 words,	 materialism	 is	 a	 negation	 without	





We	 call	 the	 Kantian	method	 idealist	 simply	 because,	 as	we	 demonstrated	
above,	 it	 is	 explicated	 in	 terms	 of	 his	 theory	 of	 the	 Idea	 as	 a	 supra-sensuous	 or	
virtual	presence,	which	is	affirmed	despite	the	fact	that	it	is	not	given	to	sensuous	
intuition.	 Although	 Bergson	 fully	 endorses	 the	 Kantian	 dualism	 of	 time	 and	
freedom	 and	 gives	 the	 status	 of	 the	 Absolute	 to	 the	 latter,	 he	 distances	 himself	
from	 Kant	 since	 the	 idealist	method	 falls	 short	 as	 a	mere	 belief	of	 the	 absolute,	
which	is	a	kind	of	half-affirmation	of	the	negativity	of	the	Absolute.	Although	Kant	





is	 still	 spoken	 of	 from	 its	 opposite	 side,	 the	 side	 of	 time.	 In	 this	 way,	 the	




in	 the	domain	of	 the	commonly	designated	 image	of	Kant	 in	 terms	of	a	 skeptical	
destroyer	 of	 the	 Absolute.	 Rather,	 the	 concept	 of	 freedom	 is	 where	 Kantianism	
participates	 in	 the	 long	 tradition	 of	 Western	 metaphysics	 and	 he	 is	 criticized	
precisely	at	this	level	where	his	philosophy	is	considered	as	a	continuation	of	this	












the	 percept.	 They	 all	 appeal	 from	 the	 insufficiency	 of	 our	 senses	 and	











Absolute	 [l’absolu],	 hence	 the	 insufficiency	 that	 he	 speaks	 of	 here	 is	 the	
insufficiency	 towards	 the	 knowledge	 of	 the	 Absolute. 304 	To	 say,	 then,	 that	
metaphysics	 is	 a	 substitution	 of	 the	 percept	 with	 the	 concept	 due	 to	 the	
insufficiency	of	perception	is	to	define	metaphysics	as	the	knowing	of	the	Absolute	
through	a	means	other	than	sense	perception,	i.e.,	the	supra-sensible	idea.	That	is,	
Bergson	 defines	metaphysics	 and	 idealism	of	 the	Absolute	 as	 one	 and	 the	 same,	
which	 is	 tantamount	 to	 saying	 that	 metaphysics	 since	 Zeno,	 with	 “Plato	 [being]	
first	and	foremost”,	has	always	been	about	the	“belief”	in	the	Absolute.305	



















implies	 the	 non-resemblance	 to	 itself	 (“unlike”)	 and	 the	 resemblance	 to	 itself	





“all”	 [πάντα]	 to	be	given	within	sense	perception.309	Conversely,	 the	givenness	of	
the	 Absolute	 can	 only	 be	 evisaged	 via	 the	 supra-sensible	 faculty	 of	 abstract	





Such,	 indeed,	was	 the	 sentence	 passed	 by	 the	 philosophers	 of	 the	 Eleatic	
school.	 […]	Experience	confronts	us	with	becoming:	that	 is	sensible	reality.	
But	the	intelligible	reality,	that	which	ought	to	be,	is	more	real	still,	and	that	
reality	 does	 not	 change.	 Beneath	 the	 qualitative	 becoming,	 beneath	 the	
evolutionary	 becoming,	 beneath	 the	 extensive	 becoming,	 the	 mind	 must	
seek	 that	which	 defies	 change,	 the	 definable	 quality,	 the	 form	or	 essence,	





of	 the	 Absolute	 within	 sense-perception	 is	 here	 seen	 as	 the	 raison	 d’être	 of	
metaphysics,	with	the	latter	being	founded	upon	the	constitutive	negation	of	sense	
perception	with	regard	to	the	Absolute.		
	 Now,	 if	 the	 concept	 of	 duration	 is	 Bergson’s	 philosophical	 creation	 par	
excellence	and	is	put	forth	in	relation	to	the	so-called	“problem	of	freedom”	within	
the	 context	 of	 Kantian	 philosophy,	 what	 Bergson	 is	 really	 after	 through	 his	






Parmenidean	“all	 is	one”,	 in	Thales’	“all	 is	full	of	God”	[πάντα	πλήρη	θεῶν],	or	Heraclitus’	
“all	flows”	[πάντα	ρει],	seems	to	be	used	in	a	manner	equivalent	to	the	Absolute.	Bergson	











we	 encountered	 in	 chapter	 2	 of	 this	 thesis.	 It	 is	 true	 that	 with	 Kant	 Platonism	
experienced	 a	definite	 reversal.	While	Plato	 envisaged	 the	 true	world	within	 the	
“up-above”,	Kant	 conceives	of	 it	 as	 that	which	 is	 located	 “down-below”	 as	 in	 the	
things	 in-themselves.311	That	 is,	 with	 Kant,	 we	 are	 already	 dwelling	 within	 the	
world	of	“up-above”	(the	world	of	time),	but	this	temporal	world	we	find	ourselves	
in	 is	 the	apparent	reality	and	the	 true	world	 from	which	we	are	alienated	rather	
lies	“down-below”	in	the	without-time-ness	of	the	things	in-themselves.	However,	
what	 is	 accomplished	here	 is	 a	mere	 reversal	 and	 the	negativity	 of	 the	Absolute	
still	 remains.	Kant	 only	 reverses	 the	 order,	 so	 to	 speak,	 between	 the	up	 and	 the	
down.	After	Kant,	the	true	world	is	located	in	the	Earthly	down-below	in	terms	of	
the	freedom	of	the	Absolute	Self	in-itself.	Yet,	as	we	have	shown	above,	with	regard	
to	 the	actual	availability	of	 the	Absolute,	 Kant	 squarely	 remains	within	 the	 post-
Eleatic	 tradition	 of	 Western	 metaphysics	 founded	 upon	 the	 insufficiency	 of	
perception	and	does	not,	as	Heidegger	would	put	it,	“twist	free”	from	Platonism.312		
																																																								




the	 sensuous	 perception	 of	 the	 Absolute	 as	 the	 post-metaphysical	 articulation	 of	 the	
Absolute.	 Yet	 due	 to	 his	 attachment	 to	 the	 negative	 power	 of	 Time,	 this	 “vision”	 of	 the	
Absolute	is	rendered	impossible.		
312	Heidegger	 points	 out	 that	 it	 is	 Nietzsche	who	 reverses	 Platonism	without	 ultimately	
twisting	 free	 from	it.	For	us,	 regardless	of	whether	or	not	Nietzsche’s	concept	of	 “will	 to	
power”	remains	within	the	tradition	of	metaphysics	as	onto-theology,	Heidegger’s	reading	
is	rather	directly	applicable	to	the	overall	position	of	Kantian	philosophy.	Leonard	Lawlor	
utilizes	 Heidegger’s	 reading	 of	 Nietzsche	 in	 order	 to	 argue	 that	 Bergson’s	 Matter	 and	
Memory	ultimately	twists	free	from	Platonism	(which	we	understand	as	an	idealism	of	the	
Absolute)	 via	 the	 concept	 of	memory.	 Although	we	 accept	 Lawlor’s	 argument	 regarding	
Bergson	 in	 a	 general	 scope,	we	 however	 think	 that	 twisting	 free	 from	Platonism	 rather	




the	 impossibility	of	 the	Absolute	to	be	the	object	of	knowledge	within	the	realm	of	 time.	
See	 Heidegger,	Nietzsche,	 Vol.	 I.	p.201.	 Also	 see	 Lawlor,	 L.,	 (2003).	 The	 Challenge	 of	
Bergsonism.	London:	Continuum.pp.27-28.	
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In	 other	 words,	 with	 Kant,	 the	 ancient	 conception	 of	 God-as-Substance	 gets	








Let	us	go	back	 to	our	earlier	 remark	about	 the	materialism	of	Bergson.	We	have	
mentioned	 that	Bergson’s	 criticism	of	Kant	 can	be	 seen	as	a	materialist	 criticism	
akin	to	Marx	and	Feuerbach’s	since	we	can	understand	that	Bergson’s	contestation	
is	 aimed	 particularly	 towards	 Kant’s	 Idealist	 method	 of	 affirmation,	 or	 what	
amounts	 to	 the	same	thing,	 the	belief	 in	 the	Absolute	validated	within	the	 formal	
structure	of	relating	to	the	Absolute	solely	as	the	Idea	of	Reason.			






the	Marxist	historical	 criticism	of	 ideological	 “truths”,	 i.e.,	socio-political	 criticism	
of	truths	as	historical	constructions	at	the	level	of	the	surface/social	ego.	We	have	
explained	 that	 although	 Bergson	 has	 traditionally	 been	 treated	 as	 a	 dogmatic	
metaphysician	 due	 to	 the	 supposed	 anti-Kantianism,	 this	 is	 not	 in	 fact	 the	 case	
since	there	is	the	definite	constructivist	realism	of	time	in	Bergson	made	apparent	





towards	 the	 being-there	 of	 the	 Idea	 as	 the	 negativity	 of	 the	 Absolute	 and	
																																																								
313	Bergson	says	 in	Creative	Evolution	that	“a	 formal	God”	of	Kant	becomes	God	 in	Fichte,	
and	 that	 the	 former	 is	 “much	 less	 than	 a	 substantial	 God”	 and	 “a	 little	 more	 than	 the	
isolated	 work	 of	 a	 man	 or	 even	 than	 the	 collective	 work	 of	 humanity”,	 which	 is	 a	
“humanity	already	somewhat	deified”	(CE	357/797).		
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transcendental	 dualism	 refuses	 to	 confuse	 this	 negativity	 with	 its	 absolute	
affirmativeness.	That	is,	neither	Bergson	nor	Marx	deny	the	positive	being-there	of	
the	 supra-sensible	 Idea	 (i.e.,	historical	 becoming	of	Time,	or	 the	mediation	 of	 the	
Absolute)	but	they	also	commonly	hold	that	what	is	apprehended	as	positive	in	the	
case	 of	 the	 apprehension	 of	 time	 is	 a	 strictly	 negative	 being.	 As	 such,	 they	 both	
refuse	 to	conflate	 the	reality	of	 the	 Idea	with	 the	affirmative	actual	 reality	of	 the	
Absolute	in-itself.		
	 What	we	point	out	in	terms	of	their	common	“materialist	criticism”	in	this	
chapter	 therefore	 pertains	 to	 the	 critical	 aspect,	 which	 objects	 to	 the	 Idealist	
position	 that	 claims	 to	 have	 reached	 the	 Absolute	 via	 the	 supra-sensible	 idea.	
While	 granting	 the	 status	of	 reality	 to	 the	negativity	of	 the	 Idea	as	 that	which	 is	
mediated	 or	 conditioned	 and	 therefore	 only	 affording	 us	 with	 the	 illusory	
appearance	 of	 Truth,	 this	 other	 aspect	 points	 out	 that	 to	 assume	 this	 negative	
being	as	the	affirmative	Absolute	cannot	be	permitted.	That	is,	what	is	contested	is	
the	 claim	 that	 the	 supra-sensible	 idea	 is	 the	 Absolute	 since	 the	 Idea	 is	 to	 be	
understood	 strictly	 as	 a	 mediation/negation	 of	 the	 Absolute.	 It	 must	 thus	 be	
maintained	 that	 this	 differs	 in	 kind	 from	 the	 actual	 reality	 of	 the	 Absolute.	 No	
matter	 how	 concrete	 the	 Idea	becomes	 throughout	 the	history	 of	 human	beings,	
the	 difference	 in	 kind	 between	 the	 Idea	 of	 the	 Absolute	 and	 the	 in-itself	 of	 the	
Absolute	 must	 be	 maintained	 in	 order	 to	 protect	 ourselves	 from	 the	 imminent	
threat	of	nihilism.314		
	 To	many,	this	might	not	sound	plausible	given	that	the	objects	of	criticism	
clearly	 differ	 between	 Bergson	 and	 Marx.	 After	 all,	 Bergson	 never	 directly	
mentions	Hegel	in	any	of	his	major	writings	and	Marx	never	wrote	extensively	on	
Kant.315	It	would	be	mistaken	 to	 conclude	however	 that	Bergson	was	a	 complete	
stranger	 to	 Hegel’s	 philosophy,	 or	 that	 his	 criticism	 of	 Kant	 only	 stops	 short	 at	
																																																								
314	We	 call	 the	 conflation	 between	 the	 idea	 of	 the	 Absolute	 and	 the	 Absolute	 in-itself	




is	not	so	different	 from	the	Fichtean	as	well	as	 the	Hegelian	position	 that	elevates	belief	
into	the	status	of	rational	knowledge.		

















“the	 concept	 of	 freedom	 […]	 constitutes	 the	 keystone	 [Schlussstein]	 of	 the	whole	
structure	of	a	system	of	pure	reason,	even	of	speculative	reason.”317	Due	to	the	fact	
that	 it	constitutes	the	concept	of	 the	Absolute	Self,	 freedom	is	here	unmistakably	
posited	 by	 Kant	 as	 the	 first	 principle	 of	 his	 philosophy	 as	 a	 whole.	 Granted,	 the	
explicit	 problematization	 concerning	 the	 post-critical	 foundation	 of	 metaphysics	
originates	 in	 his	 successors,	 nonetheless,	 Kant	 gives	 a	 clear	 direction	 to	 this	
endeavor.	Here,	 the	 problem	of	 freedom	 is	 not	 only	 seen	 in	 terms	 of	 that	which	
merely	concerns	the	partial/limited	sphere	of	moral	philosophy.	Rather,	it	is	stated	
to	 be	 something	 that	 holds	 together	 the	 cohesive	 system	 of	 philosophy,	 even	 of	
speculative	 philosophy.	 This	 means	 that	 even	 when	 the	 self-activity	 of	 reason	 is	
criticized	 for	 overstepping	 the	 boundary	 of	 sensuous	 cognition	 in	 the	 case	 of	
speculative	philosophy,	this	self-restrictive	move	still	requires	freedom	as	its	core	




316	Hegel,	 G.	 W.	 F.,	 ([1817]	 1991).	 The	 Encyclopaedia	 Logic.	 Trans.	 T.	 F.	 Geraets,	 W.	 A.	
Suchting,	H.	S.	Harris.	Cambridge:	Hackett.	p.125,	pp.131-133.	§	79,	§	82.	
317	CPrR	5:3-4.			




by	 nature	 beyond	 the	 “vulgar	 view	 of	 nature”	 (the	 vulgar	 nature	 refers	 to	 Fichtean	
conception	 of	 Nature	 as	 the	 Non-Ego	 as	 opposed	 to	 Freedom	 of	 the	 Ego)	 is	 wholly	
compatible	 with	 the	 higher	 conception	 of	 Kantian	 freedom	 seen	 as	 including	 natural	




for	 Kant	 plays	 a	 much	 more	 fundamental	 role	 in	 relation	 to	 supporting	 the	




philosophy	 can	 no	 longer	 be	 treated	 in	 terms	 of	 narrow	 confines	 of	 “Critical	
Philosophy”	but	as	 containing	within	 itself	 the	 seed	 for	 the	 later	development	 in	
post-Kantian	Idealism.		
Our	 argument	 pertaining	 to	 materialism	 is	 that	 what	 Marx	 criticized	 in	
Hegel’s	 dialectic,	 namely	 the	 operation	 of	 the	 “negation	 of	 negation”,	 is	 already	
prefigured	in	what	Bergson	points	out	in	Kant’s	conception	of	freedom.	That	is,	we	
argue	 that	Bergson	 is	 criticizing	 the	 root	of	Hegel’s	 negation	of	 negation	 already	









which	 does	 not	 prove	 itself	 through	 its	 own	 existence,	 which	 is	 not	
admitted.	 It	 is	 therefore	 directly	 counterposed	 to	 that	 positing	 which	 is	
sensuously	ascertained	and	grounded	in	itself.	(Feuerbach	sees	negation	of	
the	 negation,	 the	 concrete	 concept,	 as	 thought	 which	 surpasses	 itself	 in	




“negation	 of	 the	 negation”,	 which	 promises	 to	 reach	 towards	 the	 “absolutely	
positive”.	The	negation	of	negation	 is	 the	 third	moment	within	 the	movement	of	
Hegelian	dialectic,	which	is	designed	to	establish	philosophy	upon	the	“speculative	
or	 positively	 rational”.320	After	 having	 undergone	 the	 negation	 of	 the	 first	 naïve	
being	in-itself	by	the	being	for-itself	of	thought,	the	movement	reaches	towards	the	

















In	 a	 way	 analogous	 to	 Kantian	 affirmation,	 the	 negation	 of	 negation	 affirms	 the	
being	of	the	supra-sensuous	idea	by	saying	that	“representation	[Vorstellung]	also	
is”.	As	Feuerbach	states,	what	 this	achieves	 is	 the	affirmation	of	 the	negativity	of	
the	Absolute	by	saying	that	“the	‘otherness	of	thought’	is,	however,	being.”322	It	is	
an	 operation	 of	 affirming	 something	 even	 though	 the	 affirmative	 being	 that	 it	
affirms	is	not	given	to	sensuous	intuition.	This	method	of	affirmation,	which	Hegel	
also	 calls	 “intellectual	 intuition”	after	Fichte’s	 reading	of	Kant,	 is	 contradicted	by	
Feuerbach	and	Marx	since	it	still	remains	within	time	even	though	what	it	lays	its	
claim	 upon	 lies	 outside	 it. 323 	Time,	 due	 to	 its	 characteristic	 of	 being	 the	
transcendental	 form	 that	 mediates	 our	 experience	 a	 priori,	 is	 what	 puts	 our	
thought	 in	 a	 negative	 relationship	with	 the	 in-itself	 affirmativeness	 of	 being.	 As	
such,	 the	affirmation	of	 the	 idea	 is	merely	the	affirmation	of	 the	negativity	of	 the	
Absolute	 due	 to	 the	 intervention	 of	 time.	 The	 second	 negation	 that	 negates	 this	
negation	 is	 seen	 as	 an	 affirmation	 since	 it	 grants	 a	 being	 to	 this	 otherness	 of	






of	 the	pure	Ego	 formally	 excludes	 any	mediation	 and	ends	up	negating	 and	 treating	 the	
whole	 of	 the	 sense-perception/nature	 as	 something	 intrinsically	 “bad”.	 Hegel	 instead	
insists	 that	what	 is	 intuited	 immediately	 through	 intellectual	 intuition	 is	 the	 product	 of	
mediation	(Vermittlung),	which	is	also	called	“development,	education	and	culture”	(§67).	
However,	 it	 matters	 little	 for	 our	 discussion	 whether	 the	 idea	 excludes	 or	 contains	
mediation.	What	matters	for	us	is	that	the	idea	of	reason,	which	is	negative	with	regard	to	
sensuous	perception,	is	still	the	sole	object	of	affirmation	in	both	cases.	After	all,	we	are	in	
partial	 agreement	with	 the	 Hegelian	 thesis	 of	 the	mediation	 of	 the	 Idea	 since	 this	 later	
develops	 into	 Marx’s	 conception	 of	 the	 material-historical	 mediation	 of	 ideological	
consciousness.		
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affirms	 as	 the	 immediate	 being	 is	 the	 being	 of	 thought	 as	 negativity,	 or	 the	
mediated	as	immediate	presence	to	consciousness.		
	 This	 means	 that	 the	 negation	 of	 negation	 affirms	 being	 but	 the	 affirmed	
being	through	this	dialectic	is	insofar	as	it	is	not	the	immediate,	sensuous	material	
reality.	It	does	not	affirm	the	immediate	sensuous	being	since	the	latter	is	already	
negated	 by	 time.	 The	 negation	 of	 negation	 thus	 still	 remains	 on	 the	 side	 of	 the	
other	 with	 respect	 to	 the	 immediate	 sensuous	 reality.	 The	 temporal	 division	
between	 the	 thing-in-itself	 and	 phenomenon	 is	 thus	 only	 apparently	 overcome	
since	the	being	of	thought	can	be	affirmed	only	insofar	as	its	being	is	separate	and	
distinct	 from	 sensuous	 material	 reality	 due	 to	 the	 authority	 of	 time.	 Feuerbach	
therefore	 states:	 “Hegel	 is	 a	 realist,	 but	 a	 purely	 idealistic	 realist	 or,	 rather,	 an	
abstract	realist;	he	is	a	realist	in	the	abstraction	from	all	reality.”324	
We	 can	 see	 here	 that	 the	 way	 in	 which	 Hegel’s	 negation	 of	 the	 negation	
gives	 itself	 the	 authority	 to	 affirm	 the	 Absolute	 is	 hence	 analogous	 to	 what	 we	
pointed	out	above	in	the	case	of	Kant.	In	this	sense,	Bergson’s	criticism	of	Kantian	
conception	of	 freedom	 is	 reminiscent	of	 the	Marxist/Feuerbachian	 criticism.	The	
supra-sensuous	 idea	 is	 first	 seen	as	 the	object	of	 criticism	 in	 the	case	of	Kantian	
speculative	philosophy	but	when	it	comes	to	the	practical/moral	philosophy,	 it	 is	
affirmed	 despite	 of	 its	 negativity	and	 turns	 into	 an	 object	 of	 affirmation	 through	
“belief”.	 Bergson’s	 particular	 strand	 of	 materialist	 criticism	 is	 thus	 primarily	 an	
objection	 raised	 against	 the	 very	 method	 of	 reaching	 towards	 the	 affirmative	










































domain	of	 the	other	of	time	or	Freedom.	That	 is,	 through	the	concept	of	duration,	



















The	 particularity	 of	 Bergson’s	 concept	 of	 duration,	 which	 is	 what	 makes	 his	
philosophy	unique	vis-à-vis	 the	 traditional	Western	metaphysics,	 is	 expressed	 in	
its	 astounding	 simplicity:	 the	 free,	 Absolute	 Self	 is	 within	 the	 reach	 of	 our	
knowledge	and	it	is	furthermore	something	that	gives	itself	forth	within	the	actual	
perception	 or	 intuition	 of	 duration.	 The	 conception	 therefore	 refers	 to	 a	 kind	 of	
sensuous	 knowing,	 which	 accomplishes	 a	 consciousness	 of	 the	 Absolute	 Self	
attained	through	an	actual	perception.		
The	 difference	 from	 the	 Kantian	 position	 is	 evident.	 Although	 duration	
refers	to	the	aspect	of	reality	that	resides	outside	of	time,	it	is	nonetheless	seen	as	
that	which	 gives	 itself	 forth	within	 one’s	 actual	 intuition.	 It	 is	 this	 characteristic	
that	gives	 the	method	of	 intuition	 its	unique	capacity	 for	affirmation.	Against	 the	
traditional	 Western	 metaphysics	 that	 only	 grants	 the	 Absolute	 the	 status	 of	 a	
virtual	presence,	Bergson	argues	through	the	concept	of	duration	that	it	 is	rather	
the	 actual	datum	of	perception,	 or	 that	 it	 is	actually	 there	within	one’s	 sensuous	
awareness.	And,	 although	 it	 is	made	 available	 as	 an	 object	 of	 knowledge	 that	 is	
there,	 this	 very	 thereness	of	 the	 Absolute	 does	 not	 indicate	 its	 negativity	 but	 its	
affirmativeness.	 To	 be	 sure,	 however,	 the	 simplicity	 of	 the	 above	 formulation	 is	







Although	 duration	 is	 the	most	 fundamental	 conception	 that	 supports	 the	








its	 thereness	 within	 intuition.	 Yet,	 in	 relation	 to	 Kant,	 nothing	 seems	 more	
contradictory	and	unacceptable	than	to	put	forth	such	an	argument.	As	we	pointed	
out	above,	if	duration	is	indeed	posited	within	the	Kantian	framework	of	defining	
freedom	 in	 terms	of	without-time-ness,	 this	means	 that	Bergson	 situates	himself	
within	 the	 framework	 of	 conceiving	 duration	 in	 terms	 of	 that	 which	 transcends	







Indeed,	 duration	 seems	 to	 be	 an	 impossible	 concept.	 But	 this	 is	 only	 the	
case	 if,	by	“knowledge”,	we	understand	the	kind	of	knowledge	that	belongs	to	an	
empirical	 subject	 that	 a	 priori	 submits	 its	 object	 to	 a	 determinate	 relation	 and	
hence	relativizes	the	object.	That	is,	the	very	definition	of	knowledge	is	something	
that	a	priori	contradicts	the	affirmation	of	the	Absolute:	knowledge	of	the	Absolute	
turns	 it	 into	 Non-Being	 or	 into	 a	 diminution/alteration	 of	 it;	 as	 such,	 a	 possible	






Again,	 as	 many	 commentators	 have	 done	 so	 in	 the	 past,	 one	 might	 be	




328 It	 is	 our	 view	 that	 Hegel	 presents	 the	 knowledge	 of	 the	 Absolute	 (i.e.,	 the	
speculative/positively	 rational)	 through	 this	 route	 of	 reasoning.	 In	 the	 preliminary	










Kantianism”	 and	 assume	 that	 his	 thought	 implies	 either	 a	 return	 to	 pre-Kantian	
dogmatic	metaphysics	or	a	 turn	 to	vulgar	positivism	devoid	of	any	consideration	
for	 the	 finitude	 of	 our	 perceptual	 knowledge.	 Even	 if	 one	 overcomes	 the	 first	
temptation	that	pertains	to	the	realism	or	retrieval	of	time,	there	is	the	temptation	
to	sidestep	the	very	possibility	of	duration	by	choosing	to	one-sidedly	focus	upon	
the	 dynamic	 pluralism	 of	 time.329	Although	 the	 latter	 option	 would	 effectively	
rescue	Bergson	from	the	accusation	of	pre-Kantianism,	it	would	end	up	mystifying	
the	 in-itself	 of	 the	 Absolute.	 Yet	 no	 matter	 how	 concretely	 we	 understand	 the	
mediation	 of	 the	 Absolute	 and	 no	 matter	 how	 closely	 we	 follow	 the	 historical	
transmutations	 of	 time	 via	 the	 theory	 of	memory,	 this	 does	 not	 tell	 us	 anything	
about	the	possibility	of	duration	since	the	inquiry	is	not	aimed	at	the	right	target.	
Of	 course,	 the	 becoming	 of	 time	 implies	 the	 presence	 of	 the	 “virtual	 other”	 that	
supplies	 it	 with	 the	 potentiality	 for	 self-negation	 and	 hence	 transformation.	
However,	 in	 the	 same	way	 that	 the	 real	 curve	 necessarily	 remains	 distinct	 from	
any	determined	functions	in	the	case	of	infinitesimal	calculus,	the	Absolute	Self	or	
duration	 itself	 necessarily	 remains	 distinct	 from	 any	 products	 of	 temporal	
mediation.	That	 is,	our	understanding	of	 the	negativity	of	 the	Absolute	cannot	be	
equated	with	its	affirmativeness.	Unless	we	come	face	to	face	with	the	distinctness	
of	 the	 problem	 that	 solely	 belongs	 to	 the	 in-itself	 of	 the	 Absolute,	 the	 latter	
necessarily	remains	unknown.	
																																																								






dissipation.	Although	 it	 is	 true	 that	 duration	 passes	 into	 time	 out	 of	 the	 functioning	 of	





note	 that	 Deleuze	 sees	 the	 shortcomings	 of	 Bergson’s	 philosophy	 (particularly	 with	
respect	 to	 three	 syntheses	 of	 time	 in	 Difference	 and	 Repetition)	 precisely	 because	 he	
equates	duration	with	memory.	Also,	in	What	Is	Philosophy?	Deleuze	speaks	of	“the	plane	
of	immanence”,	or	the	“infinite	movement”,	as	that	which	only	occurs	in	the	first	chapter	of	
Matter	 and	 Memory	 and	 nowhere	 else.	 For	 us,	 this	 is	 a	 misreading	 caused	 by	 his	






Absolute	 is	 now	 seen	 as	 located	 in	 the	 “down-below”	 (the	 thing-in-itself)	 rather	
than	in	the	“up-above”.	Yet,	unless	we	directly	enter	into	the	realm	of	the	Absolute	
Self	 in-itself	 and	 interrogate	 its	 possibility	 with	 respect	 to	 actual	 knowledge,	 it	
remains	 the	 pure	 beyond	 and	 hence	 a	 mere	 product	 of	 mystification.	 More	
importantly,	in	this	way,	metaphysics	is	bound	to	remain,	as	Kant	describes	in	his	
first	 preface	 to	Critique	of	Pure	Reason,	as	 the	 “battleground	of	 endless	 conflicts”	
whereby	no	true	agreement	or	no	common	ground	can	be	obtained	without	having	
to	resort	to	violence.330	If	the	only	avenue	to	the	Absolute	is	metaphysics,	or	if	the	
Absolute	 can	 only	 be	 approached	 via	 the	 abstract	 cognition	 of	 the	 idea	without	
being	 supported	 by	 any	 “touchstone	 of	 experience”,	 war	 remains	 the	 ultimate	
destiny	 of	 human	 reason.	 The	 task	 of	 overcoming	 metaphysics	 is	 therefore	 the	









the	 above	 quotation	 from	 Time	 and	 Free	Will,	 duration	 is	 said	 to	 be	 that	 which	
possesses	 a	 positive	 thereness	 within	 actual	 intuition.	 The	 affirmativeness	 of	




be	 bypassed	 by	 merely	 repeating	 the	 various	 descriptions	 Bergson	 gives	 to	
duration	(continuous	multiplicity,	flow,	real	time,	movement,	etc),	since	any	verbal	
description	 of	 the	 “what”	 of	 duration	 necessarily	 covers	 over	 and	 negates	 its	
absoluteness	 and	 hence	 betrays	 its	 fundamental	 constitution.	 Nor	 can	 we	 be	






Our	 inquiry	 into	 the	 affirmative	 capacity	 of	 duration	 must	 therefore	
inevitably	 confront	 the	 problem	 of	 contradiction	 between	 the	 Absolute	 and	
knowledge.	The	only	way	in	which	we	can	do	so	is	to	examine	the	concept	in	terms	
of	 the	 problem	 of	 contradiction	 and	 let	 it	 be	 an	 inquiry	 into	 the	 condition	 of	
possibility	 for	 the	 reconciliation	 of	 the	 contradiction.	 That	 is,	 instead	 of	 turning	
away	 from	 the	 problem	 of	 contradiction,	 we	 must	 examine	 the	 concept	 as	 that	
which	 responds	 to	 it	 and	 provides	 it	 with	 an	 answer.	 Our	 argument	 is	 the	
following:	 the	 above	 contradiction	 inevitably	 confronts	 the	 concept	 precisely	
because	 the	 concept	 is	 posited	 directly	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 contradiction.	 In	 other	
words,	 duration	 is	 not	 where	 the	 contradiction	 between	 the	 Absolute	 and	
knowledge	arises	and	left	unresolved.	Rather,	it	is	where	this	problem	is	cared	for	
and	provided	with	a	solution.	In	a	word,	we	can	understand	the	concept	in	terms	of	
that	 which	 performs	 a	 sublation	of	 the	 contradiction	 between	 the	 Absolute	 and	
knowledge.		
In	 the	previous	 chapter,	 as	 a	 preliminary	 to	 the	present	 investigation,	we	
examined	 the	 Kantian	 conception	 of	 freedom	 as	 that	 from	 which	 duration	
differentiates	 itself.	 Since	 the	 Kantian	 conception	 of	 freedom	 implies	 the	
affirmation	of	 the	Absolute	Self	as	 the	 Idea	of	Reason	(belief),	we	stated	 that	 the	
concept	of	duration	 is	posited	against	 the	 Idealism	of	 the	Absolute,	which	 is	also	
where	 Kantianism	 meets	 the	 dominant	 tradition	 of	 Western	 metaphysics.	 We	
concluded	 that	 the	 concept	 of	 duration	 is	 therefore	 ultimately	 put	 forth	 against	
Kant’s	participation	in	the	traditional	way	of	approaching	the	Absolute	that	stems	
from,	 as	 Bergson	 states	 in	 the	 lecture	 given	 at	 Oxford	 University	 in	 1911,	 the	
constitutive	 “insufficiency	 of	 perception”.	 The	 crux	 of	 the	 problem	 for	 our	
investigation	lies	in	discerning	precisely	what	constitutes	Bergson’s	next	step	after	
recognizing	 his	 opposition	 against	 metaphysics/idealism.	 If	 the	 claim	 upon	 the	
“knowledge	of	the	Absolute”	appears	as	naïve	and	absurd,	it	is	because	we	confuse	
duration’s	 role	 within	 Bergson’s	 dialectic.	 After	 recognizing	 his	 confrontation	
against	 metaphysics,	 it	 would	 be	 a	 mistake	 to	 assume	 that	 he	 then	 walks	 away	
from	 the	 constitutive	problem	 that	 gave	birth	 to	 it,	 namely,	 from	 the	problem	of	
the	 contradiction	 between	 the	 Being	 of	 the	 Absolute	 and	 its	 Non-Being	 within	
sense	 perception.	 The	 concept	 of	 duration	 seemingly	 exhibits	 a	 naiveté	 vis-à-vis	
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their	 usual	 contradiction	 against	 the	 Absolute	 is	 sublated/relieved	 from	 the	
standpoint	of,	as	Hegel	would	say,	“the	Third”.331		
Our	 investigation	 into	 the	 concept	 of	 duration	 shall	 therefore	 be	 directed	
towards	uncovering	its	particular	operation	of	sublation	–	or	the	particular	way	in	
which	it	constitutes	the	thirdness	with	respect	to	the	Being	and	the	Non-Being	of	
the	 Absolute.	 Of	 course,	 metaphysics	 utilizes	 a	 certain	method	 to	 transcend	 the	
contradiction	 and	 Bergson’s	method	 of	 intuition	 as	 a	whole	 certainly	 contains	 a	
retrieval	 of	 this	 kind	 of	 sublation	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 coming	 into	 being	 of	 Time.	





as	 it	 is	 obtained	 as	 a	 result	 of	 a	 particular	 kind	 of	 mediation.	 The	 affirmative	
capacity	 of	 the	 concept	 of	 duration	 can	 be	 approached	 via	 conceding	 that	 the	
immediate	is	not	given	immediately	but	it	is	rather	obtained	through	a	special	type	of	
mediation.	Indeed,	it	seems	plausible	to	assume	that	one	can	grasp	duration	as	the	
other	 of	 time	 by	 simply	 pointing	 towards	 what	 is	 contradicted	 by	 conceptual	
knowledge.	 In	 other	 words,	 duration	 seemingly	 presents	 itself	 under	 the	 vulgar	












seemingly	 suggest	 that	 to	 get	 a	 hold	 of	 duration	 is	 easy	 and	 it	 can	 be	 done	
immediately.	 Quite	 the	 opposite	 is	 in	 fact	 the	 case.	 Bergson	 states	 that	 an	
apprehension	of	duration	requires	a	“strenuous	effort	of	reflection”	and	does	not	
give	 itself	 forth	 within	 a	 mere	 “instinct	 or	 feeling”.333	For	 us,	 this	 “effort”	 that	
Bergson	speaks	of	is	the	non-metaphysical	method	of	sublation.	As	we	will	show,	
duration	 is	 not	 something	 given	 within	 a	 natural,	 uncritical	 consciousness.	
Bergson’s	argument	implies	that	 ‘the	other	of	time	 is	time’,	or	that	 ‘the	outside	of	
intuition	 is	 intuited’.	 The	 necessity	 to	 think	 of	 duration	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 non-
metaphysical	method	of	sublation	for	us	means	that	the	copula	“is”	in	the	previous	










save	 duration	 from	 its	 seeming	 dialectical	 naiveté,	 we	 need	 to	 emphasize	 the	
necessary	involvement	of	mediation.	The	problem	is	to	understand	precisely	how	
this	mediation	works	in	relation	to	the	assertion	that	duration	is	the	knowledge	of	
the	Absolute.	 In	order	 to	clarify	 the	specificity	of	 this	operation	 to	help	us	direct	
our	attention	 towards	 its	precise	particularity,	we	need	 to	pose	a	question:	does	
the	involvement	of	mediation/sublation	indicate	that	duration	or	the	Absolute	Self	









one	 of	 the	 highest	 aims	 of	 Bergson’s	 philosophy.	 As	 he	 states	 in	 the	 second	





of	 Time	 as	 well	 as	 his	 attack	 on	 Metaphysics	 is	 simultaneously	 a	 confrontation	
against	determinism	and	a	fervent	defence	of	individual	freedom	for	self-creation.	
Yet	does	the	involvement	of	mediation	in	the	apprehension	of	duration	mean	that	









the	 Absolute	 Truth	 itself	 into	 an	 object	 of	 artistic	 creation.336	It	 seems	 that	 the	
“anti-metaphysical	 view”,	 or	 the	 overcoming	 of	 metaphysics	 is	 achieved	 via	
subordinating	 Truth	 under	 Art.	 Does	 our	 insistence	 upon	 the	 involvement	 of	
mediation	 imply	 that	 Bergson’s	 conception	 of	 duration	 ultimately	 amounts	 to	
recommending	 the	 same?	 Sartre’s	 existentialism,	 which	 professes	 that	 existence	
precedes	 essence,	 contains	 this	 Nietzschean	 call	 for	 individual	 creation.	 Many	
philosophers	 who	 come	 after	 him	 embrace	 this	 doctrine	 as	 a	 sign	 of	 political	
radicalism	 and	 some	 attempt	 to	 align	 Bergsonism	 with	 this	 kind	 of	 doctrine	 in	












or	 by	 rendering	 the	 Absolute	 into	 a	 product	 of	 creation?	 The	 answer	 to	 this	
question	depends	solely	upon	what	is	meant	by	mediation	in	the	special	sense	that	
we	 use	 the	 term	 and	 with	 what	 specific	 means	 it	 sublates	 the	 contradiction	
between	 the	 Being	 and	 the	 Non-Being	 of	 the	 Absolute.	 One	 thing	 is	 certain:	 if	
mediation	 can	 only	 be	 an	 act	 of	 creation	 and	 hence	 a	 contestation	 of	 Truth,	 the	
overcoming	 of	 metaphysics	 would	 rather	 make	 a	 circular	 return	 back	 to	
metaphysics.	As	Heidegger	notes,	this	kind	of	Nietzschean	reversal	of	metaphysics	
would	end	up	with	 a	 “completion”/“fulfillment”	 [Vollendung]	 of	metaphysics	 and	
would	 not	 in	 fact	 “twist	 free”	 from	 it.338	In	 other	 words,	 the	 subordination	 of	
Metaphysics	 under	 Art	 does	 not	 relieve	 us	 from	 the	 mystifying	 belief	 in	 the	
Absolute	or	 in	onto-theology	but	rather	re-inscribes	us	within	 it.	 If	mediation	can	
only	be	a	creation,	the	Absolute	would	be	merely	“our”	anthropomorphic	product	
of	 creation	 and	 hence	 it	would	 not	 be	 the	 Absolute	 but	 a	 contingent	 result	 of	 a	
finite	 determination.	 The	 Absolute	 would	 be	 an	 alteration	 performed	 upon	 the	
Uncreated	Absolute	 (“Nothing”);	between	 the	created	Absolute	and	 the	uncreated	
Absolute,	ontological	difference	returns	once	again	and	bring	us	right	back	to	the	
problem	 of	 contradiction.	 The	 overcoming	 of	metaphysics,	which	 strives	 to	 be	 a	
negation	 of	 the	 Absolute	 Truth,	 rather	 ends	 up	 affirming	 the	 latter	 as	 the	
unknowable	beyond	once	again.		
Although	 we	 argue	 for	 the	 necessary	 involvement	 of	 mediation	 in	 the	
apprehension	of	duration,	 the	kind	of	mediation	 that	we	 speak	of	differs	 in	kind	
from	creation.	It	is,	according	to	Bergson,	an	operation	of	“recovery”	[retrouver],	or	











premiére].340	It	 is	 therefore	 rather	 the	 opposite	 of	 creation,	 since	 it	 is	 not	 an	
outward	movement	that	differentiates	and	creates	what	is	other	than	itself.		What	
is	 obtained	 via	 the	 mediation	 is	 not	 something	 that	 comes	 into	 being.	 The	
mediation	 that	 we	 are	 speaking	 of	 here	 is	 rather	 an	 inward	 return	 from	 the	
movement	 of	 determination	 back	 into	 the	 undetermined	 source	of	 creation	 that	
endures	remaining	a	movement	in-itself.	It	is	therefore	not	a	mediation	in	the	sense	





only	 selected,	 strengthened	 and	 corrected	 reality…	 The	 tragic	 artist	 is	 no	
pessimist”. 342 	Although	 he	 stresses	 his	 opposition	 against	 the	 duality	 of	 the	
apparent	 and	 the	 real	world,	 he	 nonetheless	 remains	 a	 dualist	 since	 to	 create	 a	
better	 reality	 requires	 the	 Good	 that	 presides	 above	 and	 beyond	 the	 apparent	
world.	 Sartre,	 too,	 after	pronouncing	 that	modern	 thought	 is	 the	 “monism	of	 the	
phenomenon”,	 nonetheless	 begins	 Being	 and	 Nothingness	with	 the	 introduction	
that	 remarks:	 “[i]t	 seems	 rather	 that	 we	 have	 converted	 them	 all	 into	 a	 new	
dualism”.343	What	 we	 need	 is	 not	 to	 see	 Art/Creation	 as	 the	 antithesis	 of	 the	
metaphysical	 Truth,	 since	 metaphysics	 has	 always	 been	 such	 an	 activity.	 The	
opposition	 between	 Art	 and	 Metaphysics	 is	 only	 a	 pseudo-opposition.	 The	 real	
opposition	rather	resides	in	the	difference	between	the	product	and	the	condition	
of	production.	What	we	are	after	 in	 this	 investigation	 is	 the	means	 to	obtain	 the	
knowledge	of	the	latter	without	letting	it	be	a	mere	result	of	“our”	creation.	After	
all,	having	said	the	above,	transcendental	dualism	as	a	whole	is	not	at	all	opposed	
to	 creation.	On	 the	 contrary,	 self-creation	 is	 of	 supreme	 importance	 and	 it	 is	 the	
only	 avenue	 of	 hope	 we	 can	 have	 with	 respect	 to	 the	 future	 of	 our	 collective	
existence.		
We	 will	 come	 back	 to	 the	 importance	 of	 self-creation	 as	 the	 ultimate	




342	Nietzsche,	 The	 Anti-Christ,	 Ecce	 Homo,	 The	 Twilight	 of	 the	 Idols,	 and	 Other	 Writings,	
p.170.		
343 	Sartre,	 J.-P.,	 ([1943]	 2003).	 Being	 and	 Nothingness.	 Trans.	 H.E.	 Barnes.	 London:	
Rutledge.	p.3.	
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before	moving	 on	 to	 the	 concrete	 activity	 of	 creation,	 and	 in	 order	 to	 engage	 in	
such	an	activity,	there	is	a	prior	question	we	must	address:	from	what	source	shall	
our	creation	gather	its	motive	and	strength?	A	mere	imperative	for	creation	alone	
obviously	does	not	help	us.	Without	 knowing	 the	motivation,	which	 is	 the	raison	
d’être	of	any	reasonable	action,	there	would	be	no	difference	in	kind	between	our	
creation	 and	 unconscious	 biological	 functions,	 which,	 along	 with	 the	 socially	
induced	 moral	 obligations,	 mechanically	 reproduce	 us	 in	 response	 to	 the	
capricious	sway	of	Life	according	to	its	own	logic.	Bergson	says:		
	




depends	on	what	we	are;	but	 it	 is	necessary	 to	 add	also	 that	we	are,	 to	 a	






Nature	 and	we	 remain	 alienated	 from	 the	 act	 of	 creation.	 Being	 left	 to	 itself,	 Art	
belongs	to	the	region	of	Nature	and	hence	it	is	a	mere	confirmation	to	the	fatalistic	
necessity	 of	 the	 Law	 of	 Nature	 that	 exists	 outside	 ourselves.	 Creation	 indeed	
happens	 within	 the	 universe	 incessantly	 and	 does	 not	 require	 our	 conscious	
participation	for	it	to	go	on.	It	is	not	that	we	engage	in	a	self-conscious	activity	of	
creation	but	it	is	Life,	which	is	outside	of	ourselves,	that	produces	us	as	its	product.		
The	 privileging	 of	 Art	 over	 Truth	 only	 appears	 to	 be	 based	 upon	 a	
revelation	of	freedom,	yet	this	freedom	for	creation	would	signify	our	subjugation	
to	 Life’s	 creativity	 or	 abandonment	 within	 it	 unless	 we	 have	 the	 strength	 to	
become	 the	 cause	 of	 ourselves	 and	 give	 ourselves	 the	 purpose	 for	 our	 own	
creation.	The	difficulty	is	that	although	we	must	obtain	the	purpose,	which	must	be	
strictly	ours	so	that	we	can	turn	creation	into	genuinely	our	creation	based	upon	
freedom,	 this	 purpose	 cannot	 be	 derived	 from	 the	 certain	 interests	 of	 finite	
individual	consciousness.	The	latter,	which	is	attached	to	the	surface/social	ego,	is	




















It	 is	 clear	 that	 for	 Bergson	 genuine	 creation	 requires	 a	 prior	 mediation,	 which	
differs	in	kind	from	creation.	Or,	to	put	it	in	another	way,	a	genuine	creation	must	
be	made	up	of	 two	kinds	of	mediation	 at	 once:	 one	of	which	 is	 creation	 and	 the	
other	a	movement	of	recovery/unmaking.	If	the	former	is	left	to	itself	without	the	
latter,	it	can	only	ever	be	a	blind	and	mechanical	creation	and	its	sense	of	purpose	
can	 only	 be	 derived	 from	 something	 other	 than	 itself.	 If	 it	 is	 combined	with	 the	
insight	 brought	 forth	 by	 the	 latter,	 creation	 can	 turn	 into	 a	 reasonable	and	 Self-
Conscious	evolution	that	contains	within	itself	the	foundation	of	the	Absolute	Self-
Consciousness.	The	essence	of	Bergson’s	philosophy,	which	 is	concentrated	upon	
the	 putting	 forth	 of	 the	 concept	 of	 duration	 vis-à-vis	 the	 dominant	 tradition	 of	





How,	 then,	 does	 the	 non-metaphysical	 sublation	 work?	 Or,	 how	 can	 we	
“unmake”	ourselves	and	get	back	to	 the	Absolute	Self	 in-itself	beyond	the	above-
explained	 contradiction?	 If	 traditional	Western	metaphysics	 seeks	 to	 resolve	 the	
contradiction	via	the	affirmation	of	the	suprasensuous	idea	or	by	taking	the	route	
of	 seeking	 the	 self-sufficiency	 beyond	 the	 either-or	 within	 the	 sovereignty	 of	
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Thought,	 the	 concept	 of	 duration	 employs	 the	 means	 to	 transcend	 the	
contradiction	 by	 positing	 the	 “supra-intellectual	 intuition”.345	That	 is,	 it	 attains	
self-sufficiency	beyond	the	contradiction	by	raising-up	not	 the	 intellectual	side	of	
consciousness	but	 its	 sensuous	 side.	Thus,	 the	non-metaphysical	mediation	 is	 an	
operation	that	indicates,	as	Bergson	states	in	Creative	Evolution,	that:	“[s]ensuous	
intuition	 itself	 […]	 is	 promoted.”	 [L’intuition	 sensible	 va	 donc	 elle-même	 se	
relever].346	The	word	“relever”	here	is	of	tremendous	importance	as	it	can	be	seen	
as	 carrying	 a	 specifically	dialectical	 connotation	 that	 corresponds	 to	 the	German	
word	 Aufhebung/sublation,	 which,	 as	 Derrida	 explains,	 signifies	 both	 a	 kind	 of	
relieving	and	promoting	of	 an	original	 function	at	 the	 same	 time.347	In	 its	higher	
form,	the	sensuous	knowledge	that	ordinarily	enters	into	conflict	with	the	Being	of	
the	 Absolute	 loses	 its	 attachment	 to	 conceptual	 mediation	 and	 becomes	 united	
with	its	other	so	as	to	constitute	itself	into	the	knowledge	of	the	Absolute.	Duration	
therefore	 transcends	 contradiction	 through	 this	 relieving/promotion	 of	 the	
sensuous	 intuition	 but	 insofar	 as	 this	 method	 differs	 from	 the	 metaphysical-
idealist	method	of	sublation,	we	can	say	that	it	succeeds	in	escaping	from	the	trap	





explained	 above,	 it	 is	 said	 that	 the	 surface	 ego	 covers	 over	 duration	 due	 to	 the	
necessity	to	live	within	society.	In	Matter	and	Memory,	the	concept	of	surface	ego	is	
further	developed	 into	 the	 theory	of	memory,	which	a	priori	 intervenes	 into	our	
perception	 in	 view	 of	 “attention	 to	 Life”	 and	 turns	 the	 pure	 perception	 into	
something	only	 true	 “in	 theory”,	 “by	right”	 [en	droit].348	In	Creative	Evolution,	 the	
covering	 over	 of	 duration	 is	 explained	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 dominant	 genesis	 of	 the	
faculty	 of	 intelligence	within	 human	 beings	 and	 it	 is	 conceived	 as	 a	 faculty	 that	














we	 can	 easily	 find	 Bergson’s	 seeming	 endorsement	 of	 the	 position	 that	 we	 are	
irreversibly	cut	off	from	duration	and	abandoned	within	time	so	that	we	are	only	





duration	 is	 neither	 probable	 nor	 accidental	 but	 rather	 the	 pure	 transcendental	
givenness.	No	doubt,	 the	 apprehension	of	duration	 requires	 a	 specific	method	of	
mediation	unlike	any	other.	Yet,	this	mediation	does	not	take	place	through	a	rare	
object	 that	 is	 utterly	 unavailable	 to	 most	 of	 us	 like	 the	 philosopher’s	 stone.	
However	subtle	it	may	be,	it	is	an	operation	of	grasping	what	is	a	priori	given	to	all	
of	us	unconditionally.	In	this	sense,	the	non-metaphysical	method	of	sublation	is	an	
act	 of	 opening	 towards	 what	 is	 already	 there	 within	 each	 and	 every	 empirical	
experience.		
As	 we	 know,	 Bergson	 conceives	 of	 two	 kinds	 of	 purity	 in	 Matter	 and	
Memory:	 one	 is	 pure	memory	 and	 the	 other	 is	 pure	 perception.	Accordingly,	our	
empirical	 consciousness	 is	 said	 to	 be	 the	 mixture	 or	 synthesis	 of	 the	 two.	 This	
dualism	can	be	seen	as	Bergson’s	retrieval	as	well	as	his	going	beyond	Kantianism	
as	 the	word	 “pure”	 specifically	 refers	 to	 the	 notion	 of	 the	 transcendental	 in	 the	
Kantian	 sense.	 As	 Kant	 explains,	 all	 our	 empirical	 cognition	 springs	 from	 “two	
basic	 sources”	 that	 are	 a	 priori	 synthesized.350	In	 other	 words,	 any	 empirical	
experience	is	transcendentally	synthesized	into	a	composite,	or	as	Bergson	put	it,	it	
is	 the	 “fold”	 between	 intuition	 and	 concept.351	Now,	 for	 Kant,	 what	 is	 “pure”	 or	
“transcendental”	 is	 obtained	 via	 the	 “a	 priori	 cognition”	 that	 isolates	 what	 is	








composite	 existence	 of	 experience	 itself	 possible	 as	 its	 irreducible	 condition.352	
That	is,	since	any	empirical	experience	is	conceived	as	a	mixture	of	receptivity	and	
spontaneity,	Kant	reaches	towards	the	universal	by	disentangling	this	mixture	and	
capturing	only	what	 is	pure,	 i.e.,	those	 that	 “occur	absolutely	 independently	from	
all	experience”	so	that	“nothing	empirical	whatsoever	is	mixed	in	with	them”.353		
Overall,	 the	 non-metaphysical	 method	 of	 Bergsonian	 sublation	 does	 not	
deviate	from	the	basic	Kantian	premise	regarding	the	transcendental	structure	of	
empirical	 consciousness.	 For	 Bergson	 also,	 natural	 consciousness	 is	 a	 composite	
made	up	of	 spontaneous	memory	and	receptive	perception	and	 the	purity	of	 the	
transcendental	 givenness	 is	 obtained	 through	 disentangling	 this	 mixture	 and	
lifting	 one	 beyond	 the	 contradiction	 so	 as	 to	 sublate	 it	 in	 its	 purity.	 Duration	
therefore	is	not	at	all	an	“uncritical”	conception.	On	the	contrary,	it	is	posited	fully	
within	the	legacy	of	Kant’s	critical	philosophy.	Bergson	however	goes	beyond	Kant	








as	 its	 transcendental	 condition	 “absolutely	 independently	 from	 all	 experience”,	
how	 does	 this	 prevent	 pure	 sensuousness	 from	 being	 treated	 also	 as	 the	
irreducible	 component	 that	 makes	 up	 the	 necessary	 half	 of	 the	 transcendental?	
Any	 one-sided	 explication	 of	 conceptual	 spontaneity	 alone	 does	 not	 tell	 us	
anything	about	the	non-conceptual	character	of	intuitive	receptivity	without	which	
the	premise	regarding	the	composite	nature	of	empirical	experience	cannot	subsist	
at	 all.	 However,	 Kant’s	 overall	 project	 is	 concerned	with	 purifying	 the	 empirical	
consciousness	 from	 sensuous	 experience	 and	 with	 extracting	 the	 form	 of	









such	 a	 contestation	 through	 the	 theory	 of	 the	 transcendental	 schematism	 of	
imagination	 that	 explains	 the	 subsumption	 of	 time/receptivity	 under	 the	
categories,	since	this	responds	to	the	problem	of	the	disjunction	between	concepts	
and	 intuition. 356 	Yet,	 even	 after	 recognizing	 the	 validity	 of	 the	 theory	 of	
schematism,	 the	 gulf	 between	 spontaneity	 and	 receptivity	 remains	 intact	 and,	 in	
fact,	the	irreducibility	of	the	purely	receptive	side	of	the	composite	becomes	even	
more	 pronounced.	 After	 all,	 the	 doctrine	 of	 schematism	 is	 not	 at	 all	 intended	 to	
erase	 the	 heterogeneity	 between	 the	 thing-in-itself	 and	 intuition	 but	 rather	 to	
demonstrate	the	unity	and	the	self-consistency	(dynamic	or	otherwise)	of	the	finite	
human	intuition	in	its	enclosure	within	its	own	spontaneity	so	as	to	protect	what	





I	 cannot	 even	 assume	 God,	 freedom,	 and	 immortality,	 for	 the	 sake	 of	 the	
necessary	practical	use	of	my	 reason,	 if	 I	 do	not	 at	 the	 same	 time	deprive	
speculative	reason	of	its	pretensions	to	transcendent	insight.	[…]	I	therefore	
had	 to	 annul	knowledge	 [das	Wissen	aufheben]	 in	order	 to	make	 room	 for	
faith	[Glauben].358		
	
It	 is	 clear	 that	 for	 Kant,	 the	 critical	 reflection	 upon	 the	 finitude	 of	 human	
knowledge	 is	 at	 the	 same	 time	 what	 makes	 room	 for	 the	 sovereignty	 and	 the	
incorruptibility	 of	 the	 Good	 and	 what	 protects	 it	 from	 our	 pretentious	 and	






358	CPR	 Bxxx.	 In	 Faith	 and	 Knowledge,	 Hegel	 calls	 this	 “the	 religious	 point	 of	 view	 of	
Protestantism.”	However,	it	would	be	mistaken	to	assume	that	Hegel	then	does	away	with	
Faith	 [Glauben]	 by	 cancelling	 it	 with	 a	 dispassionate	 knowledge	 [Wissen]	 that	 is	 simply	
against	 faith.	 What	 Hegel	 aims	 to	 achieve	 overall	 is	 precisely	 the	 sublation	 of	 the	
contradiction	between	faith	and	knowledge,	and	this	was	also	what	Kant	intended	to	do	as	
we	 can	 see	 from	 the	 above	 passage	 in	 the	 first	 critique.	 After	 all,	 Hegel	 says	 in	 the	
Encyclopaedia	 Logic	 that	 “everything	 rational	 can	 equally	 be	 called	 “mystical”	 […]	 the	
mystical	 is	 the	 concrete	 unity	 of	 just	 those	 determinations	 that	 count	 as	 true	 for	 the	
understanding	only	 in	 their	 separation	and	opposition.”	See	Hegel,	Faith	and	Knowledge,	
p.57,	Encyclopaedia	Logic,	§	82.	
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and	knowledge	 and	maintains	 both	 the	 speculative	 and	 the	practical	 domains	 in	
their	own	respective	territories.	It	is	therefore	not	at	all	out	of	his	desire	to	cancel	
out	 the	 transcendental	 duality	 of	 consciousness	 that	 Kant	 issues	 the	 prohibition	
against	pursuing	the	purity	of	receptivity.	On	the	contrary,	he	does	so	precisely	in	
order	 to	 preserve	 the	 duality	 so	 that	 the	 otherness	 of	 the	 other	 of	 time	 can	 be	
maintained	as	the	Other.	The	problem	that	remains	 is	 the	following:	after	raising	
the	Other	so	high	beyond	ourselves	to	the	extent	that	 it	 is	no	 longer	visible	 from	
where	we	are,	what	saves	 it	 from	being	denied,	 forgotten,	and	abandoned	as	 the	
“useless	 and	 superfluous”	 idea	 as	 Nietzsche	 says?	 The	 profound	 lesson	 that	 the	
doctrine	of	schematism,	 in	particular,	and	Kantianism,	 in	general,	 teaches	us,	and	
to	 which	 Bergson	 remains	 a	 faithful	 observer,	 is	 that	 our	 finite	 consciousness	
dwells	 one-sidedly	within	 time	 and	 time	 is	 the	 field	 of	 forgetfulness	 of	 the	 pure	
givenness	of	the	given.	In	time,	we	can	only	envisage	ourselves	within	the	field	of	
consciousness	 where	 the	 purely	 given	 is	 a	 priori	 subordinated	 under	 our	
spontaneity	 and	 this	 transcendental	 structure	 guarantees	 the	 synthetic	 identity	
between	what	is	purely	given	 and	what	is	given	 to	us	so	as	 to	 relegate	 the	 former	








Absolute	 Self?	 If	 the	 purification	 of	 the	 intellectual	 side	 of	 empirical	 composite	
gives	 us	 the	 self-consciousness	 of	 the	 enclosed/individual	 selfhood,	 the	
purification	of	the	sensuous	side	 illuminates	what	 lies	outside	of	this	enclosure	–	
the	 realm	 of	 the	 “Open”	 –	 which	 is	 not	 alien	 but	 rather	 complementary	 to	 the	
enclosure.359	The	irony	here	is	that	 if	 it	 is	not	coupled	with	a	definite	 insight	 into	
the	reality	of	the	Other,	Kant’s	reverence	towards	it	is	also	that	which	contributes	
to	 its	downfall	 into	 the	status	of	 “indifferentism”	or	nihilist	 skepticism	due	 to	 its	





beyond	 our	 knowledge,	 what	 convinces	 us	 that	 it	 shall	 therefore	 be	 respected	
except	for	the	culturally	conditioned	moral	obligation	that	turns	us	into	“a	machine	
for	 the	making	of	gods”	as	Bergson	says?361	To	point	out	 the	 “groundlessness”	of	
our	existence	has	become	fashionable	in	invoking	an	image	of	anti-conservatism	so	
praised	within	the	leftist	circles	worldwide.	But	if	it	is	only	used	in	a	negative	sense	
(as	 in	 the	 lack	 of	 ground),	 groundlessness	 is	 in	 fact	 catastrophic	 for	 any	 serious	
concern	for	building	a	foundation	for	the	genuine	well-being	of	collective	existence.	
We	must	be	equipped	with	a	means	of	showing	the	genuine	capacity	for	a	concrete	








the	 means	 to	 affirm	 the	 outside	 of	 our	 finite	 consciousness	 not	 in	 terms	 of	 a	
probable	or	a	virtual	existence	but	as	 the	 transcendental,	necessary	reality.	 In	so	
doing,	we	must	also	protect	ourselves	from	making	the	obvious	mistake	of	falling	
back	 into	 pre-Kantian	 dogmatism.	 That	 is,	 the	 demand	 for	 the	 acquisition	 of	 the	
actual	knowledge	of	 the	outside	as	 the	necessary,	 transcendental	reality	 is	not	at	
all	a	call	to	dismiss	Kant’s	warning	against	the	pretension	of	transcendence.	On	the	
contrary,	it	allows	us	to	affirm	the	reality	of	the	Outside	in	its	own	particularity	so	
that	 we	 can	 let	 it	 present	 itself	 in	 a	 way	 that	 differs	 from	 what	 spontaneous	
consciousness	would	make	of	it.	More	specifically,	we	need	to	maintain	our	guard	
against	 confusing	 the	 knowledge	 of	 the	 Absolute	 Self	 with	 an	 object	 of	
conceptual/spontaneous	knowledge,	which	belongs	to	the	surface/social	ego	and	is	
hence	already	a	product	of	 the	 socio-political	 “adaptation”.362	As	we	explained	 in	
Part	I,	the	surface/social	ego	functions	in	view	of	the	attention	to	Life.	This	means	
that	the	type	of	knowledge	that	belongs	to	finite	consciousness	or	what	is	treated	







The	 actual	 reality	 of	 the	 outside	 is	 not	 revealed	 to	 us	 as	 long	 as	we	 one-
sidedly	 place	 ourselves	 within	 the	 field	 of	 spontaneous	 consciousness.	 The	
affirmativeness	of	 the	outside	must	be	 sought	 in	 the	 region	of	 reality	 that	 is	 not	
affirmative	 to	 “us”	 but	 is	 in-itself	 and	 the	 latter	 must	 be	 established	 within	 a	
radically	different	kind	of	knowledge.	According	to	Bergson,	what	we	must	acquire	
is	 the	 “pure	 knowledge”	 [la	 connaissance	 pure]	 that	 differs	 in	 kind	 from	 the	
“customary	or	useful	knowledge”	of	 the	surface	ego.364	The	ultimate	question	we	
must	 ask	 is,	what,	 in	 concrete	 terms,	 is	 required	of	 us	 to	 get	 a	 hold	 of	 this	 pure	
knowledge?	 We	 already	 pointed	 out	 above	 that	 duration	 is	 to	 be	 seen	 as	 pure	
transcendental	 sensuousness	 and	 hence	 it	 is	 something	 that	 abides	 by	 the	 basic	




The	 problem	 is	 that	 the	 very	 definition	 of	 the	 concept	 remains	 locked	
within	sensuous	knowledge	although	it	is	independent	of	all	experience	and	this	in	
fact	 means	 that	 duration	 can	 be	 said	 to	 exist	 only	 for	 those	 who	 experience	 it	 in	
actual	 reality.	 Here,	 we	 must	 accept	 a	 seemingly	 aporetic	 proposition:	 although	
duration	 is	 transcendental/pure	 and	 hence	 independent	 of	 all	 experience,	 it	 is	
nonetheless	 something	 that	must	 be	 experienced	 in	 its	 actual	 reality	 for	 it	 to	 be	
disclosed	as	real.	That	is,	although	Kant’s	premise	regarding	the	composite	nature	
of	 empirical	 consciousness	 would	 suffice	 for	 us	 to	 speculate	 upon	 the	
transcendental	 availability	 of	 duration,	 a	 “theoretical	 knowledge”	 of	 this	 kind	
would	 be	 a	 mere	 equivalent	 to	 establishing	 duration	 as	 the	 idea	 of	 reason	 and	
would	not	 at	 all	 fulfil	 its	basic	definition	of	being	 sensuous	knowledge.	To	put	 it	
simply,	although	 it	 is	 independent	of	all	experience	and	this	means	that	duration	
must	 differ	 from	 what	 is	 given	 within	 empirical	 consciousness,	 it	 still	 does	 not	
come	to	us	if	we	rely	upon	theoretical	thinking.		
How,	 then,	 can	we	 acquire	 pure	 knowledge?	 One	 cannot	 conceive	 of	 any	
other	ways	of	apprehending	duration	other	than	through	pure	sensuousness.	That	
which	 is	 independent	of	all	experience	 is	 independent	of	all	empirical	experience	
and	 the	 latter	 is	 the	 mixture	 of	 receptivity	 and	 spontaneity.	 In	 the	 case	 of	




possession	 of	 the	 transcendental.	 For	 this,	 one	 must	 merely	 reflect	 upon	 the	
empirical	composite	in	thought	and	extract	what	is	thought	in	it	through	the	means	





the	non-metaphysical	mediation	makes	 a	movement	 of	 the	 opposite	 kind.	As	we	
stated	 above,	 it	 is	 a	 movement	 of	 “unmaking”	 or	 “renouncing”.	 It	 is	 not	 a	
purification	 of	 thinking	 from	 sensuousness	 but	 a	 renouncing	 of	 thinking	 within	
empirical	 cognition	 so	 that	 sensuousness	 can	 be	 independent	 from	 empirical	
spontaneity.	 It	 is	 a	 knowing	 insofar	 as	 the	 faculty	 of	 sensing/perception	 returns	
into	 itself	 and	 knows	 itself	 as	 sensuousness	 (pure	 sensuousness).	 We	 may	
therefore	 call	 this	 movement	 a	 sensing	 of	 sensing,	 or	 sensuousness	 raised	 or	
sublated	to	the	level	of	self-consciousness.			
Although	 the	apprehension	of	duration	requires	our	active	engagement	 in	
the	mediation	 since	 it	 is	 something	 that	must	be	obtained	as	 a	 result	 of	our	own	
action,	it	 is	crucial	to	point	out	that	this	action	is	not	a	going-after	in	the	sense	of	
grasping	or	turning	an	object	into	a	thing	that	abides	by	our	form	of	spontaneity.	
Rather,	it	 is	an	act	of	receiving.	The	 faculty	of	 receptivity	 is	a	 faculty	of	 receiving	
something	 as	 given.	 What	 is	 received	 is	 not	 something	 that	 stems	 from	 our	
spontaneity	but	it	is	given	as	a	Gift	from	elsewhere.	The	act	of	receiving	a	gift	differs	
from	an	act	of	taking	something	as	mine	and	it	must	be	an	act	of	opening	towards	
the	 pure	 givenness	 of	 what	 is	 given.	 If	 conceptual	 knowledge	 is	 an	 action	
conditioned	by	desire	or	eros	that	 is	 turned	 towards	a	 fulfilment	of	an	 individual	
interest	or	pleasure	(the	attention	to	Life),	the	pure	knowledge	achieved	via	non-
metaphysical	mediation	corresponds	to	an	opening	up	towards	the	state	of	Love	or	
agape	 that	 attains	 Joy	 rather	 than	 pleasure.365 	As	 Bergson	 states	 in	 The	 Two	
Sources	of	Morality	and	Religion:	“the	soul	that	 is	opening,	and	before	whose	eyes	










lack	of	what	 it	desires.	Time	then	appears	to	us	as	 the	terrible	vicious	circle	 that	
confines	our	existence	within	 it,	 a	kind	of	 round	wheel	where	we	must	 run	after	
ourselves	only	to	realize	that	it	is	endless	and	without	meaning	or	destination.		
On	the	contrary,	love	is	not	conditioned	by	an	object	that	lies	outside	itself;	
it	 is	 that	 which	 disrupts	 the	 vicious	 circle	 since	 love	 is	 realized	 when	 the	
separation	between	the	object	of	desire	(i.e.,	the	Absolute	Self)	and	the	subject	that	
desires	 it	 is	overcome	and	coincides	 in	a	Unity.	As	Bergson	says,	“gone	[…]	 is	 the	
distance	between	the	thought	and	the	object	of	 the	thought.	 […]	Gone	the	radical	
separation	 between	 him	 who	 loves	 and	 him	 who	 is	 loved.”367	One	 cannot	 love	
oneself	 if	 one	 desires	 oneself	 as	 an	 object	 that	 is	 lacking	 from	 oneself	 since	 the	
distance	between	the	object	of	thought	and	the	thought	itself	cannot	be	overcome	
by	 or	 within	 thought.	 In	 front	 of	 the	 gulf	 between	 itself	 and	 its	 object,	 what	
thinking	 can	 achieve	 as	 its	 highest	 goal	 is	 to	 become	 conscious	 of	 its	 alienation	
from	the	Absolute	Self,	that	is,	its	finitude,	or	of	the	infinite	distance	to	the	Absolute	
Self	that	forever	lies	ahead	of	it.		
If	 it	 succeeds	 in	 purifying	 itself	 from	 the	 influence	 of	 spontaneity,	 sense	
perception	 can	 actually	 experience	 and	 know	 itself	 as	 the	 Absolute	 Self.	 That	 is,	
sense	perception	can	overcome	the	infinite	distance	between	the	Subject	and	the	
Object	and	enter	into	the	state	of	Absolute	Unity	with	itself	and	receive	the	given	as	
pure	givenness.	Bergson	states	 in	Introduction	to	Metaphysics:	 “[w]e	call	 intuition	
here	 the	 sympathy	by	which	 one	 is	 transported	 into	 the	 interior	 of	 an	 object	 in	
order	 to	 coincide	 with	 what	 there	 is	 unique	 and	 consequently	 inexpressible	 in	
it.”368	Unlike	the	faculty	of	spontaneity,	the	faculty	of	receptivity	has	therefore	the	
capacity	 to	 “sympathize”	 with	 its	 object	 or	 become	 one	 with	 it	 without	
																																																								
366	TS	 58/1024.	 Schopenhauer	makes	 a	 precise	 distinction	 between	 eros	and	agape	and	
argues	 that	whereas	 the	 former	 is	 “selfishness”	 [Selbstsucht],	 the	 latter	 is	 “compassion”	
[Mitleid]	 or	 caritas	 and	 deserves	 to	 be	 called	 “pure	 Love”	 [reine	 Liebe].	 Bergson’s	 own	
distinction	between	pleasure	 and	 joy	profoundly	 echoes	 Schopenhauer’s	 distinction	 and	
what	 Bergson	 calls	 joy	 precisely	 corresponds	 to	 what	 he	 conceives	 of	 “Love”	 [amour],	








apprehension	of	duration	 is	 the	 consciousness	or	 the	knowledge	of	 the	Absolute	
Self	but	this	is	not	a	knowing	in	the	sense	of	grasping	what	is	known	as	“mine”.	The	




of	 duration	 resides	 within	 this	 act	 of	 sympathizing	 with	 oneself	 or	 Self-Love.	
Strictly	speaking,	this	love	or	affirmation	of	the	Absolute	Self	is	not	something	that	
belongs	 to	 the	 realm	of	human	experience.	Bergson	states	 in	Matter	and	Memory	
that	 we	 must	 “seek	 experience	 at	 its	 source,	 or	 rather	 above	 the	 decisive	 turn	
where	[…]	it	becomes	properly	human	experience.”369	The	pure	knowledge	or	the	
actual	 apprehension	 of	 duration	 thus	 corresponds	 to	 the	 realm	 of	 reality	 that	 is	
traditionally	understood	 in	 terms	of	what	 is	seen	through	the	divine	revelation	of	
the	eternity	of	the	Soul/Spirit.370		
At	 this	 point,	 it	 becomes	 clear	 how	 seriously	 one	 needs	 to	 take	 the	
etymology	 of	 the	 term	 “duration”.	 The	 word	 “duration”/la	 durée	 is	 the	 past	





time	 in	 the	manner	of	 indefinite	prolongation.	On	 the	contrary,	 the	endurance	of	
duration	 cannot	 be	 seen	 as	 that	 which	 has	 a	 beginning	 or	 an	 end	 and	 as	 being	
either	 short-lived	 or	 long-lived.	 Duration	 does	 not	 take	 the	 form	 of	 quantitative	
measure.	The	endurance	of	duration	knows	neither	births	nor	deaths;	it	is	eternal.		
Of	 course,	 this	 mystical	 undertone	 has	 been	 the	 constant	 source	 of	
condemnation	 from	 the	 viewpoint	 of	 Marxist	 materialist	 criticism.	 After	 all,	




eternity	 of	 the	 Soul	 must	 be	 posited	 and	 solved	 in	 terms	 of	 experience.	 See	 TS	 262-
265/1198-1201.		
	 202	










mysticism	 of	 the	 Eternal	 Spirit	 [nous],	 which	 subsequently	 influenced	 the	
formation	 of	 the	 philosophical	 doctrine	 of	 Christianity.	 However,	 Bergson’s	
philosophy	is	that	which	makes	the	mystical,	i.e.,	the	divine	secret,	available	to	all	of	
us.	It	 is	not	a	mysticism	in	the	sense	of	holding	on	to	a	secret	as	a	secret	so	as	to	
make	 it	 into	 something	 that	 resides	 outside	 of	 knowledge	 that	 demands	 faith	
beyond	doubt.	On	the	contrary,	Bergson	demystifies	the	divine	secret	by	 letting	 it	
be	 presented	 to	 our	 faculty	 of	 knowledge.	 It	 is	 not	 mysticism	 if	 the	 mystery	 is	
revealed.	 The	 opposition	 between	 historical	 materialism	 and	 mysticism	 only	
obtains	as	long	as	the	divine	secret	is	to	be	affirmed	in	terms	of	the	Idea	of	Reason	
as	 the	 object	 of	 mere	 belief.	 Our	 argument,	 on	 the	 contrary,	 has	 been	 that	 the	
transcendental	dualism	of	Bergson	rather	posits	the	Divine/Beyond	within	the	real	
sensuous	 experience	 and,	 hence,	 does	 not	 contradict	 this	materialist	 criticism	of	
the	 “flight”	 into	 the	 Other	 world.373 	In	 fact,	 we	 might	 as	 well	 claim	 that	 if	
																																																								
371	Pierre	 Hadot	 states	 in	 his	 Plotinus	 or	 the	 Simplicity	 of	 Vision:	 “was	 it	 not	 from	 his	
mediations	 on	 the	 philosophy	 of	 Plotinus	 that	 Bergson	 derived	 his	 conception	 of	 the	
Immediate,	his	critique	of	 finalism,	and	his	sense	of	 “organic	 totality?”	Hadot,	P.,	 ([1989]	




373	In	 this	 sense,	 although	Bergson	himself	does	not	 fully	 realize	 this	 extreme	proximity,	
the	Bergsonian	conception	of	 the	Absolute	 is	close	 to	Eastern	wisdom	traditions	such	as	
Hinduism	 and	 Buddhism	 that	 prioritize	 the	 direct	 knowledge	 of	 the	 divine	 through	




utilized	 technique	also	within	Buddhist	meditation	practices	as	 it	 appears	 in	 the	 famous	
Satipaṭṭhāna	 Sutra	of	 the	 Pali	 canon.	 Of	 course,	 by	 referring	 to	 the	 proximity	 between	
Bergson	 and	 the	 Eastern	 spiritual	 practices,	 we	 are	 not	 saying	 that	 such	 experiential	
knowledge	 does	 not	 exist	 within	 the	 history	 of	 Western	 spirituality.	 The	 above	 cited	
revelatory	experience	of	Plotinus	as	well	as	the	famous	“conversion”	of	Paul	rather	testify	
to	 its	 universal	 validity.	 Inasmuch	 as	 the	 “Eastern”	 experience	 exists	 in	 the	 West,	 the	
dogmatization	of	the	experience	in	the	East	has	undoubtedly	also	been	true.		
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materialist	 criticism	 one-sidedly	 remains	 within	 the	 criticism	 of	 all	 truths	 as	
ideological	 construction	 and	 fails	 to	 articulate	 its	 own	 affirmative	 foundation,	 it	
ends	up	being	the	true	mysticism	of	our	era.	While	criticizing	all	truths	as	fictitious,	
it	ends	up	maintaining	the	unavailability	or	secrecy	of	what	is	true.		
	 To	 disclose	 the	 Divine/Beyond	 as	 that	 which	 is	 available	 for	 sensuous	
perception	therefore	means	that	we	do	not	have	to	surrender	to	opinions	in	order	
to	 construct	 an	 ethical	 community.	We	 just	have	 to	observe	what	 is	deep	within	
inside	all	of	us	and	know	that	the	Absolute	Self	affirms	itself	within	us,	or	that	we	
can	 intuit	 ourselves	 as	 the	 Absolute	 Self	 without	 relying	 upon	 any	 dogma.	 The	
meaning	 of	 the	 affirmation	 that	 we	 ascribe	 to	 duration	 is	 none	 other	 than	 the	
capacity	 to	 affirm	what	 is	 divine/eternal	within	 us	 or	 it	 is	 the	 capacity	 to	 intuit	













describes	 duration	 as	 something	 only	 true	 in	 theory	 and	 why	 only	 privileged	
individuals	 are	 said	 to	have	 accomplished	 the	 actual	 knowing	of	duration.	To	be	
sure,	the	difficulty	of	actually	perceiving	duration	comes	directly	from	the	fact	that	
our	 spontaneous	 consciousness	 is	 directed	 towards	 the	 attention	 to	 Life.	 Even	
though	 it	 is	Life	 that	 conditions	us	 and	we	are	made	of	Life,	due	 to	 the	 constant	
attention	and	the	labour	that	Life	demands	from	us,	it	becomes	extremely	difficult	







contact	 with	 other	 men	 who	 we	 resemble,	 and	 united	 to	 them	 by	 a	
discipline	 which	 creates	 between	 them	 and	 us	 a	 relation	 of	
interdependence.	 Has	 the	 self	 no	 other	 means	 of	 clinging	 [attacher]	 to	
something	 solid	 than	 by	 taking	 up	 its	 position	 in	 that	 part	 of	 us	which	 is	
socialized?374		
	
Here,	 the	 attention	 to	 Life	 shows	 itself	 in	 terms	 of	 its	 other	 face,	 namely,	 one’s	
“clinging”	or	 ”attachment”	 to	 individual	 lives.	It	 is	 as	 if	Life	 forgets	 itself	 through	
the	 labour	of	having	 to	move	up	 towards	 the	 surface	 from	 the	depth	and	as	 if	 it	
comes	to	see	itself	only	as	one	among	many	lives.	Life	loses	its	pure	originality	and	
begins	 to	 see	 itself	 as	 a	member	 of	 a	 group,	 a	 numeric	 entity	 that	 defines	 itself	




that	 stands	 against	 what	 lies	 outside	 it	 as	 its	 Other.	 In	 short,	 life	 comes	 to	 be	
defined	against	what	negates	it	from	without,	namely,	Death.	This	means	that	along	
with	 our	 original	 will	 or	 the	 attention	 to	 life	 that	 preserves	 the	 lives	 of	 the	





It	 is	 this	 latter	 aspect	 that	 accounts	 for	 the	 difficulty	 of	 apprehending	
duration.	 The	 difficulty	 is	 ultimately	 caused	 by	 our	 inability	 to	 overcome	 our	




Weisheit]. 375 	We	 are	 afraid	 of	 death	 because	 it	 appears	 to	 us	 as	 the	 dark	





375	Hegel,	 G.	 W.	 F.,	 ([1807]	 1977).	 Phenomenology	 of	 Spirit.	 Trans.	 A.	 V.	 Miller.	 Oxford:	
Oxford	Univ.	Press.	§§	194–195.	
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Kant	 is	 fully	 aware	of	 the	 centrality	of	 the	 fear	of	death.	 In	The	End	of	All	
Things,	he	states:		
	
It	 is	a	common	expression	[…]	 to	speak	of	a	person	who	 is	dying	as	going	
out	of	time	into	eternity.	This	expression	would	in	fact	say	nothing	if	eternity	
is	 understood	 here	 to	 mean	 a	 time	 proceeding	 to	 infinity;	 for	 then	 the	
person	would	 indeed	 never	 gets	 outside	 time	 but	would	 always	 progress	
only	from	one	time	into	another.	Thus	what	must	be	meant	is	an	end	of	all	
time	 along	 with	 the	 person’s	 uninterrupted	 duration;	 but	 this	 duration	
(considering	 its	 existence	 as	 a	 magnitude)	 as	 a	 magnitude	 (duratio	
Noumenon)	wholy	 incompatible	with	time,	of	which	we	are	obviously	able	
to	 form	 no	 concept	 (except	 a	 merely	 negative	 one).	 This	 thought	 has	
something	horrifying	about	it	because	it	leads	us	as	it	were	to	the	edge	of	an	
abyss	[…]	Now	when	we	pursue	the	transition	from	time	into	eternity	[…],	
as	 reason	does	 in	 a	moral	 regard,	 then	we	 come	up	 against	 the	end	of	all	





time”	 and	 hence	 invoking	 an	 image	 of	 eternity	 that	 is	 of	 an	 “uninterrupted	
duration”.	 Here,	 Kant	 comes	 extremely	 close	 to	 opening	 up	 towards	 pure	
sensuousness	of	eternal	duration.	Yet	he	quickly	retracts	by	saying	that	such	time	
is	something	that	“we	are	obviously	able	to	form	no	concept	[of]	(except	a	merely	
negative	 one)”.	 That	 is,	 although	 Kant	 shows	 an	 awareness	 of	 the	 possibility	 of	
envisaging	the	other	of	time	as	time,	since	he	does	not	grant	himself	any	means	of	
apprehending	 something	 other	 than	 through	 conceptual	 knowledge,	 Eternity	 is	

















reverse	 is	 in	 fact	 the	 case.	 “My”	 life	 is	 the	 illusion	produced	by	Life	 and	 it	 is	 the	
conception	of	 “my”	 life	 that	 is	 really	 the	 appearance/the	 idea	 of	 reason.	What	 is	
real	and	concrete	is	the	Eternity	of	Life.	Death	is	therefore	not	the	negative	Other	
that	limits	Life.	Our	argument	therefore	is	that	the	seeming	contradiction	between	
Life	and	Death	 is	merely	a	pseudo-contradiction.	Life	has	no	opposite.	Life	 in	 fact	
has	nothing	outside	itself	and	simply	is.	We	need	to	stop	understanding	life	as	this	
or	 that	particular	 lives.	Life	does	not	refer	 to	“my”	 life,	human	life,	animal	life,	or	
any	organic	life	that	is	negatively	determined	with	respect	to	that	which	is	not	life.	
Life	 is	 the	 current	 that	 carries	 absolutely	 everything	 that	 existed,	 exists	 and	will	
exist.		
However	paradoxical	 it	may	sound,	 the	Eternity	of	 the	Soul	does	not	exist	
apart	from	our	finite,	individual	selves,	and	we	do	not	have	to	look	for	it	other	than	
within	our	sensuous	reality	here	and	now,	in	the	present.	However,	to	enter	into	the	





as	 the	 future	within	 itself	 out	 of	 its	 self-differentiation,	 the	 Eternal	 Present	 thus	
appears	 to	 be	 the	 dimension	 of	 the	 Other	 from	which	 the	 self	 is	 alienated	 even	
though	it	is	in	the	service	of	the	Present	that	the	Past	engages	in	its	perpetual	strife	
(attention	to	Life).	If	the	Past	perpetually	extends	itself	into	the	present	and	onto	
the	 future,	and	 if	our	derivative	consciousness	 is	shut	up	within	this	circle	of	 the	
Past,	 this	 is	 the	 equivalent	 to	 saying	 that	 there	 is	 no	 future	 since	 the	 future	will	
eternally	 be	 the	 product	 of	 the	 Past.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 if	 one	 succeeds	 in	
apprehending	 the	Other	of	 the	Past	 in	 the	Present,	 this	 is	 equivalent	 to	 grasping	
the	dimension	of	 the	Future	 in	 the	Present	 since	 the	Future	 is	what	differs	 from	
and	 hence	what	 brings	 alterity	 to	 the	 repetition	 of	 the	 Past.	We	 thus	 argue	 that	
through	the	apprehension	of	duration,	the	Future	needs	to	be	understood	as	that	
which	endures	as	it	is	and	it	becomes	disentangled	from	the	circle	of	the	Past.		






have	 stressed	 above	 that	 the	 method	 of	 apprehending	 duration	 is	 the	 supra-
intellectual,	pure	sensuous	intuition.	This	means	that	duration	does	not	exist	as	the	
object	 of	 spontaneous	 thought	 but	 it	 must	 be	 intuited	 in	 and	 through	 the	 Body	
which	can	only	exist	in	the	present	as	a	perpetual	becoming.	The	present	which	is	
apprehended	 through	 the	 body	 is	 the	 perpetual	 becoming	 and	 it	 is	 through	 the	
body	that	we	come	to	know	the	illusion	of	the	individuality	of	“my”	life.	The	idea	of	
“my”	body	 is	 a	misnomer	 since	 “my”	body	 is	 in	 a	perpetual	becoming	and,	 in	 its	
becoming,	it	never	ceases	to	be	in	relationships	with	what	is	not	my	body.	In	short,	
we	 may	 say	 that	 it	 is	 not	 even	 that	 I	 have	 my	 body	 and	 then	 it	 enters	 into	
relationship	with	the	world.	My	body	and	the	world	do	not	exist	apart	from	each	
other.		
The	 body	 brings	 us	 back	 to	 our	 argument	 about	 pure	 sensuousness.	 The	
body	 allows	 us	 to	 see	 our	 existence	 other	 than	 through	 “my”	body	 in	 space	 and	
time.	 The	 latter	 is	 an	 appearance	 of	 the	 body	 in	 terms	 of	 an	 individual	 body	
grounded	 in	 time,	 or	 it	 is	 an	 externalization	 of	 the	 body	 from	 its	 sensuous	
corporeality.	 Our	 individual	 bodies	 are	 therefore	 not	 the	 body	 seen	 in	 its	 self-
consciousness.	As	finite	consciousness,	“we”	are	conscious	of	our	bodies	but	those	
bodies	that	we	are	conscious	of	as	ours	are	the	results	of	our	spontaneity.	In	order	
to	 apprehend	 duration	 and	 be	 in	 the	 present,	which	 brings	 about	 alterity	 to	 the	
circle	 of	 the	 past,	we	must	 invert	 this	 ordinary,	 idealistic	 view.	 Neither	 the	 true	
meaning	of	becoming	nor	the	body	reveals	itself	to	us	as	long	as	we	see	it	in	terms	
of	a	series	of	individual	entities	residing	within	time	–	becoming	cannot	be	seen	as	
the	becomings	of	x,	y,	z	 individual	bodies.	 	The	becoming	of	 the	body	 is	not	what	
appears	under	our	gaze.	It	must	be	felt	from	within	since	it	is	precisely	that	which	






and	the	Becoming	of	 this	One	Body	 is	absolutely	singular	and	 is	only	 identical	 to	




Oneness	 of	 the	 body	 cannot	 be	 understood	 either	 as	 Being	 or	 as	 Non-Being.	
Oneness	 or	 singularity	 obtained	 through	 pure	 sensuousness	 is	 that	 which	
transcends	 such	 a	 conceptual	 constraint.	 It	 is	what	 is	 called	within	Buddhism	as	
Emptiness	 [Śūnyatā],	 which	 is	 neither	 Being	 nor	 Non-Being	 but	 precisely	 that	
which	 makes	 the	 actual	 differentiations	 of	 bodies	 themselves	 possible	 since	 it	
resides	 at	 the	 root	 of	 all	 that	 exists.379	From	 this	 perspective,	 the	Eternity	 of	 the	
Soul	needs	 to	be	understood	 in	 terms	of	 this	singular	existence	of	 the	Body.	 It	 is	


























379	There	 is	 a	 strong	 tendency	 in	 confusing	 the	 non-Western	 conception	 of	 the	 Śūnyatā	
[void,	 emptiness]	 (the	 view	 expressed	 by	 the	 Buddhist	 Prajñāpāramitā	 Sutra	 most	
famously)	 with	 Nothing	 in	 the	 wake	 of	 the	 first	 dissemination	 of	 “Oriental”	 philosophy	
within	 Europe	 in	 the	 18th	 and	 the	 19th	 centuries.	 In	 Science	 of	 Logic	 as	 well	 as	 in	 the	
Encyclopaedia	Logic,	Hegel	mentions	Buddhism	in	the	doctrines	of	Being	and	equates	the	
concept	of	Śūnyatā	with	the	abstract	conception	of	Nothing,	which	is	opposed	to	Being	and	
hence	 as	 a	 “simple	 and	 one-sided	 abstraction”	 still	 caught	 in	 dialectical	 contradiction.	
Despite	of	his	familiarity	with	Schopenhauer’s	thought,	Nietzsche’s	treatment	of	Buddhism	
in	The	Will	to	Power	does	not	seem	to	go	beyond	this	Hegelian	misreading.	There	is	a	great	
deal	 of	 potential	 for	 Bergson’s	 conception	 of	 duration	 to	 intervene	 into	 this	 traditional	

















the	 philosophy	 of	 Bergson.	 In	 lieu	 of	 conclusion,	we	 shall	 end	 our	 exposition	 by	
inquiring	 into	 the	 consequence	 of	 having	 this	 duality.	 As	 we	 stated	 in	 the	
introduction,	dialectical	 logic	refers	 to	 the	beginning,	the	principle	that	politics	or	
any	practical	action	must	rely	on	as	its	condition	of	possibility.	The	question	now	
is:	what	 exactly	 have	we	 gained	 from	 turning	 towards	 Bergson’s	 transcendental	
dualism	in	terms	of	the	problem	of	dialectical	logic?	What	does	it	mean	to	have	the	
duality	 of	 time	 and	 duration	 as	 the	 beginning	 or	 principle	 of	 everything	 for	
politics?			
We	began	 the	present	 investigation	with	 a	 remark	upon	 the	 impasse	 that	
besets	 philosophy	 after	 the	 materialist	 reversal	 of	 dialectic.	 After	 Marx’s	
determination	that	“Life	is	not	determined	by	consciousness,	but	consciousness	by	
Life”,	 philosophy	 has	 been	 one-sidedly	 deploying	 itself	 for	 the	 purpose	 of	 self-
critique.	 Predominantly,	 philosophy	 has	 come	 to	 see	 itself	 as	 the	 capacity	 to	
criticize	itself	as	the	product	of	material	history	and	performs	its	duty	of	criticizing	
itself	 or	 to	 distance	 itself	 from	 itself	 by	 conceding	 its	 ultimate	 powerlessness	 in	
front	of	the	true	logos	of	Life.	The	material	life-process,	which	has	come	to	occupy	
the	privileged	place	 of	 the	 “Demiurge	 of	 the	 real”,	 then	 structurally	 assumes	 the	
form	of	the	unknowable	Idea	and	the	materialist	reversal	of	idealism	ends	up	being	
the	“fulfilment”	of	Idealist	Metaphysics,	which	is	another	name	for	onto-theology	or	






which	 gives	us	no	 choice	but	 to	 see	ourselves	 as	 the	derivative	products	 of	 Life.	
Our	self-consciousness	has	thus	been	suffering	from	the	sense	of	powerlessness	to	
establish	 itself	 upon	 a	 new	 theory	 of	 Absolute	 Knowledge	 and	 this	 effectively	
undoes	 “the	 death	 of	 the	 abstraction	 of	 the	 divine	 Being”	 and	 the	 “one-sided	
extreme	 of	 the	 Self”.381 	We	 once	 again	 find	 ourselves	 within	 the	 antithetical	
opposition	 between	 consciousness	 and	 the	 Absolute	 and	 so	 the	 materialist	
reversal’s	 promise	 of	 liberation	 ends	 up	 being	 a	 false	 promise	 that	 repeats	 the	
same	old	mistake.	Against	the	predicament	of	historical	materialism	ending	up	as	a	
repetition	 of	 idealist	 metaphysics,	 the	 fundamental	 question	 that	 has	 motivated	
our	 project	 is:	 how	 can	 Bergson’s	 philosophy	 prepare	 the	 ground	 for	 a	 genuine	
form	 of	 politics	 or	 a	 genuine	 form	 of	 living	 after	 the	 materialist	 reversal	 of	
dialectic?		
Our	 central	 argument	has	been	 that	Bergson’s	method	of	 intuition	 can	be	
read	 in	 terms	of	a	materialist	 reversal	of	 the	 idealist	 theory	of	 intuition	which	 is	
not	only	capable	of	critiquing	the	determinateness	of	derivative	consciousness	but	
also	of	affirming	 the	Absolute	Self	 from	a	materialist	 standpoint.	By	qualitatively	
distinguishing	time	and	duration	and	granting	transcendental	status	to	both	terms,	
Bergson’s	 philosophy	 accomplishes	 the	 materialist	 reversal	 of	 intuition	 without	
nullifying	the	possibility	for	establishing	the	materialist	knowledge	of	the	Absolute	
Self.	 Having	 established	 the	 duality	 of	 time	 and	 duration	 as	 the	 transcendental	
condition	 of	 intuition,	 we	 can	 now	 directly	 raise	 questions	 regarding	 the	
consequence	 of	 having	 the	 duality:	 what	 benefit	 does	 the	 establishment	 of	
transcendental	duality	of	intuition	promise	for	politics	and	what	kind	of	living	does	
it	make	possible	as	a	result?		
In	many	ways,	 the	persistence	of	nihilism	 is	 equivalent	 to	our	 inability	 to	
become	 the	 free	 individuals	 that	 make	 their	 own	 history	 and	 it	 is	 of	 utmost	
importance	 for	 today’s	 philosophy	 to	 establish	 the	 condition	 of	 possibility	 for	 a	
genuine	form	of	human	freedom.	As	we	stated	in	the	 introduction,	what	we	have	








leads	 towards	 the	 so-called	 reasonable	 evolution	 and	 this	 is	 said	 to	 be	 the	 “true	
work	of	integration”	envisaged	as	“the	ultimate	end	of	philosophical	research”	[La	
démarche	 extrême	 de	 la	 recherché	 philosophique].383 	The	 establishment	 of	 the	
transcendental	duality	of	time	and	duration	is	our	attempt	to	clarify	the	condition	
of	this	“synthesis”,	which	is	promised	as	the	telos	towards	which	the	formation	of	
the	 method	 of	 intuition	 aims	 to	 prepare	 itself	 as	 an	 “artifice”	 for	 it.	 The	 final	
question	 we	 must	 therefore	 pose	 is:	 how	 can	 we	 understand	 the	 “free	 act”	 of	
“synthesis”	 as	 the	 end	 and	 what	 is	 the	 meaning	 of	 this	 end	 conceived	 as	 the	
“reasonable”,	 that	 is,	 rational,	evolution?	 Also,	what	 does	 it	mean	 to	 conceive	 of	




can	 be	 read	 in	 terms	 of	 a	 materialist	 reversal	 of	 the	 theory	 of	 intuition.	 If	 the	
transcendental	 dualism	 of	 time	 and	 duration	 delivers	 to	 us	 the	 materialist	
conception	of	intuition,	then	the	synthesis	of	reasonable	evolution	is	a	materialist	
conception	of	the	end.	In	what	sense	of	the	term	can	we	speak	of	the	synthesis	of	
reasonable	 evolution	 as	 the	 materialist	 conception	 of	 the	 end?	 Is	 not	 teleology	
precisely	what	constitutes	 the	pitfall	 that	 today’s	materialism	seeks	 to	deny	as	 it	
implies	a	determinism	or	a	belief	in	the	pre-given	destiny	of	history?	If	materialism	
is	 to	be	 seen	as	 teleological	 –	or	 if	 there	were	a	materialist	 teleology	 in	 the	 first	
place	–	can	we	still	call	it	a	materialism	which	is	supposed	to	be	an	overcoming	of	





Such,	 indeed,	was	 the	 sentence	 passed	 by	 the	 philosophers	 of	 the	 Eleatic	
school.	 [...]	 Experience	 confronts	 us	with	 becoming	 [présence	du	devenir]:	
that	is	sensible	reality.	But	the	intelligible	reality,	that	which	ought	to	be,	is	
more	 real	 still,	 and	 that	 reality	 does	 not	 change.	 Beneath	 the	 qualitative	
becoming,	 beneath	 the	 evolutionary	 becoming,	 beneath	 the	 extensive	
becoming,	 the	 mind	 must	 seek	 that	 which	 defies	 change,	 the	 definable	
quality,	 the	 form	 or	 essence,	 the	 end	 [la	 fin].	 Such	 was	 the	 fundamental	










Bergson,	 the	 idealism	 of	 the	 end	 has	 its	 origin	 in	 the	 mechanical/intellectualist	
view	of	the	universe	where	“all	is	given”	in	advance	and	is	based	upon	a	mistaken	
conception	of	time	that	produces	no	unforeseen	novelty.385	Instead,	Bergson	agues	
that	 what	 is	 real	 is	 the	 sensible	 qualitative	 becoming	 itself;	 the	 idea	 or	 the	
supposedly	pre-given	destination	of	 this	becoming	 is	something	that	 the	“bent	of	
our	intellectual	habits”	superimposes	upon	the	reality	of	becoming.386		
It	is	easy	to	see	that	this	opposition	against	the	ideal	end	is	equivalent	to	the	









end.	 No	 doubt,	 the	 materialist	 reversal	 endows	 philosophy	 with	 the	 means	 to	





protect	 itself	 from	 accidentally	 establishing	 the	 Idea	 of	 Nothingness	 or	 Chaos,	
which	is	still	determined	as	an	abstract	object	of	belief	and	hence	secretly	comes	to	
replace	God’s	old	position	as	the	external	author	of	history.	After	the	fictitiousness	















from	 one’s	 “free	 act”.	 Let	 us	 recall	 that	 of	 paramount	 importance	 is	 our	




are	 confronted	with	 the	 special	meaning	 of	 the	 human	 that	 differs	 in	 kind	 from	
how	 it	 is	 ordinarily	 defined	 with	 respect	 to	 its	 derivative	 characteristics.	 To	 be	
sure,	Bergson	also	speaks	of	the	human	in	terms	of	“the	impotence	of	speculative	
reason”	and	hence	in	terms	of	its	inability	for	the	free	act	of	synthesis.388	There	are,	
therefore,	 two	 radically	 different	 concepts	 of	 the	 human	 about	 which	 Bergson	
never	offers	a	sufficient	explanation	as	to	how	such	polyvocality	is	itself	possible.	
After	 criticising	 the	 derivative	 nature	 of	 the	 human	 consciousness,	 the	 question	
thus	 becomes:	 in	 what	 sense	 of	 the	 term	 does	 Bergson	 also	 speak	 of	 “man,	 the	
thinking	being”	who	is	capable	of	being	the	author	of	reasonable	evolution?			
	 Overall,	 our	 project	 of	 establishing	 the	 duality	 of	 intuition	 in	 Bergson’s	
philosophy	has	no	higher	aim	than	to	prepare	the	logical	ground	for	distinguishing	
two	 heterogeneous	 types	 of	 synthesis	 so	 as	 to	 distinguish	 two	 different	












sake	 of	attention	 to	Life.	Within	 this	 configuration,	 it	 is	 the	 synthesis	 of	 the	 Past	
that	 produces	 the	 “human”	 as	 its	 derivative	 product	 and	 the	 subjectivity	 of	 the	









synthesis	 is	outside	 the	subjectivity	of	 the	human	–	 it	 is	 the	Past	 that	determines	
the	present	and	the	future	of	the	human	out	of	its	freedom.			




whole	 point	 of	 us	 establishing	 the	 transcendental	 duality	 of	 intuition	 has	 been	
precisely	to	make	possible	a	higher	kind	of	synthesis	and	to	explain	the	condition	
of	 possibility	 for	 a	 different	 conception	 of	 the	 human	 as	well	 as	 of	 the	 end	with	
respect	 to	 it.	Whereas	 the	 synthesis	 of	 the	Past	 is	 the	 auto-differentiation	 of	 the	
Past	which	produces	the	present	as	well	as	the	future	as	the	derivative	products	of	
the	Past’s	negativity,	 the	 transcendental	dualism	we	have	put	 forth	also	captures	













up,	 neutralizes,	 and	 finally	 cancels	 historicity”	 of	 the	 “future-to-come”,	 the	
materialist	conception	of	telos	is	to	bring	about	the	indetermination	of	the	future	in	
the	 present	 so	 as	 to	 open	 up	 the	 condition	 for	 our	 free	 determination.390	The	
materialist	conception	of	the	end	is	therefore	not	something	that	presents	itself	as	
that	which	synthesizes	the	continuous	genesis	of	history	according	to	a	pre-given	
plan.	 Rather,	 it	 refers	 to	 human	 beings’	 free	act	 of	 synthesis	 and	 it	 is,	 as	Walter	
Benjamin	 says	 in	 Theses	 on	 the	 Philosophy	 of	 History,	 that	 which	 disrupts	 and	
“blasts	open”	the	“homogeneous	course	of	history”	and	prepares	the	ground	for	a	






difference	 between	 duration	 and	 time	 to	 which	 we	must	 return.	 By	 saying	 that	
Bergson’s	 transcendental	dualism	serves	as	 the	basis	 for	 the	distinction	between	
two	kinds	of	synthesis,	we	are	not	saying	that	it	is	duration	that	corresponds	to	the	
higher	synthesis	of	the	Present.	On	the	contrary,	the	second	kind	of	synthesis	is	the	
synthesis	 between	 time	and	 duration	 and	 it	 is	 hence	 that	which	 takes	both	 time	





since	 it	 involves	 no	 separation	 of	 terms	 between	before	 and	after	 without	 them	
being	 absolutely	 identical	 to	 each	 other.	 The	 pure	 heterogeneity	 of	 duration	
therefore	shall	not	be	confused	with	the	synthetic	identity	of	the	Past	in	the	case	of	












Hegel,	 stems	 from	 the	 conviction	 that	 there	 is	 a	 hidden	 source	 from	 which	 the	
determinate	 form	 of	 time	 springs	 forth.	 In	 fact,	 as	 we	 have	 seen	 in	 this	 thesis,	
Bergson	 speaks	 of	 “pure	 memory”	 and	 this	 conception	 closely	 resembles,	 as	
Deleuze	 points	 out,	 the	 Platonic	 theory	 of	 reminiscence	 which	 is	 effectively	
“ontological”	 in	 its	character.392	Indeed,	 in	this	sense,	Bergson’s	conception	of	the	
past	cannot	be	understood	as	the	former	present	but	it	is	the	present	that	springs	
forth	from	the	Past.		
Our	argument,	however,	 is	 that	 this	view	of	synthesis	 is	not	 the	only	view	




memory	and	 thus	seemingly	becomes	 fixed	as	 the	pure	object	of	 thought.	 In	 this	
way,	 it	 seems	 as	 if	 the	 concept	 of	memory	 is	 that	which	 turns	 duration	 into	 the	
abstract	 Idea	and	any	 “immediate”	 intuition	of	 the	Absolute	Self	 seems	 to	be	 the	
result	 of	 the	 auto-differentiation	 of	 the	 Idea.	 No	 matter	 how	 concrete	 the	 Idea	
becomes	within	the	development	of	history,	insofar	as	the	pure	Idea	is	grasped	as	
the	object	of	supra-sensuous/intellectual	 intuition,	the	purity	of	the	Absolute	Self	
eternally	 stays	 away	 from	 human	 consciousness.	 Based	 upon	 this	 configuration,	
Bergson’s	 philosophy	 could	 thus	 be	 accused	 of	 coming	 to	 present	 a	 solution	
equivalent	to	that	of	idealist	metaphysics	based	upon	the	ontological	conception	of	
the	pure	Past	and	memory	seems	 to	 function	 in	 the	same	way	as	 the	ontological	
copula	functions.	The	point,	however,	in	establishing	the	transcendental	dualism	of	
intuition	is	to	account	for	two	heterogeneous	ways	of	apprehending	the	purity	of	
the	 Absolute:	 one	 is	 through	 the	 supra-sensuous/intellectual	 intuition	 and	 the	
other	 is	 through	 the	 purely	 sensuous	 intuition.	 The	 very	 object	 of	 knowledge	 in	
both	 cases	 is	 the	 same	 but	 the	 manner	 of	 intuiting	 and,	 hence,	 of	 grasping	 the	
object	differs	radically.	As	such,	this	difference	in	method	effectively	produces	two	







of	 the	object	 to	 consciousness	 can	be	 summed	up	 in	 the	 following	way:	whereas	






of	 human	 consciousness.	 This	 is	 tantamount	 to	 saying	 that	 the	 object	 for	 both	
types	 of	 intuition	 is	 the	 Becoming	 or	 the	 synthetic	 middle	 that	 produces	 the	
actuality	 of	 the	 human	 experience	 by	 sublating	 the	 contradiction	 between	Being	
and	Thought.	Whereas	the	first	intuition	grasps	Becoming	as	such	in	the	synthetic	
middle	 that	 lies	 between	 two	 heterogeneous	 terms	 (i.e.	Being	 and	 Thought),	 the	
second	type	of	intuition	grasps	the	Absolute	Identity	of	the	heterogeneous	as	such	
of	the	middle.	In	other	words,	the	Becoming	grasped	through	the	apprehension	of	
Duration	 “is”	 the	 middle	 and	 it	 immediately	 “is”	 the	 Absolute	 Identity	 of	 the	
heterogeneous	as	such.	Duration	therefore	does	not	stem	from	a	synthesis	but	it	“is”	
immediately	 identical	 to	 the	 very	 Being	 of	 Becoming;	 it	 is	 identical	 to	 the	 very	
source	of	the	synthetic	identity	between	heterogeneous	terms.	In	short,	duration	is	
Life	in-itself	and	it	is	identical	with	the	very	Being	of	the	synthesis.			
Inasmuch	 as	 time	 is	 that	which	 conditions	 the	 uniquely	 “human”	 form	 of	
consciousness	 and	 duration	 is	 the	 Other	 of	 time,	 what	 is	 known	 through	 the	
apprehension	of	duration	is	precisely	the	Other	of	Man	or	it	is	that	from	which	the	
human	 springs	 forth.	 The	 transcendental	 duality	 of	 intuition	 therefore	 grasps	
within	intuition	both	the	coming	into	being	of	the	human	as	the	derivative	product	
of	 Life	 as	well	 as	 the	 very	Being	of	 the	 source	of	 the	human,	which	 is	 Life	 itself.	
Now,	 if	 intuition	 contains	 both	 the	 human	 and	 its	 source,	 what	 becomes	 of	 the	
bearer	of	 this	duality?	The	 special	meaning	with	which	Bergson	 speaks	of	 “man,	




admits	 and	 expounds	 upon	 the	 existence	 of	 the	 synthesis	 of	 the	 past	 which	
conditions	the	coming	 into	being	of	 time	out	of	 the	synthetic	 identity	of	 the	past.	
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This	synthesis	constitutes	the	reason	of	the	becoming	of	the	human	being	insofar	
as	 the	 human	 is	 the	passive	product	 of	 the	 synthesis	 and	 insofar	 as	 its	 course	 of	
becoming	 is	determined	 in	accordance	to	an	end	that	 lies	within	the	synthesis	of	
the	past.	Whether	 it	calls	 itself	 idealism	or	materialism,	the	conception	of	history	
this	 synthesis	 gives	birth	 to	 is	deterministic	 in	nature.	 Since	 the	 synthesis	of	 the	
past	is	what	explains	the	coming	into	being	of	time	and	time	is	the	transcendental	
horizon	 of	 the	 human	 subjectivity,	 the	 past	 takes	 up	 the	 role	 of	 the	 mystical	
bestower	of	the	destiny	of	the	becoming	of	the	human	being	and	the	future	of	the	
human	is	indiscernible	with	its	fate	from	which	the	human	is	alienated.			
The	 transcendental	 dualism	 of	 intuition	 contains	 within	 itself	 the	






Insofar	 as	 the	 apprehension	 of	 duration	 is	 directed	 towards	 the	 Absolute	 Self,	
which	 is	 the	 source	 of	 time,	 the	 object	 of	 intuition	 in	 the	 case	 of	 duration	 is	
identical	 to	 the	 pure,	 immemorial	 past	 seen	 from	 the	 side	 of	 time.	 However,	
duration	 is	 the	 immediate	 apprehension	 of	 the	 Absolute	 within	 pure	 sensuous	
perception	 and	 it	 is	 that	 which	 grasps	 the	 in-itself	 of	 the	 past	 –	 not	 as	 the	
retrospective	object	of	 thought	solely	 inferred	 from	 its	products	but	as	an	actual	
datum	 of	 sense	 perception	 and	 hence	 as	 actually	 existing	 as	 the	 independent	
dimension	of	 the	not-yet	or	the	 future	as	such.	Through	this	operation,	which	 is	a	
kind	of	conversion	of	 consciousness	 that	gives	birth	 to	a	new	subjective	position,	
what	was	 seen	as	 the	pure	 immemorial	past	 gets	outside	of	 itself	 and	 reappears	
instead	 as	 actually	 existing	datum	of	 experience	within	 the	different	 form	of	 the	
present.	 Within	 this	 new	 subjective	 consciousness,	 the	 Absolute	 is	 no	 longer	 a	
mere	object	of	belief	that	hovers	over	the	derivative	consciousness	and	determines	
its	 becoming	 from	without.	 The	 apprehension	 of	 duration	 disrupts	 the	 synthetic	







Overall,	 the	ultimate	end	of	 the	Bergsonian	method	of	 intuition	 is	 to	disentangle	
the	circular	continuity	of	 the	past	(which	virtually	contains	within	 itself	both	 the	
present	 and	 the	 future)	 so	 that	 the	 new	 form	 of	 the	 present	 can	 emerge	 as	 the	
condition	for	the	synthesis	between	that	which	has	been	produced	by	the	past	and	
that	which	is	not	yet	or	the	future	as	such.	“Man,	the	thinking	being”	is	none	other	
than	 that	which	 resides	 in	 this	new	 form	of	 the	present,	which	apprehends	both	
the	past	and	the	future	as	its	elements	of	synthesis.	Having	the	duality	means	that	
the	sense	through	which	the	becoming	of	human	being	is	understood	as	well	as	the	
conception	of	 the	end	to	which	 the	becoming	 is	 directed	undergo	 a	 fundamental	
transformation.	From	seeing	itself	solely	as	the	finite	being	that	is	determined	from	
without,	the	human	being	comes	to	know	itself	as	the	duality	of	the	finite	and	the	
infinite	 and	 hence	 comes	 to	 know	 itself	 as	 more	 than	 human.	 This	 self-
consciousness	 of	 the	 duality	 results	 in	 a	 fundamental	 transformation	 of	 the	
meaning	 of	 the	 human	 as	 such:	 “the	 human”	 comes	 to	 understand	 itself	 as	 the	
overcoming	of	the	human,	 simultaneously	occupying	both	 the	place	of	 the	human	
and	 its	 Other.	 If	 we	 adopt	 Nietzsche’s	 vocabulary,	 the	 human	 being	 overcomes	
itself	and	becomes	the	Overman	[Ubermensch].	
This	 transformation	 of	 the	 human	 being,	 then,	 is	 also	 the	 fundamental	
transformation	 of	 the	 experience	 of	 the	 present	 as	 such.	 The	 present	 therefore	
comes	to	be	understood	as	the	site	where	the	overcoming	of	the	past	takes	place.	It	
is	 the	place	of	both	an	acknowledgement	of	 the	 force	of	 the	past	as	well	as	of	an	
awareness	of	the	potentiality	for	a	new	becoming.	“Man”	in	the	sense	that	Bergson	











One	 might	 ask	 a	 final	 question:	 how	 can	 the	 human	 jump	 out	 of	 the	
historical	forces	of	determination	and	become	the	new	human	being	that	is	capable	
of	producing	one’s	own	history?	To	become	the	producer	of	one’s	own	history:	does	
this	 not	 rather	 indicate	 the	 self-centred	 belief	of	 the	 human	 being	 that	 seeks	 to	












disappears	 in	 front	of	our	eyes	and	what	we	have	 instead	 is	 its	 illusory	 shadow.	
The	 fact	 that	 the	 two	 kinds	 of	 synthesis	 are	 distinguished	 upon	 a	
transcendental/logical	 basis	 means	 that	 no	 theory	 of	 historical	 development	 can	
explain	the	becoming	of	human	being	from	one	to	another.	If	the	synthesis	of	the	
present	 is	 to	 be	 seen	 as	 that	 which	 comes	 after	 the	 synthesis	 of	 the	 past	 in	 a	
chronological	fashion,	this	would	be	to	argue	that	the	second	type	of	human	being	
and	 the	 higher	 synthesis	 would	 be	 the	 result	 of	 the	 historical	 evolution	 of	 the	
human.	 Put	 differently,	 the	 higher	 synthesis	would	 be	 the	 future	 product	 of	 the	
pre-given	destiny	of	 the	historical	development	that	governs	the	movement,	as	 it	
were,	from	a	point	A	to	a	point	B	on	the	line	of	temporal	development.	In	this	way,	
the	 transcendental	 difference	 between	 the	 past	 and	 the	 future	 would	 be	
obliterated	and	we	would	confuse	the	higher	synthesis	with	the	future	becoming	of	
the	 synthesis	 of	 the	 past.	 The	 new	 would	 be	 forever	 subordinated	 under	 the	
determination	of	 the	past	and	whatever	development	one	would	 find	 in	 the	new	
product	would	be	 the	result	of	 the	historical	 synthesis	of	 the	past.	Again,	history	
would	look	like	a	theatre	that	showcases	the	new	in	terms	of	the	re-appearance	of	






Bergson	 states:	 “humanity	 lies	 groaning,	 half	 crushed	 beneath	 the	 weight	 of	 its	
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